t 




THE 



CRIMEAN COMMISSION 

AND THE 

CHELSEA BOARD: 



A REVIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND REPORT OF THE 

BOARD, 



BY 

COLONEL TULLOCH, 



LATE COMMISSIONER IN THE CRIMEA. 



LONDON: 
HARRISON, 59, PALL MALL, 

EDINBURGH : EDMONSTON AND DOUGLAS ; DUBLIN : ALEX. THOM AND SON. 

* 1 85 7. 



Int'i Exchange 1 



AUG 1? m2 ] 



//// 



INTRODUCTION. 



as 



n, HE circumstances which have led to the present publica- 
'. are almost too well known to require explanation, and 
ave rather to excuse myself for having delayed it so 
r , than to offer any apology for now entering on the 
subject. 

Sir John McNeill and I, having, in February 1855, 
been sent out as Commissioners to inquire into the supplies 
of the Army in the Crimea, submitted, in J anuary following, 
two detailed Reports on that subject, to the Secretary of 
State for War, which, having been presented to Parliament, 
created considerable excitement against the officers supposed 
to be responsible for the due application of these supplies to 
the wants of the troops. 

In consequence of the representations of these officers a 
Military Board was assembled at Chelsea on 3rd April last, 
with the view — not merely of hearing such explanation as 
they might have to offer, but with instructions so to direct 
its inquiries f that the truth should be made manifest, WarSntfp.'l 
" and that iustice should be done to all parties." Before ° f Board ' s 

J 1 Proceedings. 

that Board I ultimately felt compelled to appear, under the 
circumstances hereafter detailed. 

Severe illness, brought on by incessant labour for several 
weeks in a most unusual, harrassing, and painful duty, 

? 2 



iv INTRODUCTION. 

unsupported by any legal assistance,* prevented my attendance 
at the Board after the 5th May, and till lately rendered me 
incapable of any prolonged mental exertion. 

A Report of the Board, adverse to the conclusions of my 
colleague and myself, having, immediately before the proro- 
gation, been presented to Parliament, I feel it my duty, 
before it re-assembles, to fulfil the obligation originally in- 
curred in appearing at Chelsea, by submitting, through the 
medium of these pages, all that I should have stated, had my 
health permitted me to be present till the Board closed its 
proceedings. 

Before doing so, however, I must be permitted to notice 
and comment upon some serious and radical defects in the 
constitution of the Board. 

1. The want of all local experience on the part of its 

members. 

2. The manner in which they were chosen for the duty. 

3. The objectionable selection of the witnesses, 

4. The absence of proper intimation to the Commis- 

sioners of the animadversions to be inquired into. 

On each of these I propose offering a few observations 
by way of illustration. 

The first and most important requisite for any inquiry of 
this kind, where so much depended on the circumstances in 
which the Army had been placed, was local knowledge. 
Owing to the want of it, the Sebastopol Committee had 
already felt its inadequacy to deal thoroughly with the 
subject, and my colleague and I were sent out to obtain, 
on the spot, that information which had been vainly 
sought at a distance. When, therefore, it was considered 
expedient to assemble a Board for the purpose of testing the 
accuracy of our Report, it was, certainly, not too much to 
expect, that it should have been composed of persons pos- 

* The offer of legal assistance was not made to me till the 17th April. See 
letter of Mr. Peel, No. 9 of Appendix. 



INTRODUCTION. V 

sessing, at least, equal opportunities of information, and fully 
acquainted with all that had taken place during the eventful 
period to which it referred. 

To review the labours of two Commissioners, who had 
spared neither time nor trouble to make themselves 
fully acquainted with all these matters on the spot, was, 
in itself, a most unusual proceeding ; but, to do so through 
the medium of officers not possessing even the first requisite 
for accurate conclusions, was to recognize the hitherto 
unheard-of principle, that want of experience in the Crimea 
was the most suitable qualification for the solution of all 
Crimean difficulties ; and absence of local information the 
fittest test for deciding questions mainly dependent on local 
circumstances. 

Not one of the seven Members composing the Board had 
ever been in the Crimea ; and a reference to its proceedings 
will show that no General, nor any officers who had com- 
manded corps in that country, during the period under 
review, were examined in regard to the events then passing, 
except a few belonging to the Cavalry, who were directly 
or indirectly interested in the result. I point this out in 
no spirit of disrespect to the Board, but as a possible 
means of accounting for the errors and omissions by which 
their .Report is characterized. 

Most persons, civil or military, will admit that one of the 
greatest safeguards in the formation of every court is the 
precaution of choosing its members — not according to the 
arbitrary selection of any individual, but according to an 
established roster from which the required number is taken. 
In the Chelsea Board, however, this principle was completely 
violated. I do not suppose, far less allege, that this was done 
with any object hostile to the Commissioners; but, that 
seven General Officers and a Secretary should have been 
selected all of one political bias, was in itself a circum- 
stance sufficiently remarkable to shake public confidence in 
the result. Even the Judge- Advocate-General felt himself 



si 



INTKODUCTIOX. 



compelled to allude to this peculiarity in the construction of 
the Court as follows :* 

" The noble Lord complains that the inquiry was 
6e political in its character, owing to the circumstance of the 
(t Judge-Advocate being a Minister and attending the Court. 
" Sir, so totally opposed is this to the fact that I solemnly 
" declare that I never, during the whole inquiry, asked or 
" heard what were the politics of the General Officers, of 
Ci which I knew nothing, with the exception of the three who 
** were in Parliament ; but since the noble lord has made this 
(( assertion I have inquired, and upon credible information I 
** have learnt that every one of the General Officers is of the 
ee same political party as himself. ('Hear/ and a laugh.) 
Cf And, besides that, there was a gentleman who acted as 
" private secretary to Sir Alexander Woodford who was in 
" the room the whole time when the doors were closed, who, 
** as I believe, was a private friend, and, as I know, was a 
" strong political partisan of the noble lord, so that he had 
Ci everything in his favour ; and the noble lord's judges, they 
" who tried him, and who judged and acquitted him, were all 
tf his own political partisans. (Cheers.) 

I am just as little disposed as the Judge- Advocate- 
General to infer that this selection was made with any 
ulterior views; but all who value the semblance even, of 
fairness, must admit, that it would have been better had the 
Court been otherwise constituted. 

As the Board did not contain in itself the elements of 
proper information, it was obviously the more requisite that 
arrangements should have been made to bring home those 
witnesses from the Crimea on whose statements the Report 
of the Commissioners had been founded, or, such of them 
at least, as they considered essential to the establishment of 
any facts, the accuracy of which was questioned. 

* Vide Speech of Judge Advocate General in the House of Commons on 
the 21st July last, in reply to Lord Lucan's statement in the House of Lords. 



INTRODUCTION. 



vii 



While, however, the officers, who complained of the 
alleged animadversions in their Report, were afforded every 
facility in this respect at the expence of the public, no steps 
were taken to ensure any similar advantage to the Commis- 
sioners, though, when a Board of Officers in London were to 
sit in judgment upon evidence taken in the Crimea, it was 
most essential they should have the parties who gave that 
evidence before them. The first official intimation, however, 
that the Commissioners received of the existence of the Board, 
was a notification, dated 4th April, 1856, from Mr. Peel, 
that the General Officers wished them to be informed that 
they would commence proceedings on the 7th of that month. 

To the fairness of such an inquiry, it was further essential 
that the Commissioners should have been informed, in due 
time, of the animadversions complained of, that they might 
be prepared with evidence to establish their statements ; but 
in the cases of Sir Richard Airey and Colonel Gordon, all 
information of this kind was w ithheld : indeed, up to the 
very hour when these officers opened their cases, not the 
slightest hint had been conveyed to either of the Commis- 
sioners of the parts of the Report intended to be assailed, or 
whether objections were to be raised at all. 

A Board thus constituted, and of which public rumour 
predicted the object and the verdict, even before the pro- 
ceedings commenced, my colleague and I could scarcely 
have been expected to recognize ]; but events soon proved 
that we stood in very different positions as regarded our 
obligations in this respect, Sir John McNeill being uncon- 
nected with the military profession, the decision of seven 
General Officers, whether adverse or otherwise, could not 
have affected him ; but it might have had a very material 
influence upon my future career, for however slight the 
effect it might have produced elsewhere, any opinion coming 
from such a body could not be otherwise than deferred to, 
by the General Commanding-in-Chief who had appointed 
them. My colleague and I were consequently no longer on 



viii 



INTRODUCTION. 



the same footing, — to him the decision of the Board could 
be of no moment — to me, though no party to its constitution, 
it might be fraught with very serious consequences. 

Even this risk, however, I might have encountered in 
order to retain the valued co-operation of my colleague ; but 
in the opening of the proceedings regarding the Cavalry, 
assertions were made before the Board by Lord Lucan seri- 
ously affecting my character as an Officer, as he expressly 
charged me with having made a Report " totally at variance 
u with the fact and truth," with ee having invidiously made 
" statements for the purpose of throwing discredit on the 
" Cavalry," and with having been actuated by motives of 
" malice and malignity" towards that body. 

To have allowed such a charge to pass unnoticed, even 
if casually made, would be in direct opposition to the usual 
practice in the Army; but to sit tamely under it when 
deliberately uttered before a Board of General Officers, 
not one of whom made the slightest attempt to protect an 
absent man, would have indicated a want of spirit and feeling, 
ill becoming a member of my profession. 

The course usual on such occasions in the army is for the 
Officer accused to take steps to clear his character^ by 
requesting a Court of Inquiry ; but the Board was already 
sitting in that capacity : I saw no alternative, therefore, but 
to appear before it, even at the risk of sacrificing the benefit 
I should have otherwise derived from the advice and co- 
operation of my colleague. 

Lord Lucan subsequently expressed his regret for 
having attributed such motives to me ; but this came 
too late to prevent my being forced, in my own defence, 
before a Court, to the constitution and proceedings of which, 
I entertained objections quite as decided as Sir John McNeill. 

Though this circumstance, much to my regret, rendered 
a separate course of action necessary, it never for a moment 
interrupted that unanimity of feeling with which my col- 
league and I had so long laboured to accomplish the great 



INTRODUCTION. 



ix 



object of our mission. In evidence of this I have much 
pleasure in annexing two letters from Sir John McNeill, the No. 1 and 2 of 
one addressed to the Secretary of State for War immediately Appeadlx 
after the presentation of our Report to Parliament, the other 
addressed to myself, on receiving the proofs of this volume, 
which I had forwarded for his perusal. 

What took place after I appeared, up to the period 
when I was suddenly attacked by severe illness it is 
unnecessary for me to comment upon ; but surely I had 
a right to expect, that, though absent, my reputation 
would have been safe under the protection of the Board, 
and that no statement to my prejudice would have been 
admitted into their Report, except upon the clearest and 
most unquestionable evidence; that, above all, care would 
have been taken to sift that evidence thoroughly, considering 
that it was not given upon oath, and that almost every 
witness was directly, or indirectly, interested in discrediting 
the statements of the Commissioners. 

In reviewing the Board's proceedings it will be observed 
that I have selected — not any particular part or parts of their 
Report, for I am well aware that there are few inquiries of an 
extensive nature, in which some mistakes may not be found ; 
but, even at the risk of being tedious, I have gone through 
the whole, taking every section seriatim, and I trust I have 
been able satisfactorily to show that it presents features of 
so extraordinary a character as to deserve the serious con- 
sideration of every one who wishes well to the profession of 
Arms, or is interested in the reputation of those who belong 
to it. 

But, the injury such a Report might have done to me 
individually, sinks into insignificance when compared with 
its effect, present, and prospective upon the Service ; for 
what hope can reasonably be entertained that the same 
frightful calamities may not occur again, if a Board of 
General Officers gravely arrive at the conclusion that these 
were solely attributable to the want of pressed hay from 



X 



INTRODUCTION. 



England ? Whether such a conclusion is warranted by the 
evidence, and whether hay would have supplied the men 
with fresh meat ; recovered the clothing lying useless in their 
squad-bags and knapsacks ; provided fresh bread, and sup- 
plied lime-juice and medicine for the sick; roasted green- 
coffee for the healthy; and secured shelter for the horses 
which perished, because, nothing was done, in one Brigade, 
at least, for their protection, the public will now be able to 
decide for themselves. I can only say that I would prefer 
such a conclusion being promulgated to the world under the 
authority of seven General Officers, rather than by any 
statement of my colleague and myself. 

It requires no demonstration to show, that could we 
conscientiously have disposed of the question in this sum- 
mary manner, it would have been our best interest to have 
done so. As regards myself in particular, many painful cir- 
cumstances have resulted from arriving at conclusions of a 
different complexion. 

For upwards of twenty years I had been constantly em- 
ployed at the War Office, either as Military Superintendent of 
Pensioners, or in other duties connected with the admin- 
istration of the Army. During that period I had always 
been on the best possible terms with the Staff at the Horse 
Guards, and from the late Commander-in-chief in particular, 
under whom, when Secretary at War, I had served for 
several years, I received, previous to leaving England, the 
strongest mark of confidence, in his suggestino; that I should 
have the local rank of a General Officer in the Crimea, 
to place me on the same footing as the British Com- 
missioner with the French army, and in a position better 
corresponding to the heavy responsibilities likely to devolve 
upon me, than my present rank of Colonel. 

It may, therefore, be supposed with what feelings of 
regret I found it my duty, to join with my colleague, in 
reporting that defective departmental arrangements in the 
Crimea had contributed, in no inconsiderable degree, to the 



INTRODUCTION. 



sufferings of the troops, and in pointing out that the system 
hitherto relied on as sufficient to provide for every emergency, 
had totally failed under the exigencies of the Crimean 
Campaign. 

There was every inducement, too, of professional sym- 
pathy, in my case at least, to have prevented any allusion to 
the delay of the Cavalry in sheltering their horses; but 
fortunate was it for the Commissioners that, in the stern path 
of their duty, they allowed no such consideration to weigh 
with them ; otherwise, in how discreditable a position would 
they have been placed when the publication of the censures 
in Lord Lucan's Divisional Orders, hereafter referred to, 
revealed that important fact. 

It has been maintained, however, both by Lord Lucan 
and Sir Richard Airey, that the Commissioners were under 
no obligation to report at all, except on Commissariat matters, 
and that in doing so they exceeded their instructions. In 
making such an assertion, these officers must have omitted 
to refer to the second letter of instructions received by the 
Commissioners the day previous to their leaving England, 
and which was as follows : — 

" War Department, 22nd February ', 1855. 

" Referring to your instructions of the 19th instant, I have further 
a to desire that you will make it your business to ascertain what may 
" have been the sources of supply of provisions, forage, and other articles 
" supplied to the troops in the Crimea. 

" You will further make inquiry into the alleged delay in unshipping 
" and distributing the clothing and other stores supplied for the use of the 
" Troops, and, having obtained all the information in your power, you 
" will submit to me a full report on the subject. 

" I am, &c." 

PANMURE. 

Xothing, surely, could have been more explicit than 
this ; and, accordingly, several months after forwarding a 
preliminary Report respecting the supplies more immediately 
under the charge of the Commissariat, the Commissioners 



xii 



INTRODUCTION. 



submitted a second Report, confined exclusively to the 
clothing and other stores referred to in their last letter of 
instructions. 

The mere circumstance, however, of the former of these 
Reports being dated from Constantinople, and the latter 
from England, has been gravely commented upon as an 
objection, though they would, in the opinion of most persons, 
have been far more exceptionable, could it have been alleged 
that they were prepared, amid all the din and bustle of 
daily warfare in the Crimea, so opposed to that calm exa- 
mination and careful consideration which the subject, as 
well as the extent and intricacy of the materials, required. 

That the Commissioners spared no pains in collecting the 
information which was to form the basis of their Reports, 
will, I apprehend, be conceded even by those who have been 
foremost to question their accuracy ; but it is necessary to 
explain that, with regard to a most important part illustrative 
of the enormous mortality in some corps compared with 
others, they laboured under the very serious disadvantage 
that, while their conclusions and deductions were published, 
the facts on which they had been founded were only partially 
made known. 

At a very early stage of their inquiry the Commissioners 
saw the necessity, before venturing on any report as to the 
sufferings of the troops from the non-distribution of the 
supplies, into which they were specially directed to inquire, 
that the extent of the sickness and mortality during the 
previous winter, and the diseases which occasioned it, should 
be carefully examined. It is true they had no authority for 
this extension of their inquiries ; but the verbal statements 
made to them on this subject were so overwhelming in some 
instances, and so conflicting in othv.rs, that it appeared abso- 
lutely requisite to test them by numerical evidence before 
allowing them to influence their conclusions. The medical 
officers of corps supplied the information readily, as affording 
one of the best evidences of their unparalleled exertions, 



INTRODUCTION. 



xiii 



and of the difficulties they had to contend with, at a time 
when the whole army was, in a manner, one vast hospital. 

Information thus cheerfully given, the Commissioners felt 
assured they could not be wrong in receiving, and arranging 
in such a manner as to exhibit the results in a comprehensive 
form ; but, appreciating an objection which was made to 
publishing such facts while the war continued, and every 
exertion was still requisite to recruit the Army to its full 
establishment, they at considerable disadvantage restricted 
themselves on that occasion to a mere statement of the 
total loss. The necessity for withholding such information 
having now, however, happily passed away, I am permitted 
in justification of the conclusions at which my colleague 
and I arrived, to submit it to the public, as well as some 
details relative to the amount of duty performed by the 
force in front during; the winter. 

From this information, the particulars of which are 
given in the latter part of this volume, it will be found 
that after dividing, according to the several arms of the ser- 
vice in which it occurred, the aggregate loss from sickness 
alone, during the winter of 1854-55, in the Crimean army, 
including what took place at Scutari, and on the passage, 
the following results are obtained : — 

The average loss of Infantry, as roughly estimated in the 

Commissioner's Keport, was 39 per cent. 

But in the Naval Brigade, which took a 
very prominent part in the operations 

during the whole siege, it was under 4 per cent. 

The loss of Cavalry was 15 per cent. 

Of Artillery 18 per cent. 

While the loss of Officers, of all arms, was 

about 6 per cent. 

But dividing the Infantry into groups, according to the 
periods of their arrival in the Crimea and the localities they 
occupied, the following are the results : — 



xiv 



INTRODUCTON. 



The average loss of four regiments which 
arrived in and about January, and did 
not for nearly a month take any part of 
the duties in the front was only .... 7 per cent. 

The average of four other regiments, which 
arrived in December, and were sent im- 
mediately to the front, was .... .... 27 per cent. 

In the Highland Brigade, stationed at Bala- 

klava, the average was .... .... 24 per cent. 

While in the regiments employed in front, 
on which the duties of the siege chiefly 
devolved, the average was .... .... 45 per cent. 

And in eight of these corps which suffered 

most, it was 73 per cent. 

This loss, be it observed, occurred within the short 
period of seven months, and was exclusive of men killed in 
action, or who died of their wounds. How far it may have 
been caused by the privations of the troops hereafter referred 
to — how far attributable to the excessive amount of duty 
they had to perform, the details of which are fully given at 
the end of this volume, must remain matter of conjecture ; 
but that it could not have been in any important degree the 
result of climate, must be inferred from the circumstance of 
this loss having occurred in a country which, by the con- 
current testimony of nearly all the Medical Officers, as well 
as the experience of the following year, appears to have 
been almost as healthy as Great Britain, except perhaps as 
regards Cholera. 

Out of about 10,000° men who died during these seven 
months, belonging to the Crimean Army, only 1,200 were 
cut off by that epidemic, the remainder perished by no foe- 
man's hand — no blast of pestilence, but from the slow, though 
sure, operation of disease, produced by causes, most of which 
appeared capable at least of mitigation. 

Compared with this, the mortality in our Army on all 
previous occasions sinks into comparative insignificance ; even 



INTRODUCTION. 



XV 



that of Walcherenj which threw the nation into mourning, 
and for years convulsed our Senate, did not exceed a fourth 
part of the average here recorded. Armies have perished 
by the sword — they have been overwhelmed by the elements, 
but never, perhaps, since the hand of the Lord smote the 
Host of the Assyrians, and they perished in a night, has 
such a loss from disease been recorded as on this occasion. 

With the graves of ten thousand of their countrymen 
before their eyes, with the mouldering remains of Britain^ 
choicest Cavalry beneath their feet, and with an overwhelm- 
ing mass of evidence in their possession, to show how much 
of this loss might have been averted by a proper application 
of the supplies, could the Commissioners be expected to 
arrive at the conclusion of the Board of General Officers, 
that for all this no one in the Crimea was to blame. 

I have only to request those who are interested in the 
solution of this important question to peruse the following 
remarks on the Proceedings and Report of the Board and to 
judge for themselves. 

ALEX. M. TULLOCH, 
Colonel, 

Late Commissioner in the Crimea, 

63, Eaton Square, London, 

24th January, 1857. 



REMARKS 

ON 

THE PEOCEEDINGS AND EEPOET 

OF THE 

BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS 

APPOINTED TO TN QUIRE INTO THE STATEMENTS OF 

SIR JOHN McNEILL and colonel tulloch, 

ANIMADVERTING UPON THE CONDUCT OF CERTAIN OFFICERS ON THE GENERAL 
STAFF, AND OTHERS, IN THE ARMY OF THE CRIMEA. 



Following out the coarse indicated in the pre- 
ceding Introduction, I now' propose adverting to the 
case of each complainant in the succession adopted by 
the Board. First in order comes that of 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL THE EARL OF 
LUCAN. 

The first point to which Lord Lucan directed the 
attention of the Board of General Officers, was the 
alleged inaccuracy of "the Calculations of the Com- 
missioners with respect to the Deaths of the Cavalry 
Horses." The paragraph objected to by him is in 
the following terms : — 

" With reference to the effect of the deficiency of forage, and Page 20 of 
the other privations to which the horses of the army were exposed, Commission- 
we have ascertained the loss among them, from various causes, in ers R e P ort ' 
the Cavalry and Artillery. A summary of the Returns obtained 
on that head will be found at page 193 of Appendix, which shows 

B 



2 



the loss attributable to sickness to be as follows, for the six months 
from October to March inclusive : — 

Strength DIed b ^ Rates per Cent 
b ' Sickness. of Deaths. 

Heavy Cavalry . . 1055 - 493 - 47 

Light Cavalry .. 1161 - 439 - 38 

Artillery.. 2832 - 1190 - 42 

5048 2122 42 

On this head the Board reported as follows : — 

Page IV. of " W e are Q f opinion that the mode in which the percentage of 

^ovt^' 8 deaths nas been stated by the Commissioners is calculated to convey 

p01 ' an erroneous impression, inasmuch as, though the figures are 

perfectly accurate, neither the rate percentage of deaths, contained 
in the table given at pnge 21 of the Report, nor the percentage of 
deaths according to the average strength given in the summary 
subsequently furnished by Colonel Tulloch, give the actual percentage 
of mortality." 

I regret that Lord Lucan had nothing of more 
general interest with which to commence his objec- 
tion s, than so intricate a matter as the best mode of 
calculating percentages of mortal ity . If, from the want 
of acquaintance with such subjects, the Board were 
unable to come to any decision as to what the proper 
rate should be, it appears rather an unusual course to 
find fault with the Commissioners for giving their 
view according to the best information they could 
obtain. That information, though based upon the 
numbers originally landed in the Crimea, had, at least, 
the advantage of being divested of all the complica- 
tion consequent on the daily changes in the force 
which decreased so rapidly by death, that it was 
manifestly beyond the power of figures to present any 
result which would not have been liable to some 
exception. 

Whenever the Board are prepared to olfer a 
better solution of the question than that given by 
the Commissioners I shall be ready to join issue with 
them on the subject, but till they do so I must rest 
satisfied with the admission that the figures of the 
Commissioners " are perfectly accurate.'' 

The Board do not seem to have been aware that 



3 



percentages of mortality are, at best, only approxima- 
tive results, and that on precisely the same principle, 
though in a minor degree, objections might be taken 
by them to all the calculations which form the basis 
of the Vital Statistics of this country. To remove 
every difficulty on a question which, unfortunately, 
the Board did not appear to understand, I offered to 
refer the calculations to Dr. Fan* of the Statistical 
branch in the Registrar-General's Department, as 
being probably the best qualified person in the king- 
dom to offer an opinion ; but I regret that they neither 
availed themselves of that source of information, nor 
inserted in their Report a letter from that gentleman, 
confirmatory of the calculations objected to by them. 

The second objection refers to the loss of Cavalry 
horses as compared with that of the Commissariat 
baggage animals, in regard to which the Commis- 
sioners had reported that — 

" On referring to the loss sustained by the Commissariat animals Co ^ a J^ s ' 2 * n * 
during the same period, it will be found rather less than in the ers » Report " 
Cavalry or Artillery, the deaths among them having, according to a 
Return furnished by Deputy Commissary-General Adams, amounted 
to 889 out of 2,329 orginally imported into the Crimea, or in the 
proportion of 38 per cent, a result which could scarcely have been 
expected, considering the advantages which cavalry horses might 
be supposed to have over hard-worked baggage animals, to whom 
little attention could be paid at such a period." 

On this the Board of General Officers came to 
the following conclusion : — 

" We are not enabled to offer an opinion thereon, as, on Page IV. 
examining the Returns which were furnished to us by the Audit ° f Board s 
Office relative to the matter in question, we found that the difficul- ei>01 ' 
ties of ascertaining the periods at which the Commissariat animals 
arrived in the Crimea, and of distinguishing between those lost or 
stolen, and those that died, were so great, as to render any com- 
parison of deaths between them and the Cavalry impossible. 1 ' 

The circumstance of the Board not being able, in 
this matter either, to offer any opinion, is not, I pre- 
sume, to invalidate that expressed by the Commis- 
sioners, who. had better opportunity for research, and 
perhaps a greater disposition to exercise it. Many 

b2 



4 



cases will be quoted throughout this volume, in which 
the Board have been unable to avail themselves of 
information, even when in a more tangible form ; and^ 
therefore, their failure in this instance to come to any 
satisfactory conclusions, however much to be re- 
gretted, will not, perhaps, excite much surprise. 

Had the Board, instead of referring to the Audit 
Office, consulted the different volumes and documents 
Page (jo, 3rd before them, particularly those noted on margin, a 
wpoT Commit- ^ r approximation to the dates of arrival of most of 
tee, also p. 460 the baggage animals might have been obtained ; and 
BoarS^sReport! nac ^ they then assumed, even the whole number unac- 
counted for, as deaths, they would have found the loss 
not to have equalled that sustained by the Cavalry. 

Leaving, however, these statistical questions to 
remain a matter of opinion, I shall proceed to that 
portion of the inquiry which tends to show how the 
horses died, and why they died, as to which, Lord 
Lucan's information is, fortunately, of a more definite 
description. 

One of the main causes of the heavy loss among 
the Cavalry, both with respect to men and horses, was 
the want of shelter during the severity of winter in 
the Crimea, and as that arm of the service appeared 
to have had considerable facilities, compared with the 
rest of the army, for providing shelter, and as they 
had been ordered to provide it several months before 
they did so, the Commissioners considered it their 
duty, in accounting for the non- application of the 
hutting supplies sent out from England, to make the 
following observations : — 

Page 36 of " The date at which the hutting of the Cavalry commenced was, 

Report. i n n0 case, earlier than the end of January or beginning of February; 

and it was not completed before the middle of March, by which 
time the severity of the season had so far abated that this shelter 
was of comparatively little importance. Considering that these 
men were within about a mile of the stoi*e where the wood might 
be obtained, that they had no work in the trenches, and that the 
only duties likely to interfere with the application both of horses 
and men to this important object, was the carrying up of their own 
forage from Balaklava, and furnishing parties occasionally to bring 
down sick and carry up provisions to the front (which seems never 



5 



to have occupied more than about a fifth of the whole), it appears 
strange that more rapid progress was not made in obtaining the 
advantage of hut accommodation, particularly when they are 
described as having suffered so much in their tents. 

" Considering also the suffering and severe loss of horses from 
exposure to the weather in the commencement of the winter, there 
appears to have been a want of promptitude or ingenuity in 
devising for them some means of temporary shelter, such as saved 
the baggage-horses of the Sappers and Miners at Balaklava. 
Experience has now proved, that even a very moderate degree of 
shelter would have been sufficent to save the lives of many of the 
horses, if not to maintain them in serviceable condition : and it 
must be presumed that such measures were considered prac- 
ticable ; for a proposal to erect, with the assistance of his men, some 
sort of cover for the horses of the corps appears to have been made 
by the officer commanding the Scots Greys; but the manner in 
-which it is stated to have been received by the Lieutenant- General 
commanding the Cavalry was calculated to deter other officers from 
making any similar proposal." 



The first part of these paragraphs, which was 
intended to apply to the hutting of the men, Lord 
Lucan affected to consider as relating to the stabling 
of the horses. This impression was, however, removed 
by the explanation that he had been misled by the 
accidental displacement of part of the running 
margin. It only remains, therefore, for me to 
establish the accuracy of the assertion which follows, 
that the unusual duty imposed on the Cavalry, of 
bringing down sick and carrying up provisions to the 
front, never occupied more than one-fifth of the 
whole, as Lord Lucan, in his address to the Board, Pro See £' 19 of 
has attempted to cast discredit on that statement. 10cee ings * 

The Commissioners founded their estimate onitoSofCom- 
two Returns— the one obtained from Colonel Hodge, jj^S' 
the officer commanding the Heavy Brigade, the 
other from Lieutenant-Colonel Mayou, the Assistant 
Quartermaster-General of theLightBrigade — both had See pages 458 
been furnished to the Commissioners as correct ; but Appendix to 
it was alleged before the Board by Lord Lucan, that Proceedings of 
that of Colonel Hodge had under-stated the number the Board ' 
of men employed, particularly during the first week. 

So careful, however, had the Commissioners been 
to keep within the truth, that, even admitting the 



1 



6 



numbers employed to have been as stated by Lord 
Lucan, the proportion in both brigades would only 
have exceeded, by a mere fraction, one-fifth of the 
whole ; and this excess was but for a week, as may 
be seen by comparing the strength of the brigades, 
Seepages 413 extracted from the War Office Returns, with the 
Board's Ap- numbers employed. This objection, consequently, 
pendix. though brought prominently forward by Lord Lucan, 
failed so signally, that the Board appear to have 
considered it undeserving of notice, except inci- 
dentally, in their Report. 

The second paragraph last quoted, Lord Lucan 
has thought himself justified in denouncing as being 
" totally at variance with the fact and the truth/' 
and prompted by " malice and malignity," and in 
reference to it he pledged himself to remove "the 
slightest breath of reproach" from " himself and 
the Cavalry," and to show — 

See p. 8 of " That no loss of horses could be justly charged on himself, or 
Proceedings, the Cavalry Officers generally ; but, on the contrary, that they did 
all in their power to mitigate and arrest what, unhappily, under the 
circumstances in which they were placed, and the orders to which 
they owed submission, proved entirely beyond their control, declaring 
in the strongest language that he was prepared to show that every 
endeavour, every strain, and every thing on earth that could be done 
See p. 13 of to promote and hasten the building of those stables was done ; that 
Proceedings. no t an fo our was i os f • that the operations commenced actually before 
the troops had taken their winter quarters, and that they were 
superintended by himself, and carried out by the other officers with 
an energy which deserved credit and not discredit ; and that he was 
prepared to show by his orders, for he had no other means of proof, 
that so far from the stables not having been commenced till the end 
of January, they were nearly completed by that time." 

At the very time Lord Lucan made this statement 
the orders to which he referred, and which were then 
in his hand, gave a direct and unqualified contradic- 
tion to this solemn assertion, and showed beyond 
question that if the Cavalry had really been maligned, 
the origin of the imputation was due, not to the 
Commissioners, but to his Lordship. Let those who 
doubt, peruse the following extract from his Divisional 
Order of 20th January, 1855 : — 



7 



" The Lieutcnant-General is sorry to observe, that in the Page 439 of 
Light Brigade no exertion whatever — not even an attempt has gj^^p *° 
been made to put any of the horses under cover, a fact not credit- cee( jj ngg r °~ 
able to commanding officers. They should have shown some ° ' 
desire to save the few that remain ; and as the disproportion 
between men and horses is, in this brigade, far more favourable 
than in the Heavy Brigade, it is impossible to explain, far less to 
justify, why, whilst the one brigade has hutted more than one-half 
their horses, the commanding officers of the Light Brigade have 
done nothing. Each of these commanding officers will be good 
enough to report daily how many disposable men he had the day 
previous, and what progress they have made." 



This Order, it will be observed, is dated at the 
very period when it " appeared strange/' in the opinion 
of the Commissioners, that no progress whatever had 
been made in providing shelter, and in consequence 
of which they thought it their duty to state the cir- 
cumstance, for further inquiry, if the Government 
thought it necessary. 

Even so late as the 7 th February, within a week of 
the period when his Lordship gave up his command, 
the following paragraph appears in his Divisional 
Orders regarding the unnecessary exposure of the 
horses of one of the regiments. 

" Whilst the Lieutenant -General yesterday was much pleased Page 440 of 
by finding the whole of the horses of the 4th Dragoon Guards under Appendix, 
cover, well groomed, and with horse clothing clean and in repair, 

he was as much displeased with the , who, with house-room 

at their command, positively had their horses exposed to the weather; 
the horses were encrusted with mud and dirt ;" and again, " but 
few horses had clothing at all, and that clothing in filth and rags. 
Lord Lucan scarcely ever visited a camp with less satisfaction." 

These extracts must be sufficient to convince even 
the most sceptical, that the Lieutenant- General com- 
manding the Cavalry had formed an opinion, from 
the facts under his own observation, at least equally 
strong as that expressed by the Commissioners. 
These severe strictures on the dilatory conduct 
of the Light Brigade, were either . merited or 
not merited. In the former case, how could his 
Lordship find fault with the Commissioners for 



8 

■ 

repeating, but in milder terms, his own remarks — 
in the latter, how could he be surprised if, with less 
opportunity for observation, they should have adopted 
the same belief as himself, regarding the want of 
promptitude evinced by this part of the Force ? 

It is difficult to imagine what excuse his Lordship 
can possibly offer for having occupied so many days 
of the proceedings of the Board, in his attempts to 
controvert facts established by the testimony of his 
own Divisional Orders, or for his extraordinary incon- 
sistency in first endeavouring to shield himself from 
future responsibility by unlimited censure, and then 
endeavouring to prove that those censures were unme- 
rited, by the evidence of the very men whom he had 
severely reprimanded. 

And here I must call attention for a moment, to 
the awkward predicament in which these untoward 
Orders place the evidence of Sir Eichard Airey, Major 
Connolly, and Major-General Scarlett, the first of 
whom declared it to be " utterly extraordinary" 
that a cavalry soldier should be able to do any- 
thing towards the construction of stables, even at 
a time when, owing to the absence of all care and 
grooming, the horses were in the state hereafter 
described by Lord Lucan in his Divisional Orders ; the 
second, that it was impossible there could have been 
more promptitude displayed in sheltering the horses ; 
and the third, that he was not aware more could 
have been done — all, be it observed, in direct oppo- 
sition to the recorded reprimand of Lord Lucan to the 
Light Brigade for having " done nothing," 

Sir Richard Airey, from his position as Quarter- 
master-General of the Army, must have known of 
this Order, relating, as it does, in so important a 
degree, to providing shelter: a matter intimately con- 
nected with his own Department. It was the especial 
duty of Major Connolly, as one of the Brigade-Majors 
of the Division, to circulate it, and General Scarlett, 
as commanding one of the Brigades, was the first 
person likely to have seen it, after being made public ; 



9 



yet not one of these Officers makes the slightest 
allusion to so important a circumstance, which, if 
known, must at once have closed the proceedings of 
the Board, so far at least as the Cavalry were con- 
cerned. 

But this is not all. Lord Lucan, in his anxiety 
to establish his case against the Commissioners, 
called as witnesses Colonels Douglas and Low, two of 
the cavalry officers of the Light Brigade, especially 
censured by the Order of the 20th January, an event, 
it may be presumed, they w r ere not likely to forget, 
and he put to each of them the following question : — 

"Do you consider that there might have been, on the part of Seepages 144 
myself, or of the officers commanding brigades or regiments, more and 160 of Pro- 
promptitude or ingenuity in sheltering these horses, than was dis- ceedings. 
played under the circumstances in which we were placed ?" 

Both officers replied to the effect, that they thought 
all ranks did their duty in every respect, so far as 
sheltering their horses was concerned. Neither of 
them apparently thought it necessary to recall to Lord 
Lucan's recollection that they had been censured in 
the very strongest terms for having " done nothing " 
during five weeks of the direst extremity of the 
Cavalry, and that consequently either his Lordship or 
they must have been wrong in their conclusions. 

But what must be thought of the conduct of the 
Board in the matter ? Never surely in any Court, 
civil or military, have such proceedings come before 
the public, as that an officer should charge others with 
" malice," H malignity," and even "falsehood," for 
repeating, but in very modified terms, what had been 
expressed in the strongest possible language by him- 
self, and that the members should pass unnoticed the 
fact that they had before them an official document 
under his own hand, expressly contradicting his re- 
peated and most emphatic assertions on that head. 

The Commissioners knew nothing of this Order, it 
was never communicated to them, nor did they see it 
till the proceedings of the Chelsea Board were made 
public ; they grounded their remark on what they had 



10 



seen and heard in the Crimea; but the seven General 
Officers had it before them for several months, yet not 
one ever thought of asking Lord Lucan the simple 
question, how he could possibly reconcile his complaint 
against the Commissioners, with the facts stated in 
his own Divisional Order. 

The importance of such a question could hardly 
have escaped the combined intelligence of so many 
members of the profession, if they really had read 
the Orders, which it must be inferred they did from 
their expressing themselves satisfied " by a perusal of 
" his Lordship's Divisional Orders, that he used every 
" exertion to meet the peculiar difficulties which he 
" had to contend with." What deduction, then, must 
be drawn from such an important document never 
having been even alluded to, in the course of the 
investigation ? Was this a compliance with the 
Board's instructions so to direct their inquiries " that 
the truth should be made manifest," or did they 
imagine that portion of the Warrant applicable only 
when they conceived the Commissioners to be in 
error ? 

And here it may be useful to mention as illus- 
trative of the injury done to the Commissioners by 
bringing their Eeport before a Board of Officers who 
were never in the Crimea, that had even one of the 
members had the benefit of local experience, he must 
have witnessed the charnel-house scenes which the 
cavalry camp exhibited during the winter ; he would, 
in occasionally passing through the lines, have seen 
the horses standing, or rather dying at their pickets, 
so late as the 20th of January ; nay even so late as 
the 7th of February. He would, probably, have known 
of these very Divisional Orders of Lord Lucan, and by 
drawing attention to the obvious contradiction they 
presented to his assertions, have spared me the pain 
of commenting on them in terms which I would gladly 
have avoided. 

The Board, however, ignoring altogether the 
Order of Lord Lucan, of 20th January, 1854, reported 
as follows : — 



11 



" It appears that after the Cavalry went to Kadekoi, the hutting Page 4 of 
was not carried out until January or February, owing to delays and Board's Re- 
difficulties which appear sufficiently to explain it, inasmuch as in por ' 
addition to the ordinary duties of a Cavalry soldier in the field, the 
duties performed by the cavalry from the 12th December to the 
19th January, in conveying stores to the front, and afterwards in 
transporting the sick, materially interfered with the operation of 
hutting the men and putting up stables for the horses. 

tk The insufficiency and bad quality of the intrenching tools 
added to this difficulty." 



In arriving at this conclusion respecting the delays 
and difficulties to which the Cavalry were exposed 
the Board of General Officers appear to have left out 
of view : 

1. That these could not have been accounted for 
by any uncertainty with regard to the occupation of 
the Plateau, because the most serious part of the 
delay occurred during the seven weeks after the 
Cavalry were withdrawn from that position, during 
which, as Lord Lucan's Order expressly points out, the 
Light Brigade had « done nothing" towards providing 
shelter for their horses. 

2. They could not have been accounted for, by any 
deficiency in the number of men, for Lord Lucan's 
Divisional Order states, that the Light Cavalry, who 
did nothing, was comparatively better off in that 
respect than the Heavy Cavalry, who in the same 
time had erected stabling for half their horses. 

3. It was not the want of tools, as suggested by 
the Board, for these must have been issued more than 
a month before the 20th of January, the Divi- 
sional Order of the 16th of December having stated 
that " the ground for the stabling is already marked 
out, the regiments are in possession of a certain 
number of entrenching tools, and, if required, more 
shall be given them." 

4. It was not the Commissariat Duties, for these 
had early in January been reduced to one-half of 
their former amount, yet nothing whatever was 
done by the Light Cavalry, at least, so states Lord 
Lucan. 



12 



To what extent the ordinary duties of a cavalry 
soldier in the field, referred to by the Board, may 
have had the effect of preventing the men from pro- 
curing shelter for their horses during so long a 
period, depends, of course, on how these duties were 
performed, as to which it may be as well here to 
give the opinion of Lord Lucan, from one of his 
Divisional Orders, dated 30th January, 1855. 

Pao-e 439 of " ^ i s with great concern that the Lieutenant- General has to 
Appendix to complain of the manner in which regimental duties are carried on. 
Proceedings of The men's kits and appointments are unnecessarily dirty, the horses 
Board. are badly groomed, and all uniformity of dress appears to be pur- 

posely avoided, horses are sent on duty without shoes, or so badly 
shod, that some shoes are sure to be lost. It is inconceivable how 
the different duties pass the inspection of officers and non-commis- 
sioned officers. Exposed as the Cavalry are to the criticism, not 
only of the other branches of this army, but of foreigners, it is 
matter of surprise that a greater anxiety is not shown by commanding 
officers for the characters of their regiments. It would be more 
agreeable to Lord Lucan to have to approve instead of disapprove 
so constantly of the manner in which the duties are performed ; but 
it is his duty, so far as he can, to preserve the discipline, efficiency, 
and character of the Cavalry Division ; and he is resolved that no 
consideration towards corps or individuals, shall induce him to 
overlook a system of irregularity and neglect, which, if allowed to 
continue, must seriously damage the character of all." 

When cavalry soldiers have to turn out in the 
same high state of equipment as in this country, a 
considerable portion of their time may no doubt be 
occupied in their ordinary duties ; but that nothing of 
the kind could be pleaded for the delay in this in- 
stance seems clear by Lord Lucan's own showing. 

It still remains, therefore, to be explained what 
were the delays and difficulties which appear suffici- 
ently to account for the postponement of the erection 
of stabling till the greater part of the horses were 
dead ; and if such really existed, the Board certainly 
omitted a most important part of their duty in not 
pointing them out to Lord Lucan, and calling on him 
to account for his Divisional Order of the 20th of 
January, 1855, which, so long as it remains on record, 
must ever be considered as sufficient proof that all the 



13 



Commissioners stated, in regard to want of promptitude, 
ivas very much within the mark. 

By this Order, which at length roused the Light 
Brigade into activity, Lord Lucan no doubt rendered 
an important service to the army ; it is only to be 
regretted that he should have forborne all notice of 
the fact that, between the 16th of December, when 
he made a forcible appeal to his officers, as to the 
necessity for " scarping away the ground in their 
front, and paving under their horses' feet ;" and the 
date, when the Light Brigade commenced acting 
on that Order, no less a period than five weeks 
elapsed. During all that time, he, as well as his 
staff, from their residence within the Cavalry lines, 
could scarcely have avoided being daily witnesses of 
the want of progress of which he ultimately com- 
plained in such strong terms ; indeed, his Lordship 
expressly states, " after our arrival at Kadekoi, I 
" rode nearly daily to the camp of one or more Regi- 
" ments, to see the progress made in the hutting." 
The camp of the Light Brigade must have shared 
occasionally in these visits, yet till the 20th January 
the Divisional Orders are altogether silent as to 
their having done nothing, though the loss of horses 
in the Division during the interim is stated by Lord 
Lucan at 426, and though every horse that died 
must have left one soldier at least available to 
provide shelter for the survivors. 

Yet, with this striking fact before them, the Board 
arrived at the following conclusions : — 

" With regard to the general charge of want of promptitude or p age 5 
ingenuity, as attaching to the Cavalry under the command of Boards' 
Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan, it appears by the statement port, 
made to us by Colonel Tulloch, and by the whole course of his 
examination of witnesses, to have been founded in the assumption 
that tools, and materials (including canvas), and labour, were either 
at hand, or might have been procured from the fleet or from Con- 
stantinople, an assumption which does not appear to be borne out 
by the evidence. 

" The uncertainty with regard to the occupation of the Plateau 
by the Cavalry, appears to us to form a very material element in the 
consideration of this matter, added to which, the difficulty of trans- 



port to that place was sucli, that even if it had been possible to have 
procured the before-mentioned tools and materials (including 
canvas), they could not have been there made available. 

" It further appears, that after the Cavalry arrived at Kadekoi, 
the Earl of Lucan was unceasing in his endeavours to erect shelter 
for the horses." 

I do not propose to enter here at length upon any 
discussion as to the particular description of tem- 
porary shelter which might have been made available 
for the protection of the horses. Men differ in nothing 
more than in the degree of fertility of resource with 
which they are endowed ; Lord Lucan considered that 
to place a horse in a pit was to consign him to a 
" grave/' and that to shelter him with canvas was the 
act of a madman/ and he saw between 800 and 900 
horses out of 1,600 perish, without even an attempt 
See p. iss to devise any other kind of protection, and he makes 
of Proceedings. following statement as to the difficulty of shelter- 
ing horses there, which the Board appear to have 
considered quite conclusive on the subject: — 

" In that country, with that soil, a soil that puddles after three 
or four hours' rain, consisting chiefly as it did on the plateau, of a 
strong brick clay, I say that without a roof, or unless you could 
have paved, such a trench as is talked of would have been totally 
useless ; and it would have been mischievous, because it would 
very much have obstructed you in what is far more essential, 
namely, the constant removal of your horses. When you talk of a 
pit — a pit is not only useless, but it is perhaps the most mis- 
chievous thing into which a horse can possibly be put. It has 
been tried — and there is an officer in this Court now, who could 
establish the truth of what I say, if he were examined upon the 
subject, he belongs to the Land Transport. They did make pits for 
their horses, and those pits were dug on the side of hills ; still it was 
found impossible to drain them sufficiently, and the horses suffered 
so much that the Turks who had charge of them could not be got 
to use the pits after they were dug. In short, a pit that is 
neither roofed in nor paved, would be more appropriately called a 
grave than a pit." 

JSTow, considering the fatal results of Lord Lucan's 
experience in such matters, he ghould certainly have 
been more chary of alluding to any other description 
of shelter as being u a grave," especially as the only 
testimony to which he refers in support of so strong 



15 



an assertion, is that of an officer whose name he 

does not even mention, and who was never examined 

by the Board ; forgetting apparently altogether, that 

the evidence of his own select witness, Admiral Lyons, 

to which he clings so strongly in other particulars, ' ^ e J\ 152 

was very much in favour of this mode of sheltering rocee mgs ' 

horses. 

It may be useful to contrast this tlieory of Lord 
Luean's, with the experience of Captain Measom, 
formerly of the 10th Hussars, who recently accom- 
panied a Division of the French army in Algeria, and ho f d TO worTs!" 
has published a narrative, from which the following is Vol. xiv. p. 49. 
an extract : — 

" Shortly after we rejoined the head-quarters of the column, an 
example of how horses can be protected in wet weather when in 
the field, was practically illustrated by the French Cavalry. 

" The commencement of the undertaking was, marking out in 
white lines the length and breadth of the intended pits in which 
the horses were to be placed. This was done in about an hour. 
Then the men began in earnest to dig, as if making the foundations 
for a street of houses. In twelve or fourteen hours every horse in 
the detachment was well protected against the weather. The 
animals stood in a space sunk some three feet below the level of 
the ground, which was sloped as well as drained, so that it would 
retain no water. The spare earth turned up from these spaces was 
plastered into rude walls to windward, so that the horses were pro- 
tected up to their chests against the weather, although there was 
neither time nor materials to cover them over head. The pre- 
caution had not been taken in vain, for a more fearful storm than 
that which burst over our heads before the job was over, or a 
more lasting soaking rain than that which then commenced and 
continued for four days, it was never my fate to encounter. 

" Had the horses been left unprotected, they would all have 
broken away. As it was, when the bad weather came to an end, 
they were one and all in as good condition as if they had just come 
out of one of the best stables in France." 



This is one of the descriptions of temporary 
shelter to which I referred before the Board, as having 
been practicable for the Cavalry in the first instance, 
and if twelve hours sufficed to obtain it in a French 
corps, there seems no good reason why an English 
Division should have been without it for nearly twelve 
weeks. Lord Lucan will find that none of the con- 



16 

sequences he so graphically describes as arising from 
the occupation of these pits or " graves/' were 
observed upon this occasion. He may rest assured 
that in the Crimea, as well as in Algeria, water 
usually finds its level, and that on the side of a con 
siderable declivity, such as the Cavalry occupied in 
the Valley of Kadekoi, the floors of these pits only 
required a proper slope to prevent any considerable 
quantity of water lodging in them. With every 
respect for his Lordship's testimony, and the sound- 
ness of his opinion, both must be doubted when 
opposed to the laws of nature. 
Page iv. of It is much to be regretted that in their comments 
port rd S Re " on ^ ne description, of temporary shelter obtained for 
the baggage horses of the Sappers and Miners, the 
Board should, apparently from their want of local 
knowledge, have assumed that the Commissioners 
contemplated sheltering the whole of the Cavalry by 
precisely the same means, whereas they merely 
adduced that, as an illustration of the facility with 
which three dwarf walls might be made to support 
canvas, without the assistance of the usual frame 
work* Such walls might not be found ready-made, 
as at Balaklava, but there was nothing to prevent 
their being formed, as in the case of the French 
Cavalry just referred to, by digging into the side of 
the valley of Kadekoi, and throwing up the earth, on 
which canvas, or any other covering, might afterwards 
have been fixed. It was not necessary, as the Board 
of General Officers appear to conclude, that labour 
should be obtained, otherwise than from the ranks of 
the Cavalry ; on the contrary, I expressly called 
See p. 55 of attention to the short period in which the required 

Proceedings. .. n , A . , . -. x , 

excavations tor such a purpose might have been 
made by that Force, and the number likely to have 
been available for such employment. 

The possibility of providing sailcloth from the 
Fleet, or from Constantinople, has been the subject 
of much controversy, but that was only requisite for 
a more advanced stage of shelter, and judging from 



17 

the experience of the French Cavalry in Algeria, the 
excavations would have proved useful in the mean- 
time, whether ultimately covered with sailcloth or 
not; hut unfortunately the Light Cavalry, according to 
the official statement by Lord Lucan, did " nothing." 

The discussion with regard to the use of sailcloth, 
which occupied so much of the time of the Board, 
first arose, it must he observed, during the inquiry at 
Chelsea. It formed, therefore, no part of the ques- 
tion as to the accuracy of the Commissioners' Report; 
but, as it has excited much attention, and the Board 
refer to it in their conclusions, it may be well to 
advert briefly to the subject. In doing so, it is painful 
to cast even a doubt on such testimony as that of 
Admiral Lyons or Admiral Dimdas, particularly on a 
professional subject; but neither of these officers 
seems to have been aware, when he made the state- 
ment of all the spare canvas having been landed for 
the use of the Naval Brigade, that Captain Hillyar, 
who had been serving with that brigade in the 
the winter of '54-55, had previously been questioned by 
the Sebastopol Committee as to the tent accommoda- see P . 320, 
tion, and his replies were as follows :■ — l oh 

" Were they Ordnance tents that they had ? 
"All of them. 

" Were they the same as the army had ? 
" Precisely the same. 
" Were they good tents ? 

" Some were good, and some were worn tents that had been 
used by the army at Varna," 

To this testimony that of the Commissioners 
themselves may be added, as they repeatedly visited 
the IsTaval Brigade, in order to see the arrangements 
for enforcing cleanliness, on which occasions they 
found the tent accommodation of precisely the same 
description as in the other parts of the camp, with 
here and there a few erections of sailcloth of an 
irregular form, used for cooking and cleaning pur- 
poses ; but which were not likely to have required 
more than a fractional part of the supply put on 
board the fleet when it left England, viz, : — 

c 



See Adnii- 
Ity's Return, 

605, of Ap- 
ndix to Pro- 
edings, 



Old Canvas 
New do. 
In spare sails 



8 



Yards. 

4.410 
9.890 
35,355 



Of the latter, no doubt a considerable proportion 
consisted of duplicates of sails, which could not, per- 
haps have been readily dispensed with, in case of any 
accident to the originals ; but this could not apply to 
the vast extent of light canvas, such as studding sails, 
royals, &c, never likely to be wanted in boisterous 
weather, and of which not the duplicates, but the 
originals even, as wei] as the extensive awnings 
usually on board ships of war in southern latitudes, 
might surely have been spared for so important an 
object as the salvation of the Cavalry. 

Besides this source of supply, every transport is 
bound by its charter-party to have on board, on 
leaving England, 50 yards of old, with about 480 
yards of new canvas, reckoning each bolt at forty 
yards ; and as thirty- five steam and fifty-four sailing 



see p. 453 transports were employed in the Black Sea, in 
^ort° December, 1854, of which the majority were in 



of itself, have afforded the requisite cover, even had 
none been obtainable from the navy. 



Page 147 cf But it was of little consequence what store was 
■oceedmgs. on board, when the sailcloth was never asked for, and 
certainly the doubt whether there was enough for 
the whole could afford no sufficient reason for the 
use of it not having been resorted to by a portion of 
the Force, particularly in the sheltered valley of 
Kadekoi. Had the experiment been tried, it would 
probably have been found, as in the case of Major 
Barker's Battery, and Captain Thomas's Troop of 
Horse Artillery, that it ^oukl have sufficiently 
answered the purpose, even for a considerable period. 



As if expressly to show the futility of these objec- 
tions to the use of sail-cloth, as a means of affording 
rapid covering for horses, it has since been used 
extensively for this purpose at Aldershot, without 




19 



anv or those serious consequences anticipated from 
it by Lord Lucan and some of his witnesses. If 
resorted to in a country where any other description 
of shelter could have been obtained, how triumphant 
a refutation does this afford to the objections urged 
against its adoption on a spot where there was no 
other alternative but to leave the horses exposed 
entirely to the weather. 

The want of suitable scantling, referred to by 
some of the witnesses, could not have been expe- 
rienced after the 25th December, when the vessels 
began to arrive from England with the frame-work of 
the huts ; and if the Infantry at Balaklava could, 
under the directions of Sir Colin Campbell, carry up 
to the front such heavy articles as shot, shell, and 
gun-platforms, during the greater part of two months, 
as shown in his letter to the Quartermaster- General, Evideruf/of ^ 
dated 29th January, 1855, there was, surely, nothing Camnusskm- 
to prevent the Cavalry, even without the aid of their ers Rij v qvL 
horses, from carrying up the comparatively lighter 
scantling for their stables. 

The alleged difficulty of obtaining sailcloth from 
Constantinople scarcely requires a comment. To 
suppose that during a period of active warfare the 
quantity necessary to equip a single man of war, or 
to provide tentage for a brigade, could not have been 
obtained in the Turkish Arsenals, would imply a 
degree of improvidence on the part of our Allies which 
exceeds all that has yet come to light. That, however, 
may be within the bounds of possibility ; but that in 
a port such as Constantinople, crowded with vessels 
from ail parts of the world, and forming the emporium 
of commerce for the Black Sea and upper part of the 
Mediterranean, there should be any difficulty in pur- 
chasing sailcloth, as the Board seem to have inferred 
from the evidence of Major Hackett and Captain an J*| e 2 s 
Derriman, requires a facility of belief for which I, at C eedings! < 
least, am not disposed to take credit. 

A very slight, but important, explanation may, 
however, reconcile the statements of these witnesses 

c 2 



20 



with the actual fact, and afford at the same time 
another illustration how much the conclusions of the 
Board have been affected by the exclusion of all 
officers possessing local information. The sailcloth 
used in the East, whether for tents or naval purposes, 
is made of strong cotton ; the witnesses probably 
sought only for canvas made from flax, of the descrip- 
tion usual in the British service. Hence the state - 
Page 331 f nient by Colonel Wetherall that Ci the Pasha who 
Proceedings. "had the direction of the Tophana Arsenal wrote 
" to say, that he could not get any canvas either from 
" the Arsenal or by purchase, and he begged that cotton 
" might be substituted." Had the Colonel, and the other 
witnesses tried this cotton, they would have found it 
quite as useful for ^covering the horses or for awnings 
See evidence as British canvas, with the advantage of being much 
Eva- ^oi^ % n ^ er - It is to be regretted that of seven General 
of Sevastopol Officers not one attempted to elucidate the reason 
Qu P °625 P ' 34 ' w ^ co ^ on was re f use d, though it might have been 
presumed that the Pasha would not have offered it 
for the purpose of making hospital tents, if unfit even 
for covering horses. 

It only remains to notice the opinion expressed 
by the Board with reference to the threat used by 
Lord Lucaii to Colonel Griffith. 

The Commissioners never pledged themselves for 
the correctness of this statement, but merely gave it 
as detailed to them. Colonel Griffith, when examined 
before the Board, strictly adhered to it, not only so 
far as regarded the threat of arrest, but also that such 
threat was in consequence of his proposition regarding 
temporary shelter. Lord Lucan, as the complainant, 
had the power of calling any witnesses he thought 
proper to establish his case ; but as he did not call 
even one, it must be presumed that he thought the 
matter had better rest as it stood, viz., upon the con- 
flicting testimony of himself and Colonel Griffith. 
In this he very probably consulted his best interests ; 
but if any conclusions adverse to his Lordship are 
drawn from that course, he has himself to blame. 



21 



As to other officers having been influenced by 
the misunderstanding between the Earl of Lucan 
and Colonel Griffith, it seems only necessary to 
observe, that the Commissioners never made any 
such assertion, but merely affirmed that, to threaten 
an officer with arrest because he pressed on his com- 
mander a suggestion which he considered for the 
benefit of his corps, was calculated to deter other 
officers from following his example, a truism in which 
it is believed every one must concur. The statement 
by the Board that no officers were thus influenced, 
is one exceedingly difficult of proof, considering that 
they could not have made an admission to the 
contrary, without rendering themselves amenable to 
military law. Even supposing, however, no such 
effect to have been produced, the inference by no 
means follows that Lord Lucan's proceedings were 
not calculated to have that tendency, which was all 
the Commissioners asserted. 

Before concluding my observations on this branch 
of the Eeport, there is a point to which I think it 
important, not merely in justice to my colleague and 
myself, but also to the Cavalry to direct attention. 
From the evidence obtained in the Quartermaster- seepages 
General's Department, it had been made to appear to J^^/of 8 
the Commissioners that the Orders for the Cavah •'y Commission- 
providing shelter for the horses had been issued as ers ' Re P ort - 
early as the 8th and 12th of November, about three 
months before that object was finally accomplished : 
but no explanation had accompanied this statement, 
that a month at least elapsed before those Orders 
could be obeyed, owing to the w r ant of tools, mate- 
rials, assistance, and a proper site. 

It was of the utmost importance that this circum- 
stance should have been noticed by the Board as 
affording some explanation of the extreme delay 
which the Commissioners had mildly designated as a 
want of promptitude. ISTo one perusing the Eeport 
of the Board, however, would suppose that such a 
circumstance had ever been brought under their 



22 



consideration at all. though repeatedly adverted 
to and commented on bj me. The General 
Officers might, perhaps, naturally feel disinclined 
to enter on a subject which placed the testimony 
of the Quartermaster-General in a very question- 
able light ; but as it was their duty to make 
the truth manifest, such a consideration should not 
have been allowed to operate to the prejudice of the 
Commissioners ; and, in self-defence, I must now call 
attention to the following details on the subject. 
Page 93 of On the question being put to General Airey, why, 
Qu° C 523 ingS ' Trnen ne received the written queries which gave him 
an opportunity of explaining such matters, he had 
never pointed out the want of tools, materials, assist- 
ance, &c, which for upwards of a month had prevented 
the Cavalry from complying with his Orders of 8th and 
12th .November, in providing shelter for themselves, 
that officer replied : — 

" My own examination in writing. I have already stated two 
or three times, was merely general and superficial answers to 
general questions. I had no indication whatever of the leaning of 
the Commissioners, or that they implicated any body, or thought 
that there was blame attached to anybody ; if I had the slightest 
idea of that, I should have been able to explain things perfectly." 

Unfortunately for General Airey's explanation, 
however, there was a letter from Colonel Gordon, 
acknowledging receipt of these queries, which told a 
very different tale. It is dated 4th June, 1855 ; and 
he there states : — 

Page 1G3 cf " As these questions to General Airey are fifty-two in number, 
Proceedings of nearly every one of which contains an implied accusation of neglect 
Board. or carelessness, he begs me to say that he cannot consent to 

answer them in this off-hand way, but will examine each question, 
and prepare his replies as rapidly as the other duties of his Depart- 
ment will permit, which you must be aware, from the evidence you 
have taken, are of a very extensive and varied nature." 



It is not denied by General Airey that this expla- 
nation was given by his authority, and the manner in 



23 



which he endeavours to get out of the difficult y 
appears worth quoting : — 

" The PreUminatry Report was sent to Lord Raglan, and Lord pa ge 232 of 
Raglan put it into the Military Secretary's hands and mine. The J B 1 °^ edin§s of 
verv first sentence of the Preliminary Report states, that the inquiry 
was completed, and I am only showing that my answers, written 
at a subsequent period to that, were entirely written in a different 
spirit, considering that the Commissioners had completed their 
work : and the document then goes on very much in the terms of 
the Constantinople Report now before the Board, and without 
indicating any prospect of an attempt to cast blame either upon 
Lord Lucan or myself, or, I believe, upon any of the military 
authorities. 

" Xow it was quite the latter end of July, if I rightly recollect, 
that I answered the written queries that had been left with me, 
I having then become acquainted with the Preliminary Report, 
which purported to be the result of the inquiry that was com- 
pleted, and to be thoroughly and almost enthusiastically favourable 
to the military authorities. I of course looked upon the written 
queries then in a totally different light from that in which Colonel 
Gordon had regarded them some weeks previously, before the 
Preliminary Report had appeared. That Preliminary Report did, in 
truth, so to speak, appear to extract all the poison from the written 
queries ; therefore, Colonel Gordon in the month of June, and I at 
the end of July or the beginning of August, were both justified in 
the views which we successively took of the same queries at 
different periods. To Colonel Gordon, in June, the queries had all 
the aspect of a live shell ; to me, in August, after the Prelimi- 
nary Report, and after the departure of the Commissioners from 
Constantinople, they had of course a perfectly innocent appear- 
ance, and I accordingly answered them in a slight and superficial 
way, as questions which were stripped of all their practical signi- 
ficance by the contents of the Preliminary Report, and it was with 
an accurate memory of that impression, and in perfect accord 
with that, that I answered Colonel Tulloch"s questions before the 
Board." 

I shall leave this explanation of the Quartermaster- 
General to persons who can understand it ; those 
who peruse the last paragraph of the Report he 
alludes to, and which it is presumed he must have 
read as well as the commencement, will probably be 
disposed to consider the second contradiction worse 
than the first. The Commissioners there stated : — 

£; The evidence in regard to some of the subjects of our inquiry Page 498 of 
has not yet been corrected by the officers last examined ; having Board's Ap- 
been sent to them for that purpose only the day before our departure pendix. 



24 



from Balaklava. When we have received that evidence, and the 
answers to queries transmitted at the same time, we shall have the 
honour of reporting upon the matters to which they relate." 

Xow the queries here referred to, as General 
Airey very well knew, were those he was requested to 
answer; the evidence, of the officers last examined 
was that of Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall, 
on receiving which the Commissioners were to report 
respecting the matters to which they related, so 
being thus forewarned, that their future Report would 
depend on the explanations then given, it was more 
than ever necessary that the explanations of the 
Quartermaster-General should be of such *a character 
as to prevent the possibility of error. 
Page 6io of General Airey seems to have forgotten that a 
Board'f Re° Preliminary Eeport necessarily implies that another 
port. ' is to follow ; and had he referred to the letter of Lord 
Raglan, acknowledging receipt, he would have seen 
that, though the Commissioners had concluded their 
inquiry, they certainly had not concluded their 
Reports, and that the "live shell" to which he profes- 
sionally alludes in his explanation, still remained in a 
condition to explode. 

Though this is not exactly the description of 
evidence which might be expected from an officer 
holding so distinguished an official position, I do 
not so much complain of it, as of the Board for 
not having brought prominently to notice so impor- 
tant a circumstance Fortunately, since I have ob- 
tained Lord Lucan's Order of 20th January, in support 
of the Commissioner's conclusions, this omission is a 
matter of comparatively little consequence ; for if 
Lord Lucan was justified in finding fault with the 
Cavalry for want of promptitude, when he knew that the 
necessary preparations could not have commenced sooner 
than the IQth December, how much more were the Com- 
missioners entitled to draw similar conclusions, when 
they had every reason to believe, from the evidence 
before them, that the preparations might have been 
begun nearly a month earlier. 



25 



I now come to the consideration of the case of 

MAJOR-GENERAL THE EARL OF 
CARDIGAN. 

The statement in the Commissioners' Report, of 
which this nobleman complained, was as follows : — 

" The Light Cavalry Brigade, which had for some time pre- Page 19 of 
viously been stationed in the valley adjacent to Balaklava, was Commission- 
removed, first to the vicinity of head-quarters for two or three ers Re P ort * 
days, and thereafter, on the 1st or 2nd of November, to Inker- 
man, where it was stationed near the Windmill, a distance of at 
least seven or eight miles from Balaklava. This change, at a time 
w r hen the roads were in an extremely bad state, and when there 
was great difficulty in obtaining the means of transport, created 
very serious obstacles to a proper supply of forage being obtained. 

" It is alleged by Deputy- Assistant Commissary-General Crook- 
shanks, that there was a certain quantity of hay at Balaklava, but 
not the means of carrying it to the front ; occasionally he managed 
to bring up a little, till the 14th November, when the supply failed 
entirely. After that date the want of transport affected the supply 
of barley also, which on several days did not exceed from 1|- lb. 
to 2 lbs. daily per horse, being all that they had to keep them 
alive. The Returns of one of the regiments show that, for the last 
four days they were on the ground, the average was only about 
2^ lbs. for each horse, previously exhausted as they had been by 
the want of hay or straw during the early part of the month. 

" When the supply began to fail, the Commissariat Officer 
referred to, who appears to have done everything in his power to 
meet the difficulties of the case, proposed — as he knew there was 
plenty of barley at Balaklava — that if a detachment of the horses 
were allowed to go down daily, he would engage to bring up 
enough for the rest of the Brigade. This proposition appears to 
have been brought specially under the notice of Lord Cardigan by 
Lieutenant- Colonel Mayou, Assistant Quartermaster- General of 
Cavalry, who states that his Lordship declined to accede to it, as 
he had previously done when a similar proposition was made 
to him to send the horses down for hay before that supply failed. 

"The whole Brigade remained in this state till the 2nd of 
December, when it was directed to return to its previous position, 
but by that time the horses were reduced to such a state from star- 
vation, that they could no longer bear the weight of their riders ; 
they had to be led down ; many were left on the ground in a dying 
state, and of the remainder seventeen died on the road before 



26 



the)' could reach their former station, a distance of only about 
six miles. 

" It is no part of our duty to enter into the military reasons 
which may have led to the detention of this Brigade on a spot 
where the horses could not be foraged by the Commissariat, 
or which may have induced a refusal to adopt the only measure by 
which apparently they could be subsisted ; we merely call attention 
to the fact, as one of the instances of a deficiency of supply which 
formed the special subject of our inquiry." 

Lord Cardigan assumed that the Commissioners 
here charged him with an error in judgment, in having 
contributed to the ultimate inefficiency of the Light 
Brigade by his refusal to adopt a suggestion which, 
in their opinion, was calculated to improve its con- 
dition, viz., the sending of the troop horses down to 
Balaklava for forage. 

In this assumption, as will be seen by reference to 
the Report of the Commissioners, Lord Cardigan and 
the Board were entirely mistaken. 'No opinion what- 
ever was expressed by the Commissioners^ who merely 
stated the fact, which is undisputed. 

The Board of General Officers exercise a similar 
reserve, and leave the question raised by Lord Car- 
digan undisturbed. Their conclusions on this subject 
are in the following terms : — 

It appears that at the latter end of November, the greatest 
number of horses in the encampment of the Light Brigade was 330, 
of which, owing to so many men being sick and absent, only 286 
could be mounted. 

" From this number, it would have required 120 horses to have 
brought up forage from Balaklava, and to have detached so large a 
proportion of the force would have diminished it to such an extent 
as* to have rendered it virtually useless for the purpose for which it 
had been placed in the position it occupied. 

With reference, therefore, to the military reasons noticed by 
the Commissioners, it appears to us, that Lord Raglan alone could 
judge of the fitness of the measure ; and that it could not have 
been resorted to without his sanction. 

"He appears to have been made acquainted by the Major- 
General Commanding the Brigade, by the Lieut-General Com- 
manding the Division, and by Commissary- General Filcler, with 
the hardships which the Cavalry were suffering ; but there is no 
evidence to show that Lord Raglan"s attention was particularly 
called to the proposal of the Assistant Commissary-General, that 
the horses should be sent to bring forage from Balaklava. 



27 



4i What steps, therefore, might have been taken by Lord 
Raglan, had that proposal been distinctly brought to his notice, 
can now only be matter of conjecture. The military reasons for 
keeping a large proportion of the Cavalry in the position they 
then occupied, seem to have rendered the case peculiarly embar- 
rassing ; for these reasons appear in some degree to have been 
irrespective of considerations of forage.*' 

It may safely be presumed that the purpose for 
which the Cavalry was placed in this position, was — 
not to exhibit an array of living skeletons to invite 
attack on the part of an enterprising enemy, but to 
afford protection to our own army, and that of our 
Allies, and surely the experience of seven General 
Officers might have discovered that this could be 
done better by a single troop, in a fit condition to be 
led into the field, than by a whole brigade of spectres, 
who for ten days had received scarcely a tithe of their 
regulated allowance. 

Even, therefore, had the numerical statements on 
which the Board formed their conclusions been cor- 
rect, few would be disposed to concur in them ; more 
especially when it is taken into consideration that if 
there were only 286 men to 330 horses, as is alleged, 
there must have been an excess of 44 horses, which, 
for want of riders, could not have been made available 
in the ranks, and might, therefore, have been em- 
ployed in carrying up forage without diminishing, 
in the slightest degree, the force which could be 
brought into the field. 

The total number of animals required to carry up Page 211 of 
the full allowance of barley to the brigade, is stated Board? dmgS ° f 
by Assistant Commissary- General Crookshanks at 
sixty-three. Of these, about the 18th of November, 
when he made his second application, he could obtain 
only thirty-five, which ultimately were reduced to 
ten. The Board of General Officers appear to have 
altogether ignored the fact, that it was by no means 
necessary for the Cavalry to have provided horses to 
bring up all the barley, but merely so many as would 
make up the complement required by the Commis- 
sariat. There appears not the shadow of a reason for 



28 



the assumption, merely on Lord Cardigan's state- 
ment that so large a proportion as 120 horses must 
necessarily have been taken from the effective force 
for this purpose. In a matter of life and death, one 
man might have sufficed to guide two laden horses ; 
the diet at Inkerman had certainly not been of so 
exciting a nature as to render the poor animals very 
unruly, and at a time when the infantry had not only 
to walk to Balaklava, but to carry up heavy loads 
upon their backs, and this, too, with the prospect of 
an evening's hard work in the trenches before them, 
it was perhaps not too much to expect that the Cavalry 
should lead horses on foot, at least half way. 

It was, however, a deficiency of horses to carry, 
and not of men to lead, under which the Commissariat 
laboured; and if the forty-four horses admitted to 
have been in excess of riders had only been placed at 
the disposal of that Department, with a few Dragoons 
to protect them from ill-usage, there cannot be a 
question that every difficulty might have been over- 
come, without trenching unduly either on the comfort 
or the efficiency of the Light Brigade. 

It seems almost puerile to point out expedients of 
so simple a character ; but when it is shown by the 
See p. 209 evidence of Mr. Crookshanks, that the idea of sending 
ceedin^f sPr °" e Worses na lf wa y clown for the barley, while the 
Commissariat carried it up the other half, never 
occurred even to the collective wisdom of a whole 
brigade, perhaps such suggestions may appear not 
altogether out of place. The circumstance of so 
extravagant an assertion being adopted, as that nearly 
one half of the brigade would have been necessary to 
carry up barley for the other half, affords another 
proof how deeply is to be deplored that peculiarity in 
the constitution of the Board, by which all officers 
who had any practical experience of Crimean diffi- 
culties, or of the best way in which they could be 
surmounted, were carefully excluded from it. 

The conclusions of the Board on this subject 
appear necessarily to resolve themselves into this : 



29 



that because Lord Cardigan might have had some 
difficulty in carrying up all the barley to which his 
corps was entitled, he was, therefore, justified in 
bringing up none. A half or even a quarter of the 
regulated allowance, in addition to what was supplied 
by the Commissariat, might, for a few days at least, 
have preserved life and health ; but, forgetting appa- 
rently the homely adage, that " half a loaf is better 
than no bread," his lordship and the Board seem alike 
to have evaded all such middle courses. 

The Board conclude their observations, on this 
branch of the case, in the following terms : — 

" The opinion, however, expressed by Lord Cardigan, that to Page VIII. of 
have sent the horses for that purpose to a place so distant as Board's Re- 
Balaklava, would only have augmented the losses of the Brigade, P ort * 
although not in entire accordance with some of the opinions 
offered in evidence before us, appears to be supported by a refer- 
ence to the difficulties experienced in the Royal Artillery at the 
same period. For it is in evidence that the horses in that force 
were on two occasions, between the 23rd and 2 7 tli November, 
1854, at great wear and tear, sent down to Balaklava for hay, at 
the urgent request of the Commissariat, and on their arrival there 
it was found that no hay was procurable." 

What the want of hay here referred to had to do 
with the case, as stated by the Commissioners does 
not appear ; their observations bore reference merely 
to barley, that being the description of forage 
by which horses could be maintained in life for a 
limited period, with least difficulty as to transport; 
and it had long before been stated by Mr. Crook- 
shanks, that " after moving to the front the supply 
" of hay gradually fell off till the storm of 14th 
" November, when it ceased altogether ; but that 
there was plenty of barley at Balaklava if the Light 
Brigade had only assisted him with the means of 
transport. 

There is little need, however, for going minutely 
into what the Light Brigade might have clone to aid 
themselves, when it is known that the whole of the 
Heavy Brigade were within three or four miles, and 



30 



about an equal distance from Balaklava, and that the 
assistance of even a tenth part of their numbers would 
have been sufficient to have removed every difficulty 
in the required supply of barley. This resource was 
so apparent, that the attention of the Board was called 
to it, even by the daily press, which may, perhaps, have 
led to the following questions being at length put to 
Lord Lucan : — 

"Where was the Heavy Cavalry Brigade stationed on the 16th 
November ? 

" They were stationed on the plateau near the Colline. 
' £ What were their duties at that time ? 

i; First of all we were always prepared for an attack; we had a 
party in Balaklava for a certain time ; we had, independently of that, 
a strong picket in the valley ; we had inlying pickets, and the 
foraging for our own Brigade. 

" Could they not have afforded some assistance in the convey- 
ance of forage for the Light Cavalry Brigade, say one day in three ? 

" First of all, there was no application for any such assistance 
at all. Then, if you will refer to Mr. Crookshanks's letter, you will 
find, that up to the 21st there really was no positive deficiency ; and 
I should say, from the state of the Heavy Brigade after the 21st, 
that they could not. It was quite enough for them to forage for 
themselves ; but there icas no application for assistance" 

It might naturally have been supposed that the 
next question to Lord Cardigan would have been, 
why did he not, in such an emergency, make ap- 
plication for assistance from the Heavy Brigade, 
when he found the Commissariat transport failing, and 
he was unable or unwilling to detach any portion of 
his own force ? This would have brought out the neces- 
sary evidence as to how far Lord Lucan could have 
afforded such assistance ; but not another question 
was put, and the Board dismissed the subject, quite 
as well satisfied apparently with Lord Lucan's expla- 
nation, as if the Brigades had been a hundred miles 
apart. 

2now, surely, seven General Officers were not 
assembled for the purpose of receiving the mere 
allegations of the very officers implicated in the 
mismanagement into which they were directed to 
inquire, as evidence sufficiently contradictory of the 



31 



statements of the Commissioners, and this when they 
had before them a summary of the War Office Returns, 
showing that the Heavy Brigade must, at that time, 
have numbered from 800 to 900 men and horses. 
They also knew nat' about a fortnight after the 
starvation of the Light Cavalry, Lord Lucan, even 
from a diminished force, had been able to spare 494 
horses, and half that number of men, daily, to carry 
up provisions to the Infantry, yet not one could be 
spared for the salvation of the Light Brigade at so 
momentous a crisis. 

The Board, too, must have been aware, from the 
statement of Lord Lucan and the reference to the 
duties in the Return of Major Connolly, that no real See p. 45s ? 
difficulty on that head could have stood in the way. BoardVPro- 
There was no unusual amount of sickness either ceedings. 
of men or horses ; otherwise, according to the usual 
practice, it must have appeared on the face of the 
Returns before the Board. What then was the state 
of the Heavy Brigade after the 21st November, which 
made it quite enough "to forage for themselves" — a 
duty which usually occupied only one-fourth of the 
Force, — Lord Lucan never mentioned, nor did the 
Board think proper to inquire, though the excul- 
pation or culpability of that nobleman, or of Lord 
Cardigan, or of both, depended mainly on the 
explanation. 

As Lord Cardigan had not impugned the accuracy 
of the Report, I was precluded, by previous arrange- 
ment, from directing any questions myself on the 
subject. The investigation was, therefore, entirely 
in the hands of the Board ; how they conducted it 
the results have shown ; yet no matter required 
stricter investigation : for, unhappily, there was but 
too much reason to fear, from the official corre- 
spondence of these noblemen, that there had not been 
between them that cordiality of feeling which is 
essential to effective cooperation in the field, and it 
was but just, by a rigid inquiry, to have afforded 
them an opportunity of showing that their private 



32 



feelings towards eacli other had not been allowed to 
operate to the prejudice of the public interests, and, 
that the starvation of the Light Cavalry Brigade could, 
in no respect, have been attributable to the one of 
these officers having been too proud to ask, and the 
other too hostile to offer assistance, in so dire an 
emergency. 



33 



I now come to that part of the Board's Report 
entitled 

MAJOR- GENERAL SIR RICHARD AIREY'S 
CASE. 

Before entering upon the alleged animadversions 
on the Quartermaster-General's Department, it may 
be useful to give some explanation with regard to a 
portion of the evidence of Sir R. Airey, from which it 
might be inferred that the Commissioners had, through 
ignorance of the details which usually come under 
the cognizance and direction of that Department, 
called on him to answer questions relating to matters 
with which he had no connection. A reference to 
the correspondence in which he had been engaged 
during the winter of 1854, however, will show how 
little ground there was for any such inference, par- 
ticularly when it is borne in mind that the Commis- 
sioners were sent to the Crimea, — not to ascertain 
whether each individual officer had attended to the 
supplies which, strictly speaking, belonged to his own 
Department, but to obtain from those who appeared 
best able to give it, information as to whether these 
supplies had been duly distributed, or why they had 
not been so. The references quoted below will show 
how far the Commissioners were, in this view of the 
case, justified in putting questions to General Airey 
connected with the following subjects, though not 
strictly belonging to his Department. 

In regard to lime-juice, for instance, the Com- See P . 76 of 
missioners found Sir R. Airey in correspondence with A^nSir 161 
the Commissariat. 

In regard to the supply of vegetables, in corre- it>. pages 7 
spondence with the same Department. 

In regard to fuel, in correspondence with the same ib. pages 77, 
Department. 78 ' and 79, 



34 



Appendix. 



Page 184 of As ^ f res h me at, roasted coffee, and tea, the 

Jiviuerioc in 

Commission- Quartermaster-General states that he was constantly 
ers' Report, ^ e channel of communication between Lord Raglan 
and the Commissary General . 

Forage, General Airey affects to consider as an 
Pa es 10 3" Adjutant-General's question, hut a reference to the 
anl 87. ' ' Appendix to the Commissioners' Eeport will show how 
extensive was the correspondence of his Department 
on this subject, while not a single letter appears from 
the Adjutant -General. 
See p. 21 of Even as to soft bread, when a communication was 
made to Lord Raglan, it was the Quartermaster- 
General of the Army who replied to it. 

The question of Transport and Labour, too, was 
so much a subject of correspondence with the Quarter- 
master-General, that the Commissioners may well be 
excused for calling on him for explanations on that 
head, in order to contrast them with the counter- 
statements of the Commissariat. 

The Quartermaster-General, in short, appears to 
have been, except during the period of his illness, a 
party in almost every important transaction emanating 
from Head-Quarters. To use his own words, " The 
" Commissioners found traces of his labours in almost 
" every Department of the Service." It cannot, 
therefore, be matter of surprise, that they should 
have addressed to him extensive queries, whether 
relating to matters strictly within the sphere of his 
own Department or not, as no one was more capable 
of giving the required information. 

With this preliminary observation which appears 
called for, under the circumstances, I shall now 
proceed to review the conclusions of the Board on 
the case of this officer, under the head of 



Separation prom Knapsacks." 



This subject is summarily disposed of by the 
Board as follows : — 



35 



''As regards ihe separation of tlie men from their knapsacks on See P- 
landing in the Crimea, it appears to the Board that this was a matter BoMd'"sR 
entirely within the Department of the Adjutant -General, who, under t> 
the orders of the General Commanding, could alone sec the measure 
carried in execution ; but Sir Richard Airey, having stated his 
readiness to give any information in his power, has said, that when 
the Force recovered its communication with the sea, active measures 
were taken for restoring them, and it is in evidence, that in conse- 
quence of the physical weakness of the men who embarked at Varna, 
a discretionary power as to landing with or without knapsacks was 
given to officers commanding regiments, and that most of them 
availed themselves of that power to lighten the men's burdens. 

" It also appears that no blame is attributable to the Quarter- 
master-General's Department, although much delay w r as occasioned 
in recovering knapsacks from the transports, in consequence of 
various obstacles over which that Department had no control. It 
may, however, be observed, that the packs contained very little 
that could have added to the comfort of the men, a proportion 
of the men's necessaries having been left in the squad-bags at 
Scutari." 

Eo one perusing these paragraphs could ever 
suppose that they related to a subject of so much 
importance as the deprivation of the men, for nearly 
two months, of almost every article of clothing, 
except what they had upon their backs, and this, too, 
at a time w r hen they were suffering from the severest 
weather and constant exposure, by night, and by day, 
and were employed in the trenches on fatigue duties, 
which soon reduced their only suit to rags. 

The destitution of our troops in this respect, as 
they landed, fever stricken, and covered with filth and 
vermin on the shore at Scutari, had excited the asto- 
nishment, and awakened the sympathy of all Europe ; 
well, therefore, might the Crimean Commissioners 
inquire what had occurred to reduce these men to so 
wretched a condition. Was it the result of circum- 
stances beyond control, or was it one of those events 
against which a moderate degree of foresight might 
have provided ? 

The Chelsea Board first puts forward the state- 
ment that the separation of the men from their knap- 
sacks was entirely a matter within the Department of 
the Adjutant-General ; but the evil which the Com- 
missioners commented on, was — not the separation of 

D 2 



36 



See p. i/7 of the men from their knapsacks, but that no prompt 

Evidence in , x 7 ,, 1 f 

commission- measures were taken to recover them. For this, 
ers' Report, judging from the alleged communications of Colonel 
Gordon to the Generals of Divisions on the sub- 
ject, the Quartermaster-General's Department was 
responsible, otherwise why should it have originated 
any such proceedings in the matter ? So far as 
depends on the evidence taken before the Board, 
there appears nothing whatever to controvert the 

assertions of the Commissioners, that 

» 

Page 23 of " Had the whole of the knapsacks and valises been collected 

Commission- under a proper guard in one or two vessels, selected for the 
ers' Report. purpose, and instructed to proceed along the coast till the army 
arrived before Sebastopol, no bad effects would probably have 
iesulted from an arrangement which enabled the men to lighten 
the fatigues of the march ; but for want of this precaution, the 
troops, with few exceptions, had to commence the siege operations 
in the beginning of October, with hardly any clothing beyond what 
they had on." 

Whether it was the Adjutant-General, or the 
Quartermaster-General, or the General Officers of 
Division who were to blame for all this, was no affair 
of the Commissioners, they merely stated a fact, the 
truth and importance of which is universally admitted. 
They did not arrogate to themselves the power of 
determining who was answerable for the fatal conse- 
quences of such an omission. 

The Board next endeavours to make light of the 
inconvenience by staling, on the evidence of General 
Airey, that the packs contained very little that could 
have added to the comfort of the men, a proportion 
of their necessaries having been left in the squad-bags 
at Scutari. 

These General Officers must have known well, 
though the British Public might not, that his knap- 
sack is valuable to the soldier, not merely for what it 
contains, but as a means of keeping his necessaries 
together ; that for want of it, the shirt, boots, and 
socks, brought in his blanket on landing, were in 
most cases lost even before he reached Sebastopol ; 
for, before the tents were got up, if he unrolled 



37 

his blanket to lie down, he had no place in which to 
deposit its contents. Little as the knapsack con- 
tained, therefore, the Commissioners were by no 
means disposed to look lightly on the inconvenience 
occasioned by the want of it, more especially as it 
contained among other things a pair of trousers, of 
which the soldier was much in need. 

But where was the rest of the soldier's clothing 
all that time ? The Commissioners had given the 
Quartermaster-General, or whoever was responsible, 
the credit of supposing that it was in the knapsacks, 
and therefore not readily attainable, whereas his 
evidence showed that a shell-jacket, shirt, and socks, Page 253 of 
besides various minor articles, were lying in the squad- ^^ w °' 
bags at Scutari. 

This would, at first sight, appear a most fortunate 
circumstance for the solclier,because the sqn ad-bags 
being stationary, though the knapsacks were sailing 
about the Black Sea, there could be no difficulty in 
knowing where to find part, at least, of the soldier's 
equipment. Scutari was within a couple of days' 
voyage of Balaklava, and vessels were constantly 
passing and repassing ; — the natural inference, there- 
fore, was, that the contents of these squad-bags 
were forthwith made available for the use of' the 
soldier ; unhappily, however, in most cases the whole 
of the first winter was allowed to pass without their 
being sent for. 

The result of inquiries by me on this subject has 
shown, that out of a total of twenty regiments, of 
which I have been able to trace the dates of the 
return of the squad-bags, none recovered them till 
the end of December or beginning of January, when 
five Kegiments had that good fortune ; two did not 
receive them back till February or March, and the 
remainder not till April or May, the soldier being' 
left during most of the interval almost in rags, a prey 
to vermin, and without a change of any kind. 

The omission to make these squad-bags available 
was not, however, confined to the Crimea. Thousands 



38 



of the army landed at Scutari in the early part of 
the winter, in a state of lamentable destitution with 
respect to clothing. There, at least, it might have 
been expected that the necessaries they contained 
would have been useful in affording a change for 
the men ; but still these phantom garments mocked 
their search, and it was to the charity of a few 
private individuals, administered by the hands of Miss 
Nightingale, that the sick soldier was at length 
indebted for that covering which cleanliness and 
decency required. 

How comes it that the Board of General Officers 
were altogether silent on this part of the inquiry ? 
Readily did they- adopt the statement of General 
Airey with respect to the limited inconvenience 
caused to the soldier by the want of his knapsack, 
though tending to put the Commissioners in the 
wrong; but why stop there, when a few questions 
regarding the fate of the squad-bags would have 
cleared up the whole matter ? ~Eo such course, however, 
appears to have occurred to them ; and the Commis- 
sioners were left to incur the charge of having over- 
stated instead of under-stating, the inconvenience. 

This brings me to the next section of the Board's 
Eeport, entitled, 

"Issues of "Warm Clothing from England." 

On this head the Board reported in the following 
terms : — 

p affe X. of " - Ri cnar( ^ Airey has stated, that the Quartermaster- 
Boards' Re- General's Department had no stores, no storehouses, no store- 
port, keepers, no issuers, nor means of landing transport, none, in fact, 
of the machinery necessary for receiving stores, or for keeping them, 
or for transporting or delivering them to the men ; and that 
the only duty of the Department, in relation to the issue of stores, 
was that of determining the proportions in which they should be 
shared by the troops. 

"It appears to us material to observe, that though the term 
' Quartermaster-General's stores ' seems to have been applied by the 
Commissioners to all stores for which the Quartermaster-General 
made requisition, the responsibility of that officer must be under- 



39 



stood to be limited to the duty of making requisitions for certain 
stores, and nut to their safe custody, stowage, or even issue." 

The absence here commented on of all the acces- 
sories for rendering* the abundant supply of clothing 
which had arrived available to the troops, appears 
meant to convey the impression that the Quarter- 
master-General had really nothing to do with the 
matter, and that so defective was the organization of 
the British Army, which had till then been considered 
perfect, that thousands might perish for want of 
clothing, while it lay almost within reach. I should 
be sorry to assume that this was really the state of 
the case ; but, fortunately, it is not necessary for me 
to enter into any discussion as to the special duties 
of the Quartermaster- General in regard to the cus- 
tody and stowage of stores, the remarks of the 
Commissioners having been chiefly confined to 
those which either were never apportioned to the 
troops at all, or were apportioned in more limited 
quantities than the supply on hand warranted, and 
for which his responsibility cannot be questioned. 

The scarcity of transport was a difficulty which 
the Commissioners were certainly neither disposed to 
conceal nor underrate ; but whatever it may have 
been, it could afford no excuse to the Quartermaster- 
General for not having made the Regiments or 
Divisions acquainted with the quantities in store, if 
they chose to send for them. He could not be aware 
what exertions the men might be disposed to make 
themselves, or their officers to make for them, in 
order to get up supplies so essential to their exist- 
ence ; no such exertions, however, could be expected 
when nothing was known, by either, of the stores 
being there. 

If Sir Richard Airey's views as to the limited 
nature of his duties and responsibilities in regard to 
these stores be correct, both ceased when he made 
the apportionment and issued the requisitions, on 
which each division or regiment could have its share ; 
but, under no circumstances, can it be held to have 



40 



ceased, when he took neither of these steps, and when 
his subordinates could give no better reasons for 
the omission, than were assigned by Colonel Gordon 
and Colonel Wetherall with respect to the rugs, 
blankets, and great coats. 

There are some officers, however, and these too of 
long experience, who would be disposed to go much 
further, and in a common-sense view of the matter, 
to contend that the Quartermaster- General was 
bound, when he saw no disposition on the part of the 
Commissary-General to provide transport for the con- 
veyance of the clothing, t o have brought specially under 
the consideration of the General Commanding-in- 
chief the consequent difficulties in which he was placed, 
and the necessity for imperative orders being given 
to the Commissary- General to bring over, indepen- 
dent of all other requirements, as many of the trans- 
port animals from the opposite coast as would suffice 
to carry up these supplies. The history of the 
Alicante mules, specially ordered by Lord Raglan, 
affords an illustration of what might be done by inde- 
pendent action in this respect ; and the obstinacy or 
opposition of a subordinate officer in such a matter, 
ought surely not to have been permitted to imperil 
the existence and efficiency of a whole army. 

It might have occurred to a Board of General 
Officers that, while so great a difficulty was made 
about conveying to the front a comparatively limited 
weight of warm clothing, immense quantities of shot, 
shell, cannon, and platforms were daily carried up, 
in preparation for another attack ; and that, be- 
fore the Quartermaster- General can be considered as 
having relieved his responsibility with regard to 
transport for his stores, it would appear necessary 
for him to have shown that he had suggested to Lord 
Raglan the expediency of applying a proportion, at 
least, of the same means of transport, for the con- 
veyance of the warm clothing and winter stores so 
much required by the men. 

A reference to the evidence of Sir Colin Campbell 



41 



before the Commissioners, will show that, during the 
very period that the Quartermaster- General main- 
tains the impossibility of transport as a reason for not 
issuing the greater portion of his stores, there had 
been carried to the front, during the eight weeks 
preceding the 29th of January, by the Infantry 
regiments stationed at Balaklava, the following ord- 
nance stores, besides a quantity of shot and shell 
of which no account was taken : — 

Men. 

33 platforms of 60 pieces each, being a load for 3,960 Seep. 152 of 
120 large platform sleepers, loading - - 1,200 Evidence in 
New shoes for platforms in 90 packets - - 90 Comnr.ission- 

450 pickaxes 220 ers ' Re P orL 

About 60 fascines 120 

About 30 cut cowls for platform shoes &c. - 1,236 



6,926 



in addition to 4,000 bags of biscuit, carried as far as 
Lord Eaglan's, being thirteen days' consumption for 
25,000 men. 

How can the Quartermaster-General's statement, 
as to the difficulty of transport, be listened to, with 
such facts as these before us? The weight thus car- 
ried was, at least, three or four times as great as all 
the stores, the non-issue of which had attracted the 
attention of the Commissioners ; and, surely, there 
was little utility in devoting every means to the 
transport of munitions of war, when the hands 
which were to wield them, were paralysed for want 
of clothing and covering. Policy, at least, if not 
humanity, should have dictated a different course. 

Supposing, however, there had been no means of 
transport but what the regiments in front could have 
devised for themselves, did it never occur to the Board 
how very small a proportion of them would have sufficed 
to carry up those stores ? Even where there were 
no bat horses to use, and no regimental chargers that 
could be borrowed, the employment of one hundred 
men from each regiment for a single day, in the early 
part of December, would have carried up all the rugs, 



42 



great coats, and watch coats, and another day 
and a like number of men, would have sufficed in the 
end of that month, when further supplies of these and 
the additional blankets had arrived. If the men sent 
down, had been selected from those who stood in the 
greatest need of coatees and trousers, they could also 
have exchanged their rags for new clothing at Bala- 
klava, without involving any difficulty in carrying back 
the former. 

Besides, the larger portion of the force at Bala- 
klava and Kadekoi had no difficulties as to transport; 
they were close to the stores, and yet, apparently, 
shared no better in the division of them, than the men 
in front. Indeed, it must ever prove a fatal objection 
to the line of defence adopted by the Quartermaster- 
General, that to make further issues dependent on 
the circumstance of whether the whole of those 
previously authorized for the army had, or had not 
been carried away, was in fact to regulate the supply 
by the minimum, instead of the maximum facilities 
of transport, leaving entirely out of account the very 
different circumstances in which several divisions of 
the force were placed in that respect. Why, for 
instance, should not the troops at Kadekoi and 
Balaklava have at once been allowed to obtain their 
full proportion of the supply either on shore or in 
harbour, as soon as it arrived ? Why should they 
have had to wait till the regiments at the furthest 
extremity of the camp, near Inkerman, could send 
down for their proportion ? Several of the Divisions 
which had bat animals could, of course, more readily 
bring away their supplies than those which had none ; 
why, then, should the former have been left to suffer 
from cold, because in other Divisions, nothing could 
be done except by borrowing the officers' horses, or 
sending down men for the clothing, which involved 
frequent delays ? Could the ingenuity of the Quarter- 
master-General's Department devise no better course 
than that all should suffer alike ? Might not corps 
in the immediate vicinity, or which had the amplest 



43 



means of transport, have been allowed to supply 
themselves on shipboard, and the issue from the 
stores have been confined to those which had come 
from a distance ? 

It is painful to suppose that everything was not 
done which circumstances admitted, to prevent men 
perishing from cold, while there was clothing, almost in 
sight, sufficient to relieve their sufferings ; but, when 
even the simple expedient of bringing over the 
squad-bags from Scutari was not resorted to, how 
is it possible to give credit for the best arrange- 
ments having been adopted in regard to the 
distribution of the warm clothing, which was 
necessarily so much more complicated a matter? 
The working of a Department must in some measure 
be judged by its antecedents, and so important an 
omission certainly can not be claimed as a recom- 
mendation by that of the Quartermaster-General. 

It must always be kept in view, that at the period 
when these various supplies of clothing were not 
made available, the men were falling by thousands 
under the rapid stroke of cholera and dysentery, or 
the slow torture of frost bite — whilst morning after 
morning they returned from sitting knee-deep in 
mud of the trenches, to tents the floors of which were 
scarcely drier, — their only clothing consisting of the 
regimental suit, which, to borrow the words of Sir 
Richard Airey, — 

They had had, " in the first voyage out to the Mediterranean, 
through the service in Bulgaria, through the sea-voyage to the 
Crimea ; they had worked in these coats in the trenches, and fought 
all through with them ; they were perfectly threadbare, and in many 
instances did not exist." 

Whilst this was the condition of the army, the 
knapsacks were on the Black Sea, the squad-bags 
at Scutari, thousands of pairs of trousers missing, 
thousands of coatees unused, and tens of thousands 
of great coats, blankets, and rugs, filling the Quarter- 
master-General's stores,or the harbour at Balaklava. 

This occurred principally during the time when, 



44 



owing to the illness of Sir Bichard Airey, the 
duties of Quartermaster-General had devolved upon 
Colonel Gordon. Could that officer and Colonel 
Wetherall have done less for themselves than cling 
to the mere assertions that the question was never 
raised as to giving each man a third blanket or 
second great coat, — that the Quartermasters of 
Eegiments did not like the rugs in preference to 
blankets, — and that the coatees were not issuedbecause 
fresh clothing was expected to arrive ? This, too, when 
Colonel Gordon had an opportunity afforded him on 
the 1st August, after his return to England, of record- 
ing any further explanation he thought proper. 

Without going into any discussion respecting the 
obligation devolving on the Quartermaster- General, 
in these matters, it may safely be presumed that 
it was at least his duty, or that of those acting 
for him, to have acknowledged receipt to the 
Home authorities of this large supply of stores, im- 
mediately on their arrival, and to have pointed out 
the difficulties that prevented or delayed their being 
applied to the purpose for which they were intended. 
Had he done so, perhaps some means of assisting his 
Department might have been devised : but it must 
be presumed that no such communication was made, 
at least till sC late period, otherwise there w r ould have 
been no necessity for including an inquiry as to what 
had become of these stores in the instructions to the 
Commissioners. 



The Board Report next adverts to various details 
relative to the — 



45 



Distribution of Warm Clothing. 

On this head Sir Richard Airey took exception 
to the statement by the Commissioners that "the 
" arrangements relating to the issue of the supplies 
u from the Quartermaster-General's store appear to 
" have been of questionable expediency/' and the 
Board, in the following remarks, apparently adopt his 
views on the subject. 

" Sir Richard Airey thinks it is made to appear inferentially, See p. X. of 
that this supposed want of care in the working of the department Board's Re- 
may have been the occasion, not of mere inconvenience and trouble, P ort * 
but of some of those dreadful privations to which the soldier was 
subjected in the winter of 1854 and 1855, and that although there 
always was a supply of warm clothing in the harbour of Balaklava, 
official formality or mismanagement stood up as a barrier between 
the soldier and his supplies. 

" Warm clothing being an extra issue very unusual in the 
service, the principle adopted by the Quartermaster-General as to 
the apportionment of it, appears to have been a very judicious one, 
viz., that of sending orders that the regiments should apply for it 
according to their strength, for which purpose Sir Richard Airey 
placed an officer (Lieutenant-Colonel McKenzie) at Balaklava, who 
appears to have performed his duties most efficiently ; but the cause 
of these supplies not reaching the men for a considerable time after 
the orders were given, was owing to the deficiency of transport, a 
fact fully admitted by the Commissioners." 

Any one perusing the last of these paragraphs 
would naturally come to the conclusion, that every 
regiment knew perfectly well what was in store, and 
what proportion of it they had to send for, whereas 
it was distinctly stated by Sir John Campbell, in his Evidence to° 
evidence before the Commissioners, that since he had Commissioners 
been in command of the Division, he had never received Report * 
any intimation of the articles of clothing that could be 
obtained for his men on application to the Quarter- 
master-Generals store ; and Sir Eichard Eugland also Pao . e 148of 
stated that he knew nothing in regard to warm clothing Evidence, 
being available, beyond the quantity directed by 
Head-Quarters to be drawn by the Division. 

The Commissioners did not complain of any intri- 
cacy of forms, but that the General Officers of Division 



46 



were never made acquainted with the quantity and 
description of supplies in store or in harbour, which 
might be applicable to the covering and comfort of their 
men, so that they could not adopt even the simple 
expedient of accepting one description of store if 
another was deficient, as for instance, rugs or addi- 
tional great-coats in lieu of blankets. 

A very familiar example of the consequences re- 
sulting from the system, of which the Board express 
their approval, will be perhaps of more service than 
any argument. 

Most persons interested in these matters will 
recollect how much the privations of the Cavalry were 
increased by the want of nose-bags, and the repeated 
applications which were made for them in vain ; but 
they may not recollect the following evidence given 
See second I^ord Lucan before the Sebastopol Committee as 
Report, p. 316. to the real cause of this deficiency in equipment. 

" You state that your horses were frequently in want of nose- 
bags and other necessaries ; were those nose-bags within reach, at 
the time V 

" They were on board the ' Jason.' " 

" W hy were they not given out ?" 

* s The Quartermaster-General always said that they had not got 
them in the army, till the Captain of the * Jason ' came to me to 
beg that I would assist him in relieving his ship of all those horse- 
stores." 

"When was that V 

** This was in the month of January." 

" How long were those stores on board the c Jason f 

" It must have been ever since J uly." 

So that while the horses were losing half their 
barley for want of nose-bags, and eating each other's 
tails in lieu of more substantial nutriment, the nose- 
bags were lying just as useless on board the " Jason " 
as the squad-bags, containing the clothing of the men, 
were at Scutari, and with equally serious results. 

A similar statement by the same authority, will 
be found on the same page, in regard to horse 
medicines, which, after being urgently required for 
five or six months, were at last discovered on board 
the " Medway" in the month of January. 



47 



Witi these statements of Lord Lucan on record, 
it is to be regretted that the Board, instead of 
expressing its satisfaction with the working of such 
arrangements, did not inform themselves as to their 
practical results, in which case they would have 
found that the alteration proposed by the Commis- 
sioners would at least have been valuable as affording 
to the Quartermaster- General's Department some 
security against its own omissions. A Department 
that could leave the army without a change of clothing 
during the greater part of the winter, though 
within a couple of days' sail of their squad-bags 
at Scutari, cannot certainly claim credit for inventive 
faculties of so high an order, that a few counter- 
checks of this description might not have been 
useful. 

The result of the system of distribution, which 
has gained the approval of the Board, will, however, 
be better shown by referring to the several issues 
and seeing how it worked. But, before entering on 
these details, it may be useful to explain why Sir 
Richard Airey was never examined in any w T ay as to 
the delays and omissions alleged to have taken p a g e 232 of 
place in issuing the clothing, a point on which he Proceedings, 
expresses some surprise. 

When the Commissioners, on the 24th of May, went 
to Head Quarters for the purpose of commencing 
the investigations there, respecting the distribution 
of these supplies, they were referred by Sir Richard 
Airey to Colonel Grordon and Colonel "YVetherall, for 
any information they required, because he had been 
obliged to leave this matter in their hands, in con- 
sequence of severe illness at the time the distri- 
bution was going on. 

The proposition was reasonable, and could not 
well have been refused by the Commissioners, parti- 
cularly as the total inability of this officer to attend to 
business at the period adverted to, had been confirmed 
by the evidence of Lord Hardinge, who_, a few weeks 
before, when examined by the Sebastopol Com- 



48 



mittee, had pleaded a similar excuse for the General 
in the following terms : — 

See Vol. 4, (i It is not very well known, but I know it, that he was, from 

20 8*l' QU ' the 16th Novemberti11 the 18fch or 20th December, a cripple in 
bed. He had not been able to move out from an attack of very 
severe rheumatism ; he was blind, and could not read ; he was 
obliged to have everything read to him and written for him ; and he 
was suffering from dysentery. Most people in his state would have 
come to England, but being a man of very considerable spirit and 
nerve, he determined to remain with Lord Raglan, and about the 
1 8th or 20th of December he got up, and was able to crawl 
about on crutches." 

And his Lordship pointed out, in reply to a sub- 
sequent question, that during this illness Colonel 
Gordon, the next in succession, transacted the busi- 
ness of his chief. 

Now, if reference be made to the dates of arrival 
of the clothing, it will be found that between the 
middle of November and the end of December was 
the period when most of the delay complained of 
occurred ; and if the Quartermaster-General was 
then only recovering from severe illness, he could 
scarcely be charged with any personal superintendence 
as regards these duties till after the end of that 
month. 

Under these circumstances it would, of course, 
have been unjust and unreasonable in the Commis- 
sioners to have forced on Sir Richard Airey the 
responsibility of answering questions for which he 
could only obtain the information through the medium 
of subordinates. But what must be said of the want 
of candour on the part of that officer himself in never 
once mentioning, or even hinting at so important a 
reason for no questions being put to him on the sub- 
ject of clothing ? — nay, what must be thought of his 
taunting the Commissioners with this alleged omis- 
sion, in return for their anxiety not to hold him 
responsible for acts for which others were more pro- 
perly accountable ? 

Lord Lucan, it may be observed, knew perfectly 
the fact of General Airey's illness, and alludes to it 



49 



in his replies before the Sebastopol Committee, to the 
following queries : — 

" You stated, did you not, that, from the 29th September to a Vol. II., p. 
much later period, you made frequent applications and complaints 322, Qu. 6701, 
upon various matters to the Quartermaster-General ? to 6703. 

" I made a great many complaints. 

" As you have stated that you received, generally, no answer, 
are you aware that the Quartermaster- General was, at that time, 
either ill or unable to attend to his business ? 

" He was ill, to the best of my recollection, for I had some 
interviews with him at the end of November, and, I should say, for 
the first fortnight or three weeks in December. 

" That was a period during which he could not be expected to 
attend to his business ? 

" No, I do not complain, I only mention the facts." 

General Peel, one of the Members of the Board, 
was present when these explanations were given by 
Lord Hardinge and Lord Lucan, as to General Airey's 
illness, so that four of the officers at Chelsea must 
have been aware of the circumstance ; yet neither 
General Airey, Lord Lucan, General Peel, nor Colonel 
Gordon, ever alluded to it, though its suppression 
was so detrimental to the Commissioners. 

I shall now proceed to follow the remarks of the 
Board through the several items of which the undis- 
tributed stores chiefly consisted. 



Rugs and Blankets. 

Sir R. Airey complained to the Board of the 
Commissioners' Report, because — 

" It is there made to appear that the blankets fell short, and ^ a g e of 
that the men were kept without warm clothing, because it occurred Board s Re " 
to no one to give the 8,000 rugs which were lying in store." p01 ' 

The precise words used by the Commissioners Page 20 of 

Commission- 
Were > ers > Report. 

" These rugs were nearly as well calculated as blankets to give 
protection from the cold, and were, perhaps, better suited to resist 
wet, yet when the supply of blankets fell short, it does not appear 
to have occurred to any one that the rugs were available as a 
substitute. 

E 



50 



The Board appear to have considered it quite 
sufficient that Colonel Wetherall, one of the parties 
chiefly accountable for the non-issue of these rugs, 
should have given this statement a simple contradic- 
tion, asserting that the reason why they were never 
used was because they did not resist wet, though 
Colonel Gordon, who is likely to have known their 
quality as well, admitted, in his evidence to the 
Commissioners, that " it would have been an advan- 
tage for each man to have had a rug under him." 

It would have been a better course for the 
Board to have tested the relative value of the rugs 
and blankets by sending to the Ordnance Department 
for a sample of each, and ascertaining their relative 
weight and materials, when they would have found 
that the former were half a pound heavier than the 
latter, and that though composed partly of cotton, 
the difference in the warmth of that texture, as 
compared with wool, was likely to have been more 
than compensated by the extra weight. 

If, however, the rugs were really inferior to blankets, 
how does it happen that Colonel Wetherall himself, 
places them u always under the same category as 
blankets," and states that he was in the habit of 
altering requisitions for blankets by inserting the 
words " or rugs," or why should he have created 
an obstacle to their being used by offering one 
only as the equivalent for a blanket ? Did it 
never occur to him, or to any other in the Department, 
that, by issuing two, more especially to the Cavalry 
and Infantry in and around Balaklava and Kadikoi, 
who were likely to have had least trouble in carrying 
them away, any such difficulty might at once have 
been got over, and several thousand blankets set 
free for distribution to the men in front. 

The absence of all such expedients, at a time 
when the inventive faculties of every one required 
to have been on the stretch, necessarily caused the 
arrangements for the distribution of these Quarter- 
master- General's stores to appear to the Com- 



51 



missioners " of questionable expediency." They 
were charitable enough to suppose that these omis- 
sions arose, not from want of consideration or ability, 
but because, from the Quartemaster-GeneraTs De- 
partment having so much on hand, they had not 
leisure to give sufficient attention to such matters; 
and they thought it not improbable, that had the 
General Officers of Division known of such large 
supplies being in store at the time of their greatest 
need, arrangements might have occurred to them 
by which they could more readily have been made ap- 
plicable to the wants of the troops. In short, the 
united intelligence of the Divisional Staff would thus 
have been brought to bear upon the difficulty, instead 
of that of the Head- Quarters only; and, judging from 
the result, the public service might have derived 
benefit from the change, and could certainly not 
have suffered more than under the existing arrange- 
ments. 

Colonel Wetherall, before the Board of General p ag e272 of 
Officers, however, originated the idea that these rugs ^^g 1 * 1 * * 
were not intended for the use of the army gene- cee mgs * 
rally, but were considered always to be "Hospital 
stores." He even goes so far as to allege that they, 
were "all handed over to the Purveyor," though how 
that could be the case when they remained in the 
Quartermaster-General's stores, to the number of 
22,000 when the Purveyor never acknowledged 
having received them, and when Colonel Wetherall 
was, according to his own account, offering them to 
the troops instead of blankets, it would apparently 
baffle human ingenuity to explain. 

In this statement Colonel Wetherall seems to 
have forgotten that rugs intended for hospitals are 
usually of a different size and quality from the 
barrack rugs sent out as Quartermaster-General's 
stores, being larger and heavier by upwards of a 
pound, and with a greater admixture of wool, so that 
there could be no possibility of mistaking the one for 
the other ; besides, it has been ascertained, by refer- 

e 2 



52 



ence to the office from which they were sent out that 
they were actually Barrack rugs, 

f The hospitals, too, having already been supplied 
with about 10,000 of their own rugs, it is not likely 
that more, of an inferior description, would have been 
required; indeed, the best proof to the contrary 
is, that of the first 8,000 which arrived, none were 
issued to the hospitals at all; and it was not till after 
the middle of January, by which time the number had 
reached 22,000, and an abundance of other supplies 
of every description of warm clothing had arrived for 
the troops, that 302 were sent there. These, as 
well as some small subsequent issues, amounting in 
all to about 1,000, are understood to have been for 
the use of some of the men proceeding to Scutari, 
to whom it was not considered expedient to issue 
hospital rugs. 

That 22,000 rugs should have been left unissued, 
at a time of unparalleled suffering from cold, merely 
because about 1,000 of them were used for hospital 
purposes, about two months after their arrival, was 
apparently too much, however, even for the belief of 
the Board. This defence was accordingly not alluded 
to in their Eeport ; nor should I now have mentioned 
it, but from an apprehension lest the omission should 
be liable to misconstruction. 



With respect to the blankets, it is necessary to 
premise that in this part of the Eeport of the General 
Officers, there occurs a matter so seriously affecting 
— not Sir Richard Airey or Colonel Wetherall — not 
the responsibility of the Quartermaster-General's 
Department, but the character of the Board itself, 
that I approach it with deep regret. 

They conclude that part of the Eeport which refers 
to the supply of rugs and blankets in the following 
words : — 

Page XI. of " Colonel Wetherall, in his evidence given to the Commissioners 
Board's Re- in the Crimea, informed them that : — 
port. 



53 



" ' In the month of December alone, no less than 22,740 blankets 
were issued by the Department, though only 17,323 were carried 
away.' 

"This portion of Colonel Wetherall's evidence was omitted by 
the Commissioners in their Report, but was laid before us by 
Sir R. Airey."— (p. 259.) 

This is a most serious charge, directly affecting 
the good faith of the Commissioners, and assuredly 
before making it the Board were bound, in justice to 
their own reputation, as well as out of consideration 
to the Commissioners, to have satisfied themselves 
of its accuracy. With what feelings, then, must this 
part of the Report be regarded, when it is known that 
Colonel Wetherall never gave any such evidence to 
the Commissioners in the Crimea, nor anything like 
it ; that General Airey never stated to the Board that 
Colonel Wetherall had given such evidence, and that 
the whole reflection, severe as it would be, if true, is 
utterly destitute of foundation. 

The Board refer, as their authority, to Colonel 
Wetheralfs evidence, pages 267-8, and to Sir Richard 
Airey's evidence, p. 259, of their proceedings ; but 
neither the passage referred to in the evidence of 
the former, nor the original Minutes of Evidence 
alluded to by that officer, and a copy of which is 
given by the Board at p. 471 of their proceedings, 
contain any such statement as that " in the month of 
*' December alone, no less than 22,740 blankets 
were issued by the Department, though only 17,323 
were carried away,'' nor anything of the kind, so that 
an imputation has thus been cast on the Commis- 
sioners equally groundless and odious. 

So far from there being any foundation for the 
assertion that this statement was made by Colonel 
Wetherall, on the occasion of his giving his evidence 
before the Commissioners in the Crimea, and sup- 
pressed by them, it occurs for the first time during the 
course of the proceedings in Sir Richard Airey's 
address to the Board of General Officers, at Chelsea, 
on the 2nd of May, 1856. He there states, on his own 
authority, merely, and without reference to Colonel 



54 



Page 259 of Wetherall or any one else, that, " In the month of 
Bo a C r e d ediD§S ° f December alone, no less than 22,740 blankets were 
issued by the Department though only 17,323 were 
carried away;" a statement which may be in accord- 
ance with the fact, because a day or two would 
probably be required to go through the official routine 
of communicating to the Divisions, Brigades, and 
Eegiments that the blankets were ready for delivery ; 
after this, the duties would have to be so arranged 
as to admit of a portion of the men being sent down 
to Balaklava, which might occupy another day or two, 
and if the officers volunteered to lend their horses to 
assist, as they generally did, these might not always 
be ready. The blankets authorized to be issued in^the 
latter part of December could not well, therefore, 
have been received till the early part of the following* 
month ; and had the Board only referred to the return 
of issues from the Quartermaster-General's store 
for January, they would have found that, before a 
week had elapsed, the whole of these blankets were 
in use. 

So much for the accuracy of the Board's asser- 
tions regarding the issue of blankets in December. 
As to the additional supply which arrived in the end 
of that month, the Report of the Commissioners 
merely stated that — 

Page 26 of. " When the intelligence of the loss of the * Prince,' and of the 
Commission- increasing severity of the climate in the Crimea was received in 
ers' Report. England, additional supplies of blankets were sent out. On the 
24th and 27th of December, two vessels arrived at Balaklava, bring- 
ing 25,000, a number which was more than sufficient to have 
given a third blanket to every man. This would have enabled him 
to have two dry blankets in his tent, besides the one which he 
generally brought in wet from the trenches ; an arrangement which 
had been found very beneficial in the .Naval Brigade." 

Xow, considering that the sufferings of the men 
from cold were at their height during the month of 
January, and that the number affected by frost-bite 
bore melancholy evidence of the necessity for ad- 
ditional covering at that time, it was, surely, not too 
much to expect that, if a communication had been 



55 



made to each regiment of this timely supply being 
in the harbour, and at their disposal, to the extent 
of one extra blanket per man, every officer's horse 
would, as on previous occasions, have been cheer- 
fully lent for the purpose, if no other means pre- 
sented itself of carrying up so necessary a supply. 
But how were such exertions likely to have been 
called forth, when it was not generally known either 
by officers or men that such a quantity was at hand ? 
The troops in the vicinity of Kadakoi and Balaklava 
could at all events have gone on board and supplied 
themselves. Any course surely would have been 
better than to have kept most part of this abundant 
supply either in the store or on shipboard during the 
winter, and to have summed up all that had been 
done towards making so valuable a resource available, 
in the pithy observation of Colonel Gordon, that he 
was " not aware the question had ever been raised as 
to the expediency of issuing a third blanket." 

I next come to the remarks of the Board in regard 
to the issue of 

Great Coats. 
On this head their Report states as follows : — 

" It appears that Lord Raglan, in the due exercising of his 
dispensing powers, substituted for the complicated War Office Form 
of Requisition for great coats the following form : — 

" Required for the Regiment, 

Signa tu r e 

Quartermaster- General' s Office, 

"And a tabular statement laid before the Board, and hereto 
annexed, shows that orders had been issued, up to January 20, for 
6577 great coats, of which only 3049 had been drawn; and it is 
stated by Colonel Wetherall, in his evidence, that every man had 
by that time been supplied with a sheepskin coat. 

" The only reference made by Colonels of regiments in their 



56 



replies to the Commissioners respecting great coats, was that by 
Colonel Douglas, 79th Regiment, who states, that on making a 
requisition for 300 coats, it was promptly complied with." 

With reference to these remarks, it only appears 
necessary to point out that no complaint of any 
complication in the form of the requisition was ever 
made by the Commissioners, and that their observa- 
tions in regard to the great coats referred not to what 
was, or was not issued, at so late a date as the 20th 
January, by which time the arrival of sheepskin coats 
began to diminish the necessity for additional great 
coats, but to the question why no steps were taken 
for making those already in harbour and in store, as 
well as the thousands which had, for many months, 
been lying at Scutari available for the comfort of 
the troops in the end of ^November. To attempt 
evading the responsibility by referring to transactions 
of a later date, is too palpable an evasion to escape 
the notice even of the least discerning. 

The statement of the Commissioners on the sub- 
ject of the great coats in their report was as follows : 

Page 27 of M By the end of November, or beginning of December, about 
Commission- 12,000 great coats also had arrived at Balaklava. Of these, there 
ers Report. remained in store, during the months of December and January, 
when they were most urgently required by the men, upwards of 
9,000, besides nearly 2,000 watch cloaks. These would have fur- 
nished one to every two men, and, supposing one-half to be on 
duty, would have afforded to each man a dry great coat or cloak to 
put on when he returned to his tent from the trenches, instead of 
lying down, as he often did, in one that was wet and muddy. 

" But it was not necessary to have waited even so late as the 
end of November to have commenced an extensive issue of addi- 
tional great coats, for in order that there might be a proper reserve 
in store of so essential an article of equipment, 10,000 had been 
sent from England to Scutari so early as the month of July ; of 
these 3,325 only were sent to Varna, and the remainder lay in store 
at Scutari till the middle of December. There seems to be no 
reason why these should not have been at Balaklava whenever the 
approach of cold weather required additional clothing ; and with 
the 11,000 which arrived in the end of November, they would 
have afforded ample covering at a comparatively early period for 
all the men exposed on night duty ; and on the arrival, in the end 
of December, of the gregoes, or hooded great coats, purchased by 
Major Wetherall at Constantinople, every man might have been 
supplied either with one of these or a great coat." 



57 



It is impossible to form any adequate estimate of 
the amount of suffering, disease, and death which 
might have been prevented had these been issued, 
and the soldier been thus enabled to have a change, 
instead of remaining all night in the same wet coat 
and blanket which he brought from the trenches. 

At the early period, too, when these great coats 
arrived, or might have been brought over, there 
appeared no insuperable difficulties in regard to 
transport, nor were the men so exhausted that they 
could not have come down for such an object. Surely 
when the Commissioners found that with so ample a 
resource at hand, the issues had only amounted to 
3000 up to the last week in December, it was their 
duty to record their opinion that this was not a 
distribution of the clothing in the sense referred to 
in their instructions, nor that which they had been 
led to expect. 

The only circumstance which could have pre- 
vented such a conclusion on their part, was a satis- 
factory explanation of the non-issue ; but all Colonel 
"Wetherall stated on that subject was, that "so far as 
he was aware, it was never contemplated to give each 
soldier more than one regimental great coat, espe- 
cially at a time when additional warm clothing was 
expected." Colonel Gordon expressed himself to the 
same effect, and almost in the same words, adding, 
that the sheepskin coats were considered sufficient, 
though he knew that these were not issued for six 
weeks after the period to which the Commissioners 
were referring. That officer also alluded to the pro- 
bability of there not being a sufficient number of great 
coats to issue a second one to each man, as if that 
could be any reason why they should not have been 
made available so far as they would go. He also 
pointed out the restriction in the Queen's Warrant, 
and even went so far as to touch upon the possibility 
of being made personally responsible for any issues 
out of the usual course. 

Not a word, however, was said of any difficulties 



58 



of transport by either of these officers, so far as 
regardst his supply; in fact, considering that a party 
of forty or fifty men from each regiment could have 
carried to the front in a single day their share of the 
great coats, even if none of the officers 7 horses could 
have been borrowed for that purpose, as was usually 
the case, it is inconceivable that any barrier of this 
description could have existed to so valuable a supply 
being made available. There appears no good reason 
for the delay even, of taking these supplies into store 
at all, for in so small and so crowded a harbour, all 
the division required might apparently have been made 
equally well on shipboard 

Instead of examining merely the parties who 
were responsible for the delay, the Board might, 
on so important amatter, have called before 
them a few of the many officers of regiments in this 
country, who could readily have answered the simple 
question, whether, if more blankets and more great 
coats had been at their disposal in November or 
December, they could have found the means of making 
them useful for the protection of their men, which 
was really the question at issue. 

The fact of Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas having 
obtained 300 great coats, probably in return for as 
many which had been worn the regulated period, is no 
evidence that the distribution was as general as it 
ought to have been. 

I have already pointed out the very serious error 
into which the Board of General Officers have fallen 
in their reference to what they supposed to have been 
the evidence given by Colonel Wetherall with regard 
to the issue of blankets. 

A mistake, hardly less serious, occurs in their 
reference to the evidence of the same witness with 
regard to the issue of great coats. 

The Board^ referring to a tabular statement of 
this issue u up to January 20," adds, " it is stated 
by Colonel Wetherall, in his evidence, that every man 
had at that time been supplied with a sheepskin coat" 



59 



If every man had really, by the 20th January, 
been supplied with a sheepskin coat, that might 
account for no more great coats being required after 
that date, but could certainly form no good reason 
for many thousands of great coats being left unissued 
in the months of November, December, and up to 
the 20th January, when the men most required them, 
and which was the period referred to by the Commis- 
sioners ; but, unfortunately for the conclusions of the 
Board, no statement of the kind is to be found in 
Colonel Wetherall's evidence : nor was it likely that 
he should have made any such assertion, when the 
Returns furnished by his own Department, and which 
were before the Board of General Officers, showed that, See Commis . 
up to that date, the issue of sheepskin coats amounted siers' Report s 
to no more than 6,464. _ l^LL 

The dates of the issues of the sheepskin coats has 
so important a bearing, when assigned as a reason 
for not distributing the great coats, that it may be 
useful to quote them from the Return of Issues : — 

January 4 38 Brought up . . . . 1,751 

„ 5 47 January 13 1,163 

6 5 „ 14 630 

7 17 „ 15 1,511 

8 14 „ 16 302 

9 45 „ 17 730 

„ 10 35 „ 18 170 

„ 11 350 „ 19 120 

„ 12. . . . 1,200 „ 20 87 



Carried up. . 1,751 Total 6,464 

About 11,500 were issued- between the 20th and 
end of January, and 11,000 more were only given out 
of store in the course of February. 

It may also be necessary, before leaving this 
branch of the subject, to call attention to the marked 
difference in the explanation regarding the non-issue 
of the great coats, given by Colonel Wetherall to the 
Commissioners in the Crimea, viz., " that so far as he Page 165 of 
was aware,, it was never contemplated to give each Report of Com- 
soldier more than one :" and what the same officer missioned. 



60 



Page 283 of subsequently stated to the Board, "that it never 
ce eding, Pr0 " entered into anybody's mind that the issue was 
limited to the replacing of the coats which had been 
worn any period whatever." 

If no man was to have more than one regimental 
great coat, it is quite clear that the issue must have 
been limited to the replacing of great coats which 
had become unserviceable, yet Colonel Wetherall 
informed the Board that this never entered into any- 
body's mind, and they appear to have taken his 
statement for granted, though in direct opposition to 
what, was previously given in evidence by him to the 
Commissioners on the same subject. 



The next of the issues, referred to by the Board, 
are — 

Watch Coats, Coatees, Trousers. 
As to which they observe — 

Page XII. of " In regard to the apportionment of these articles, it appears 
Board's Re- ± us ^ f roni the evidence of Colonel Wetherall, the officer who 
port ' superintended their apportionment, that every means were taken 

to issue to the troops such of them as were actually in store or 
available for use. But all the coatees were found to be too small 
for the men, by reason of the great quantity of underclothing worn 
by them. The shoes were also much too small for all purposes of 
service in the field. 

" This statement with respect to boots and shoes is borne out 
by the proceedings of a Board of Survey, on the unfitness of 
ammunition boots issued to the men, held in the 19th Regiment, on 
the 8th January, 1855. 

Though the Board must, from this, be understood 
as expressing themselves satisfied with regard to the 
distribution of the watch coats, they do not state 
upon what grounds. Considering that these arrived 
in November, — that 2,050 were in store on 2nd 
December, and that they were much wanted for the 
protection of the sentries, it does not appear why 



61 



authority should not have been given for issuing 
the whole at once, instead of one-half heing delayed 
till the 21st Decemher. As the number was so 
limited, want of transport could have nothing to do 
with the expediency of the regiments being made 
acquainted with the fact that the watch coats were 
there, if they could only manage to bring them up 
from Balaklava. 



With regard to the novel reason assigned for the 
non-distribution of the coatees, it is only necessary 
to observe that, as shown by the Quartermaster- 
General's Return, they arrived in the harbour on 28th 
November to the number of 5,934, at which time the 
men had no under clothing at all. Most of them w^ere 
without any shirt, except what they had had on their 
backs ever since their arrival in the Crimea, and 
scarcely a single article of under clothing was issued 
to them until after that day ; it was only during the 
month of December that they were completed with 
one suit, and it was January before they had a second. 
How, then, could the quantity of under clothing have 
been so great as to prevent the coatees being of any 
use ? Surely a common Jersey and a shirt, even had 
they possessed them, could have offered no serious 
impediment, particularly considering the reduced con- 
dition of the men from a Crimean regimen and Crimean 
labours. 

Such an excuse looks more like a jest upon the 
condition of the men, than one to be deliberately 
made, and as deliberately received. A Board of 
General Officers cannot require to be told that, 
even when the soldier had sufficient variety in his 
under clothing to admit of his wearing two or three 
shirts at a time, as alleged by Colonel Wetherall, he 
would gladly have divested himself of one of them for 
the additional warmth afforded by a coatee, or that 
these are usually sent out by the Ordnance of 



62 



See p. 166 
of Evidence. 



Si 

Evidence 



;e p. 



166 of 



Page 284 of 
Board's Pro- 
ceedings. 



different sizes, and that great, indeed, must have been 
the increased bulk of the soldier, before coatees 
intended for men of six feet could have been unfit for 
those of a medium or minimum size ; yet not a single 
coatee appears to have been issued, the same number 
being in store on the 81st March, as arrived by the 
" Ottawa " on the 28th November. 

Without wishing to throw any unnecessary dis- 
credit on the statement of Colonel Wetherall, I may, 
perhaps, be permitted to observe, that when extra- 
ordinary explanations of this kind are given, it is 
better that they should come from any other source 
than the party most interested in supporting them. 

Had the Board referred to the evidence on this 
subject, given by Colonel Wetherall before the Com- 
missioners in the Crimea, they would have found " that 
they (the coatees) were not issued because the new 
clothing for each regiment was shortly expected," 
yet this regimental clothing, as will hereafter be 
shown, did not arrive till two months later ; so that 
according to that officer's own showing, he, on an 
expectation which was not realized, postponed the 
issue for that long period, while the men were in 
great want and suffering. This is not however, the 

the delay ; he also states 
probably have been issued 
the trousers, (2nd Decem- 
store was not reported;" 
not a word is said about their being too small. 

It may afford a valuable instance of the incon- 
venience attending a plurality of excuses, that if the 
last of these was correct, neither of the two former 
could be so, and that if the second exhibited the 
true state of matters, the reason assigned in the first 
was equally unnecessary and inadmissible. 

But I have not yet exhausted this diversity of 
excuses respecting the coatees, for Colonel Wetherall 
in his examination informs the Board, that they were 
not issued, " because at the time when they arrived, 
i£ the regimental clothing had also arrived for the 



only reason assigned foi: 
" that the coatees would 
about the same time as 
ber) but their being in 



63 



••army, and it was at Balaklava, and could not be 
f carried up to the men." The excuse was no longer 
that it was expected, as the Commissioners had been 
told in the Crimea, but that it had actually arrived. 

On the very same day, however, that Colonel 
Wetherall made this statement, Lieutenant-Colonel 
M-Kenzie, the Assistant Quartermaster-General at 
Balaklava, had the following question put to him p age 297 of 
by the Board on this subject : — Proceedings. 

" So far as your knowledge extends, you believe that the regi- 
mental clothing did not reach the Crimea till January ? 

Certainly not. I am quite sure it did not reach the Crimea 
till January, and I think it was towards the end of January." 

Now the coatees arrived on the 28th Novem- 
ber, the regimental clothing not till two months after, 
indeed, I believe, that three months was nearer the 
time in the case of many regiments, and yet Colonel 
Wetherall states, that the former was not issued, 
because the latter had arrived, and the Board admit 
the statement apparently without mark or comment ; 
nay, more, actually enumerate these coatees among Page xix. 
the instances showing the activity of Colonel Gordon, ° ard ' s Re * 
in authorizing supplies as soon as possible after they 
were received and landed, though not a single one was 
ever issued, or authorized to he issued. 

Further comment appears unnecessary. 



With regard to the trousers, the conclusions of 
the Board are scarcely compatible with the fact, that 
during the month of December, when they would have 
been of the most vital importance to the troops, they 
could not be found ; and so apprehensive was Colonel 
Gordon that they had been sent to sea, that he See Appendix 
wrote, on the 28th December, a letter to Captain g? nere'Report 
Christie for an explanation of the reason why the p. 93. 
orders, as to every vessel clearing out her cargo 
before she sailed, had not been complied with. This 
ultimately led to the discovery that the trousers 



64 



were in the harbour, and the issue appears to have 
commenced early in the following month, but was 
only carried to the extent of about 3,000 pairs out 
of 6,000. 

With respect to this supply, however, it is essen- 
tial to notice as a striking instance <of the difficulty 
of placing any reliance even on the statements of the 
Quartermaster-G-eneral's Department, regarding what 
See \ dix y rea % ^ issue, that in the Return which they 

to Commis- 

furnished to the Commissioners in the Crimea of the 
sioners'Report, clothing in their store, 3,100 pairs of trousers were 
entered as issued in the week ending 2nd December, 
and this statement is renewed in the Return 
ending 23rd December, though, on the 28th of 
that month, Colonel Gordon, as would appear from 
his letter above quoted, was still in search of them, 
and not a single pair had left, or could have left 
the store. 

To show how necessary was the immediate issue 
of those supplies — particularly the coatees, trousers, 
and great coats — I need only refer to the following 
passage in evidence before the Board, illustrating the 
condition of the men in the early part of December, 
and which derives importance from the sanction it 
received from Sir Richard Airey. 

In the examination of Colonel M'Kenzie before 
the Board, the Judge Advocate-General read the 
following statement from the evidence of Mr. Mac- 
donald a witness examined before the Sebastopol 
Committee. 

2nd Report, p. "The men often arrived*' [i. e., at Constantinople from the 
285 of Sebasto- Crimea] " without their shoes ; they were either like those which 
pol Committee. Qne somG times sees on the feet of beggars in this country, or they 
were sometimes without shoes at all, and their shirts had either been 
cast away in utter disgust at their filthiness, or torn in shreds, or 
covered with dirt, and they were swarming with vermin; their 
troivrc-rs were all torn about the legs, and torn in every direction ; 
their coats were ragged where they retained them, and sometimes 
they came down without coats at all, and sometimes without great 
coats. Some men who appeared in great coats, wore those of their 
comrades who had died on the way down." 



Go 



In reference to this passage, Sir Richard Airey 
saidj — 

•'I am sorry to say that I think that which has been read is Page 294 of 
nearly accurate ; the army at that time was really toithout clothes. Board's Pro- 
We had landed in the Crimea, and it was not known till the 3th of c ce<hngs. 
Xovember that we were going to remain there; and between that 
time and the period that Colonel M'Kenzie speaks of, the army was 
really without clothing ; therefore the men that went down to 
Scutari — the sick and wounded — were obliged to go with what 
clothing they had. In many instances their coats were entirely 
worn out. as it is known they are issued in April, and they had had 
their coats in the first voyage out to the Mediterranean ; they had 
gone through the summer in Bulgaria with them — through the sea- 
voyage to the Crimea ; they had worked in those coats in the 
trenches, and fought all through with them, and they were perfectly 
threadbare, and in many instances did not exist. That is quite 
true." 

It was at this critical time that these supplies 
arrived, and yet they were not used though so much 
wanted. I leave to others to decide whether suffi- 
cient reason has been assigned, or whether this 
officer, who points out so distinctly the wants of the 
men, can be held blameless for not having taken 
care that the trousers in the soldiers knapsack, and 
the shell jacket, shirt, and socks, left in the squad- 
bags at Scutari, should have been made available to 
prevent such suffering. 

With regard to a proper supply of boots and 
shoes, much of the misery of the soldiers arose no 
doubt, from the want of this, the most important of 
all military equipments on active service. The Com- 
missioners, therefore, considered it their duty to 
inquire and report at some length upon the subject. 

The Board of G-eneral Officers, however, pass 
this matter over with the statement, undoubtedly 
true and confirmatory as far as it goes of the.Eeport 
of the Commissioners, that "the shoes were much 
too small for all purposes of service in the field," 
and they add, " this statement with respect to boots 
and shoes, is borne out by the proceedings of a 

F 



66 



' Board of Survey, on the unfitness of ammunition 
boots issued to the men/ held in the 19th Regiment, 
on the 8th January, 1855." 

It is somewhat remarkable and worth notice, 
principally as showing how little care has been exer- 
cised by the Board in the examination of evidence 
before them, that the Report of the " Board of Survey, 
&c.,'' is w T holly silent as to the smallness of the boots, 
and is confined to a statement of general unfitness 
for service, inasmuch as "it appears in many cases, 
Page 1%, of that two or three days wear on duty and fatigues, have 
Commissioners rendered the boots useless, the heels and soles becoming 
Report. detached from the uppers." 



Tents. 

This is a subject into which it does not appear 
necessary to enter. Nothing was stated in the Report 
of the Commissioners, with regard to the tents, 
affecting either the Quartermaster- General's or any 
other Department ; the object of their remarks was 
merely to show that a much more ample supply 
than usual of tent equipage had been afforded to 
the army in the Crimea, and that if reliance could 
be placed on the Returns received from the Tower, 
they were all new, with the exception of a frac- 
tional part, which had previously been used at 
Chobham. 



Paillasses. 

Though the Board have expressed an opinion 
against the possibility of these being of service to 
the men, few I apprehend who are aware of the suf- 
ferings of the troops in the month of December will 
be disposed to concur with them. To absolve from 
responsibility at such a time, it would be necessary 
to show that every possible expedient had been 



67 



resorted to. If one paillasse case was too thin to be 
of any use under the soldier, when straw or wool 
could not be obtained to stuff' it, what was to pre- 
vent three or four of them being issued for the pur- 
pose. At a time when even the sick considered 
themselves fortunate if they could get empty corn 
sacks to lie upon, surely these paillasse sacks were 
not to be altogether despised. If, when placed 
under the soldier, they were of little benefit, he 
might at least have had some of them to throw 
over him till a sufficiency of blankets could be pro- 
cured. If it was not worth the trouble of the 
soldiers to come from the front for them, w T hy not 
have divided them among the troops at Kadikoi 
and Balaklava ? Perhaps the Cavalry might have 
found some means of filling them from the straw 
which was often left in heaps on the wharves, or 
they might perhaps, have been useful for carrying 
it away, in which there was often much difficulty ; 
but if no one knew them to be in store, and at 
the disposal of regiments, no such expedients could 
be resorted to or thought of: at all events, any 
course would have been better than leaving them to 
cumber the store rooms, where the cost of the space 
they occupied must, in the course of the winter, 
have more than equalled their value. 



Huts. — Road to Balaklava, fyc. 

It appears unnecessary to enter into the question 
of the huts, inasmuch as though the Commissioners 
went fully into the subject in their Report, they made 
no imputation whatever upon the Quartermaster- 
General's Department with regard to it. The ques- 
tion as to the shelter for the horses has been already 
discussed, and it is needless to recur to it, 

With regard to the u Road to Balaklava," the 
Commissioners considered it their duty to report in 



68" 



the following terms, that the want of this road added 
to the difficulties of carrying supplies to the army : — 

Page 18 of " The want of a road from Balaklava to the front, passable for 

Commission- Commissariat carts, greatly increased the difficulty of supplying the 
ers' Report. army after the middle of November ; but the officers commanding 
Divisions, who were examined upon the subject, are unanimous in 
their opinion that it would have been impossible to employ a suffi- 
cient number of men to make the road, and at the same time to 
carry on the military operations in which the army was engaged." 

The Board cite this passage, and say: — 

" Sir Richard Airey has considered it sufficient for his vindication 
to quote the words of the Commissioners in their own Report, as 
satisfactorily explaining, so far at least as his own Department was 
concerned, the causes of the defects and the difficulty which existed 
in remedying them." 

It was an easy, and under the circumstances 
perhaps not an unpardonable course on the part of 
Sir Eichard Airey to assume the air of an accused 
person when no accusation had been made — to speak 
of " vindication " from charges which had never been 
brought, and to seek to give to the simple statement 
of a fact by the Commissioners the appearance of an 
admission by a hostile party. But it is unfortunate, 
to say the least of it, that a Board of General Officers, 
clothed with a judicial character, aud speaking under 
judicial responsibilities, should have permitted them- 
selves to adopt such a perversion of the Report of the 
Commissioners, and even to have added the following 
insinuation : — 

Page XIV. of u rj> this passage may be added the admission of the Com- 
oara » e- missioners, that hired labour could not be obtained, and the 
demand for the services of the troops in the trenches, and for other 
military duties, was such that they could not be spared for other 
, purposes." 

In concluding the preceding observations as to 
the non -issue of the extensive supplies of clothing 
and covering, sent out in the early part of the winter, 
and a considerable portion of which was still in the 
Quartermaster-General's Store, on the arrival of the 



Page XIV. of 
Board's Re- 
port. 



69 



Commissioners in March, notwithstanding the dread- 
ful sufferings of the men in the meantime, perhaps 
I may be permitted to refer to the Eeport of the 
Sebastopol Committee, in which the Board will find 3 i6,°Qu. 6631 
the following explanation, by Lord Lucan, of the 
cause of all these delays and omissions : — 

" The custom of the service makes it the business of the Quarter- 
master-General to receive all the supplies for the army that are 
not ■ de louche,' and a more absurd or a more mischievous system, 
or one that requires a more immediate change there cannot be, and 
there is nothing like it in any other army in the world ; for though 
the officers were thoroughly fit for their duties in the field, yet from 
the class that the Quartermasters-General are taken, men more un- 
fitted for such duties as those, could not possibly be fixed upon." 

Fortunately, it is not necessary for me to offer 
any opinion as to the justice of this sweeping censure ; 
but I must express my surprise that General Airey 
should have been so sensitive as to the remarks of the 
Commissioners, that they conceived the arrangements 
in his Department for the distribution of the stores 
to have been of " questionable expediency," while he 
allowed to pass altogether unnoticed this denunciation 
by Lord Lucan of the total unfitness of himself and 
his subordinates for that important part of their duty. 

The Commissioners did not make use of the 
strong language used by Lord Lucan, nor did they 
suggest the still more vigorous remedy which occurred 
to the Duke of Wellington, as fitting a case in which 
the necessities of the Troops sink into insignficance 
compared with their sufferings during the winter of 
1854-5, in the Crimea. Writing to General Fane, 
from Pero Negro, on the 3rd of November, 1810, 
he says : — 

u I wish I had it in my power to give you well-clothed Troops, Despatches, 
or to hang those who ought to have given them their clothing.— - Vol. VI. 

" Believe rae, &c, 

"Wellington." 



70 



I next come to that part of the Report entitled 
. THE HOK COLONEL GORDON'S CASE. 

This case is peculiar in its nature, inasmuch as 
the substance of it consists — not of any attempt to 
impugn the correctness of the Commissioners' Report, 
or to justify the conduct of the Department with 
which Colonel Gordon was connected ; hut of a charge 
against the Commissioners of bad faith in dealing 
with the evidence of himself and Colonel Wetherall. 

Such a charge, too, is the more ungenerous, as it 
originated in the latitude allowed by the Commis- 
sioners to the Officers of a Department seriously 
affected by the non-distribution of the clothing sup- 
plies, in order that they might be able to state, up to 
the latest period, and in any terms they conceived 
best for their justification, such explanations as they 
had to offer. 

This necessarily gave to the result of one or two 
days' examination on these matters the character 
rather of memoranda for subsequent revision and 
alteration, than of evidence completed and signed, as 
in the case of the other officers examined in the 
Crimea. It must never be lost sight of, therefore, 
in what follows on this subject, that it is only to 
these incomplete memoranda that the statements of 
Colonel Gordon and Colonel Wetherall relative to 
alleged omissions apply, and that even had the whole 
of them been published in the manner advocated by 
those officers before the Board, no change of any 
moment would have been necessary in the Report of 
the Commissioners' observations. 

I shall now proceed to notice the conclusions of 
the Board on this subject. 



71 

The words of the Report are : — 

" Colonel Gordon called tbc attention of the Board in the first Page XV. 
instance to the following statements which had been made by Colonel g nd 5X pg f 
Tulloch during- the course of the proceedings before the Board, and ° r a fc r s e ~ 
which statements he considered to be incorrect, as regarded himself, 
and prejudicial to him if left unchallenged." 

*I. A statement to the effect that all the originals of the evi- 
dence given by the officers in the Crimea were sent to them for 
correction.'' 

" Colonel Gordon said lhat this was not done, in certain in- 
stances, with his evidence ; and that the evidence that was sub- 
mitted to him. and which purported to be an original, was 
materially different from the actual original." 

" II. A statement with regard to Colonel Wetherall's evidence, 
viz. : — 

" Those notes were never introduced into the body of the evi- 
dence, because the marked difference between what was received in 
the one case, and acknowledged in the other, showed that the inquiry 
would lead to no beneficial result, and I therefore struck out the 
whole of the latter part of the memorandum, and in that state it 
was subsequently sent to Colonel Gordon for Colonel Wetherall, 
along with his evidence, to save the trouble of re-copying it. 

" Colonel Gordon said that the memorandum there mentioned, 
never was sent to him, and that he never saw it till he saw it 
printed in this country." 

On this complaint the Board reports as 
follows : — 

" With respect to the subjects referred to in complaints I and p age XVII. 
II, after giving due consideration to the reasons set forth by Colonel of Board's Re- 
Tulloch in his paper marked B in explanation thereof, we entirely port, 
acquit the Commissioners of being actuated by any improper 
motives in adopting the course complained of by Colonel Gordon, 
inasmuch as with respect to the evidence given to^the Commissioners 
by Colonel Gordon, we think that the Commissioners were under 
the impression that that officer had sufficient opportunity of cor- 
recting it. 

" But as that impression does not appear to have been correct, 
w r e are of opinion that Colonel Gordon's complaint is not without 
foundation." 

This assertion by Colonel Gordon, that he never 
saw the Memorandum referred to, is directly opposed 
to the admission under his own hand, to the following 
effect : — 



72 



Page 168 of " The Memorandum referred to, in the evidence of Major 
Evidence in Wetherall, relative to the non-issue of a large proportion of the 
Commissioners warm clothing and winter stores, and the explanations of that 

p r ' officer having been read over to him, (Colonel Gordon), he 

states, &c." 

The Memorandum, of course, could not have been 
read over to him, without his having seen it ; besides, 
the proof-sheet is in my possession, with a correction 
in Colonel Gordon's hand, which could not well have 
been made without his seeing the original. 

Both these documents were in the hands of the 
Judge-Advocate-General for the information of the 
Board, at the time when Colonel Gordon made this 
unfounded accusation ; and if they read them, as it 
was their duty to do, I have good ground to complain 
that they should, without the slightest remark, have 
permitted that officer to fix such an imputation on 
the Commissioners, when they had the means of 
doing both parties justice by pointing out to Colonel 
Gordon the mistake under which he laboured. 

But the inference which follows on the part of the 
Board, that Colonel Gordon had not sufficient oppor- 
tunity of correcting his evidence, is still more directly 
opposed to the fact, as will be seen by the following 
statement. 

The Commissioners, during their stay in the 
Crimea, examined about two hundred witnesses, 
including the commanding officer, surgeon, and, in 
many cases, the quartermaster of each regiment. 
ISTot having the services of a shorthand writer at their 
command,* the substance of the evidence of each wit- 
ness was noted down by them at the time of exami- 
nation ; and after being copied out fair, was forwarded 
, to him for correction and signature. 

* This arose — not from any fault of the Commissioners, but in 
consequence of the remuneration they were authorized to give, 
having been limited to nine shillings a day, being about one-third 
of the minimum rate for which the services of a shorthand writer 
could be procured. It is impossible to describe the inconvenience 
and personal toil which devolved on the Commissioners in con- 
sequence of this unfortunate instance of economy. 



73 



The evidence thus obtained was printed verbatim 
in the appendix to the Eeport ; and, until the inquiry 
before the Board at Chelsea, the Commissioners 
believed that it had been signed by each witness. 
In the instance of Colonel Wetherall, however, this 
was not the case, though, as will hereafter be shown, 
attributable to no omission on their part. 

The circumstances which occasioned this deviation 
from the usual course were as follows ; and it is for 
the reader to judge whether they afford any ground 
whatever for the very serious charge brought against 
the Commissioners by Colonel Gordon, and for the 
statement of the Board that Colonel Gordon's com- 
plaint that he had not sufficient opportunity of 
revising his evidence, " is not without foundation." 

The issue is a serious one. A charge of bad faith, 
if unfounded, recoils on the head of the man who 
makes it ; and a tribunal, before which such a charge 
is made and not supported, ill discharges its judicial 
duty if it does not mark its reprobation of the accuser 
in terms equivalent, at least, to those which it would 
have considered befitting the accused, had the charge 
been established. 

The examination of Colonel Gordon and Colonel 
Wetherall on the 28th of May 1855, before the Com- 
missioners was, at first, taken conjointly. It was 
afterwards decided, with the full approbation of Colonel Page 249 of 
Gordon, that this evidence should be separated, so that Proceedings, 
each officer might answer for that part for which he 
was more especially responsible. This was accord- 
ingly done, and the fact of the division of one 
examination into two, of course rendered some slight 
changes necessary ; but each separate evidence was 
transcribed as nearly as possible in its original form, 
and both were, on 4th June, sent by me to Colonel 
Gordon, as the senior officer, with a letter, of which 
the following is a copy : — 

41 I enclose a copy of the evidence, which, when you have See p. 250 
examined and altered as you think fit, you will please to sign at of Board's Re- 
port. 



74 



the end of each clay's work. It lias been thought best to have the 
evidence of Major Wetherall put separately, as you will see." 

The evidence, both of Colonel Gordon and Colonel 
Wetherall, was left in the possession of the former 
from the date of the Commissioners quitting the 
Crimea, until his return to London in the end of 
July, during which time he re-wrote the whole of his 
own evidence vjith his own hand, the alterations and 
additions being, as he explained, so numerous that it 
would not otherwise have been legible. He also 
made notes and corrections on Colonel Wetherall's. 
Shortly after his return, he transmitted these docu- 
ments to me, and I sent them to the printer as 
received. 

If the revision of the proofs had afterwards devolved 
on me, I should, no v doubt, have detected the absence 
of Colonel Wetherall's signature on the collation of 
See request of the proof with the original ; but Colonel Gordon hav- 
don° No G 8of ^ een permitted, at his own request, to undertake 
Appendix to that duty, both were sent to him as received from the 
printer. That officer corrected the proof and again 
made alterations, both in his own evidence andColonel 
Wetherall's ; a second proof, or revise, was obtained 
by him, and it was not till the end of September, or 
even later, that the evidence left Colonel Gordon's 
hands, and was sent to the printer with his final cor- 
rections, in which form it was ultimately received by 
the Commissioners, as containing all that his Depart- 
ment had to state on the subject. From June to 
September, consequently, the evidence remained in 
the hands of Colonel Gordon, with a written autho- 
rity from the Commissioners, to "alter it as he 
thought fit." 

Of this authority Colonel Gordon availed himself 
to the extent of making nearly one hundred altera- 
tions in the original evidence, and finally re-writing 
the whole of it. His own statement before the Board, 
fully confirms this ; and he adds, as well he might, 
Page 345 of " Nothing was more liberal than the way in which 
Proceedings, ee ^ Commissioners behaved ; they put in anything 



75 



* that we wanted, and they left out what Ave 
u wished/' 

The evidence of Colonel Gordon, written in his 
own hand, the manuscript copy of Colonel Wetherall's 
evidence, with Cojonel Gordon's notes and markings 
thereon, showing that he must have carefully perused 
it in connection with his own, and the printer's proofs 
of these evidences, with Colonel Gordon's corrections 
on both, as well as upon the proof of the memorandum 
which he alleged he never saw, are all in my posses- 
sion, and can be seen by any one taking an interest 
in the subject. 

About the time when these charges were brought 
against the Commissioners, I was struck down by 
sickness ; but the papers were placed in the hands of 
the Judge Advocate by my friend Dr. Balfour, and 
every fact I have stated was distinctly in evidence 
before the Board. 

What foundation Colonel Gordon had for his 
charge, and what ground the Board had for the 
opinion that " Colonel Gordon's complaint was not 
without foundation/' and that he appeared not to 
have " had sufficient opportunity of correcting his 
evidence," the public, now that they are in possession 
of the facts, must judge for themselves. 

Never, surely, in the experience of any Court, has 
such an event occurred as that the evidence of an 
officer, not only deliberately given, but written by 
himself, and repeatedly corrected in proof by his own 
hand, should be subsequently objected to by him- 
self, and that objection gravely sustained, with the 
generous exception of not imputing any improper 
motives to the Commissioners. 

Where such a charge was even hinted at, due 
consideration to the parties affected imperatively 
required that any statement tending to elucidate 
it should be brought prominently and carefully 
before the public ; and so strongly did I feel 
the necessity for this, that, even at the risk of a 
relapse, I had an explanation taken down in writing, 



76 



Page 17 of 
Board's Re- 
port. 



See p. 519 of 
Board's Ap- 
pendix. 



Page 343 of 
Proceedings. 



and forwarded to the Board for this purpose ; but 
what was my surprise, when the Board's Eeport 
appeared, to find that all this care had been rendered 
useless, by an erroneous reference having been given, 
under which it was impossible for any one, interested 
in the justification of the Commissioners, to find the 
explanation in the proceedings of the Board. 

This document is there referred to as the paper 
marked B ; but it will, I have no doubt, create 
as much regret to the Board as surprise to the public, 
that the paper marked B relates to an entirely 
different subject, being a Memorandum for the 
Quartermaster-General's Department ; and as no 
reference is given to any page, and as the document 
in question is not even placed among the papers 
delivered in by me, but among those delivered in by 
Colonel Gordon, it has been, to all intents and pur- 
poses, of as little use for the justification of the 
Commissioners, as if it had never been written. 
This must, of course, be considered accidental; but 
I cannot the less regret that there should have been, 
even the possibility of accident, in a matter of so 
much importance to the Commissioners. 

As that explanation, coupled with the preceding 
statement, establishes the fact that Colonel Gordon 
had the fullest opportunities of correcting and altering 
the originals and proofs, both of his own evidence 
and that of Colonel Wetherall, up to a very late period, 
I might have been content with thus throwing on him 
the whole responsibility of the very omissions of 
which he complains ; but as an attempt has been 
made to attach to them a much greater degree of 
importance than they merit, and as they have been 
repeatedly referred to by the Quartermaster-General 
as " suppressed evidence" I shall proceed to show what 
they really were, and how it happened that they 
were left out, though Colonel Gordon had at all 
times the power of retaining them if he had thought 
otherwise. 

In the reconstruction of the evidence of Colonel 



i 



77 



Gordon and Colonel Wetherall, when separated, the 
former complains that the following statement with 
regard to paillasses was omitted. 

'* The reason why they were not issued, except for the use of 
the sick, was, that straw to stuff them could not be obtained, and 
that they were considered useless without straw." 

But that officer must have known that this expla- 
nation having been already given in the evidence of 
ColonelWetherall on 28th May, taken in his presence, 
it was unnecessary again to repeat it, more especially 
as the latter had been specially named by Colonel 
Gordon, as being better qualified to give the 
required explanations on such matters than himself. 

"Hot only was this done by Colonel Wetherall, 
but the Commissioners specially gave a similar Page 27 of 
explanation in their Report, by stating that " it was Commissioners 

intended that they (the paillasses) should be stuffed Re P ort - 
" with hay or straw, but at that time these were 
" deficient in the camp." 

Colonel Gordon also complains that no notice was 
taken of his statement that F »ge 344 of 

Proceedings. 

" Many of the datesof the receipt | of warm clothing by the 
Quartermasters of corps do not appear to correspond with the 
dates of his requisitions, from which he anticipates that consider- 
able delay has occurred in bringing up these supplies after the 
authority had been given for drawing them ; and on a few instances 
being given him of these delays, he will refer to his books, and 
ascertain by the date of the requisition whether it had been in any- 
way attributable to delays in his Department, or to the Quarter- 
master being late in sending for these supplies." 

Now it was explained to Colonel Gordon at 
the time, and admitted by him, that this promising 
to make inquiry was no evidence, and these matters 
were in consequence referred to Colonel Wetherall, 
because that officer had direct knowledge on the sub- 
ject. It does not appear of what use, therefore, a 
mere promissory statement of this kind could have 
been, even if retained, in the separation of the 
evidence ; but if Colonel Gordon thought otherwise, 
he might have exercised his own discretion in the 



t 



78 



matter, having unlimited power to alter as he thought 
proper 

A still more frivolous ground of complaint is 
attempted on the part of Colonel Gordon, that 
the Commissioners did not send him the original 
notes, from which the separate evidence of himself 
and Colonel Wetherall had been copied. But Colonel 
Gordon appears to have forgotten that these notes 
were the only record of the examination which 
the Commissioners possessed, and imperfect and 
almost illegible as they were from alterations, made 
in the course of the examination, they could not be 
parted with, but at the risk of the Commissioners 
being left, just at the time they were quitting the 
Crimea, without any memorandum of the important 
statements received during the examination at head- 
quarters. If, however, Colonel Gordon really thought 
them necessary, why did he not ask for them when 
he revised the proofs after his return to this country, 
and when it is usual to refer to such original data 
before publication ? If he did not do so, he has 
surely no right to blame the Commissioners for his 
own neglect. 

When Colonel Gordon makes it a subject of com- 
plaint, that every line of the original notes was not 
kept as it stood before the separation of his own 
evidence and that of Colonel Wetherall, even at the 
risk of making both a mass of nonsense, it might 
naturally have been supposed that he was equally 
chary of alterations on his own part, hut, so great 
was the latitude he allowed himself, particularly in 
the very day's evidence of which he complains, that 
the alterations and interpolations extended to nearly 
double the length of the original. 

Having now shown how little Colonel Gordon had 
really to complain of with respect to any omissions 
from his own evidence, let us see how the case 
stands with regard to Colonel Wetherall's. 

After that officer had given his explanations 
regarding the non-issue of rugs, great coats, blankets, 



79 

paillasses, coatees, and trousers, to which the Com- 
missioners had chiefly directed their inquiries, owing* 
to the magnitude and importance of these supplies, his 
attention was called to some notes made by them at 
the end of the memorandum marked B, by which a 
few of the regiments appeared to have been more 
favoured in the distribution of blankets than others. 
Those notes, however, had been compiled from Returns proceedings, 
by the Quartermasters of different regiments, which 
it was admitted could not be strictly relied on, as 
their books having in several instances been lost, the 
Returns had to be made up from memory ; some of the 
Quartermasters, too, who originally made the issues, 
had died or left the country, and the Returns had to 
be completed by their successors, who knew but little 
on the subject. This source of information was, 
therefore, avowedly liable to exception ; but still the 
Commissioners felt it their duty to ascertain whether 
the books of the Quartermaster-General could throw 
any light on the subject, before giving up that part of 
the inquiry. 

The explanations of Colonel Wetherall were jotted 
down on the margin of these notes, which were distinct 
from any part of the continuous evidence given by 
him on the other matters, as illustrated in the follow- 
ing extract . — 

Memorandum by Commissioners. Replies of Colonel Wether all, 

" If the returns supplied by 
the Quartermaster of each corps 
are correct, it would appear that 
larger and earlier issues were 
made to some than to others. 

This requires explanation. For " 12th December, 425 had 
instance, in the Light Division, been ordered for the 23rd Regi- 
only 200 blankets are said to ment. The 34th landed with 
have been issued to the 23rd two blankets, each man from the 
Foot, while 1,960 were received ship, and these were charged 
by the 34th, of which 1,230 were to the Quartermaster -General's 
so early as 8th December, the store ; the men came without 
strength of the two corps being blankets, 
about equal. 



80 



The 77th also received 1 ,51 1 , 
and the 90th also 1,315; while 
the 88th, with nearly the same 
strength, received only 568. 



" In the 4th Division, up to 
the 1 7th December, the 57 th had 
received only 300, the 46th only 
150, the 68th only 185, and the 
1st Battalion Rifle Brigade only 
150; while the 17th Regiment 
received 1,836 on that day, and 
the 18th Regiment, in the 3rd 
Division, received 1,630 so early 
as the 8th December. 



" In the 47th Regiment only 
100 blankets were issued up to 
the 24th of December ; in the 
49th, only 200 up to the 11th of 
January ; and in the 83rd Regi- 
ment, about the same number. 

" In the Grenadier Guards no 
blankets were issued till after 
Christmas, and not more than 
half that corps, and of the Scots 
Fusiliers, were completed with 
additional blankets till the mid- 
dle of January ; while in the 1st 
Dragoons no extra blankets, and 
in the 2nd Dragoons only 66, 
were issued, up to the 11th 
January. 

" If it be alleged in the cases 
where these delayshave occurred, 
that no blankets were available, 
there appears no reason why the 
men should not have had rugs 
for a substitute." 



" The 77th have only received, 
by the Quartermaster- General's 
books, 435 ; the rest must have 
been made up by recruits landing 
with two blankets each. 

" The 17th and 18th both 
came out from England, and re- 
ceived two blankets per man on 
landing; while the 57th and 
46th, the 68th, and 1st Battalion 
of the Rifle Brigade, all received, 
on 2nd of December, an order 
for 400 each; and they might 
have had them if they chose ; 
the delay is presumed to have 
arisen from want of transport. 

" Same answer applies to 47th, 
49th, and 63rd Regiments. 



" The same remark applies to 
the Guards. 

" The 1st Dragoons received 
an order for 108 up to 2nd De- 
cember, and on the 9th January 
156. 



"The 2nd Dragoons had 100 
on 1st December, and 187 on 
10 th January. 

' It was entirely their own 
fault or want of transport which 
created the delay." 



As these explanations were taken from the books 
of the Quartermaster-G-eneral's Department, while 
there was no evidence on the other side which could 
be equally relied on, and as Colonel Gordon had 
manifested considerable annoyance on the subject, as 
will be seen by the concluding; paragraph of his 



81 



second day's evidence, the Commissioners expressed 
themselves satisfied, abandoned that part of the in- 
quiry, and ultimately inserted a statement in their 
Keport to the following effect : — 

" With the view of procuring further information in regard to p a ge 31 of 
these issues, we have obtained from officers commanding corps a Commissioners 
Return, showing the dates on which the different articles of warm Report, 
and extra clothing were received at each corps. From these it 
must be inferred, that in many cases the supplies did not reach the 
men for a considerable time after they appear, from the Quarter- 
master-General's Returns, to have been issued, But there is no 
reason to believe that the delay is in any degree attributable to 
that Department. 

" Owing to the deficiency of transport these supplies may have 
remained in Balaklava for a considerable time before they could be 
conveyed to the front, or in any other way be made available for 
the use of the men. 

" There is a similar discrepancy between the Regimental and the 
Quartermaster- General's Returns, in regard to the quantity issued 
to each corps, and to which we were at first disposed to attach 
considerable importance ; but we found that the Quartermaster- 
General's storekeeper entered as issued, everything that had been 
apportioned to the troops, and for which an authorized Requisition 
had been produced ; whereas, many of the Quartermasters of Corps, 
owing to the reduction in the numbers of their men by death, 
sickness and absence, after the supplies had been apportioned, did 
not find it necessary to draw all that the Requisitions authorized. 
A series of errors has thus arisen, which it is impossible to rectify. 

" The Quartermaster-General's Returns, however, upon which 
we have founded our conclusions, show the amounts and dates of 
the authorized Requisitions, and therefore, the largest quantity that 
could have been issued to the troops, and the earliest date at which 
the supplies could have gone out of the store." 

Having made this concession, it did not appear 
what object could possibly be served by including 
Colonel WetheralPs notes in the evidence, already 
overburdened as it was with other details ; and, 
accordingly, the Commissioners made a cross through 
that part of the page, intimating that, in their 
opinion, it might be kept out ; but had either Colonel 
Cordon or Colonel Wetherall thought otherwise, they 
were quite at liberty to have retained it. There was 
no erasure, no omission, no obliteration, nor anything 
which concealed the original ; the whole was just as 
legible as any other part of the evidence, with 

G 



82 



merely a couple of lines drawn diagonally across the 
page, and whether left in or taken out, it could not 
have altered, in the very slightest degree, the con- 
clusions of the Commissioners. 

The same observation applies to the omitted state- 
ment respecting the watchcoats, which formed the 
last paragraph of Colonel Wetherall' s evidence, but 
Page 5U of was no ^ printed in the evidence of that officer, in 
Board's Ap- the Commissioners 7 Report;* it was to the following 
pendk ' effect:— 

" With reference to the watch coats, 1,200 were issued early 
in December, and on the 21st of December 1,200 more, and on the 
4th January 1,100. That on the 2nd December about 2,000 watch 
coats were in store, of which 1,200 were issued as above." 

This explanation^ was, however, liable to exception, 
in so far as the returns furnished to the Commissioners 
Commission- ^y Mr. Archer, of the issues from the Quartermaster- 
ers> Appendix. General's stores, showed that only 458 watch coats 
had been given out in the whole month of December ; 
whereas, .1200 were stated by Colonel Wetherall to 
have been issued early in December, and 1200 more 
on the 21st December. 

Even the possibility that Colonel Wetherail might 
have meant " numbers authorized to be issued/' 
instead of numbers actually received by the men, 
would not have explained this discrepancy, because 
Pro^eedin s°of ^ e return furnished by the Quartermaster-Ceneral 
Board, ™%2. himself, and noted on the margin, showed that the 
troops had actually received in the month of December 
1061, being more than double what Mr. Archer had 
stated to have left the store. 

There was^ obviously, a most serious error some- 
where, which the Commissioners did not discover till 
Colonel Wetherall was gone, and which they could 

* Though I have here admitted the possibility of this part 
haying been originally crossed out by the Commissioners, I have 
no recollection of its being so ; and it seems just as likely to have 
been done by Colonel Gordon in consequence of the objections to 
which it was obviously liable in its original form. 



83 



not have allowed to pass without comment, had that 
part of the evidence been inserted. 

Besides, Colonel WetheralPs statement, was, in 
other respects, no answer to the Commissioners 
Memorandum regarding these stores, w r hich was to 
the following effect. 

" It seems also that about 2,350 watch coats arrived in the end Pa S e 166 of 
of November, and were ready for issue early in the following month ; ^.g^videric" 
yet no more than the half of these were distributed so late as the erS 71 ence * 
end of December, though they are described as having been most 
useful as a protection to the men on duty." 

Colonel Wetherall's reply admitted, that one-half 
of these was neither issued nor authorized to be issued 
till 21st December ; in marking that passage to be 
left out therefore, in consequence of the discrepancy 
above referred to, no injustice was done to that officer, 
but the Commissioners virtually deprived themselves of 
a direct corroboration of what had been stated in their 
Memorandum. There was no obligation, however, 
either on Colonel Gordon or Colonel Wetherall, to 
have sanctioned any such omission if they thought it 
should be retained, the waiting was left sufficiently 
legible and all that was required on the part of 
Colonel Gordon in the revision was to have put the 
word "stet " opposite the part crossed. In that case, 
however, the Commissioners would have felt it their 
duty, to have annexed a note pointing out the 
numerical contradiction, which Colonel Wetherall's 
statement and the Returns of the Quartermaster- 
General's store, involved. 

The inference drawn by the Board, that if this 
paragraph had remained, it would have made any 
difference in the Eeport of the Commissioners, is quite 
erroneous, for the only part in which they allude to the 
watch-coats or cloaks, is in the following paragraph. 

" By the end of November or beginning of December, about Page 27 of 
12.000 great coats also had arrived at Balaklava; of these, there *J e P ort . °f 
remained in store during the months of December and January, J^" 30188101 *- -■ 
when they were most urgently required by the men, upwards of 
3,000, besides nearly 2,000 watch cloaks. 5 ' 

G 2 



84 



Now, the Eeturns show, that 2,350 watch coats or 
cloaks, arrived by the " Jura/' on 21st November, and 
225 by the "Ottawa," on the 28th November, making 
a total of 2,575, of which, according to the Eeturns 
given by General Airey himself, no more than 1,061 
were received by regiments in December ; conse- 
quently the minimum quantity available, must, in 
that month, have been 1,510. On the 6th of the 
following month, 900 more were received by the 
" Eobert Low," and 1,050 were issued up to the 
16th January, making the minimum quantity on 
hand during that period, 1,350. If these were the 
minimum quantities, it is quite clear that the 
average must have been, as the Commissioners 
stated, nearly 2,000. In such masses of numbers, 
and speaking in general terms, an approximation only 
can be expected, and this could not certainly be 
complained of as being very wide of the truth. 

Such then, are the facts regarding the alleged 
omitted or suppressed evidence, of which the Quarter- 
master-General's Department has endeavoured to 
make so much, although a very few questions on the 
part of the Board would have shown that if the 
evidence was in any respect imperfect, the whole 
blame rested on Colonel Gordon, who was entrusted 
with the correction and revision of it, and who should 
not have been permitted first to assent to omissions 
and then cast the blame of them on the Commis- 
sioners, accompanied with all the odious inferences 
and comments to which they have given rise. 

In regard to the absence of Colonel Wetherall's 
signature, the Board must have entirely misunder- 
stood the facts of the case, otherwise they would not 
have arrived at the following conclusions on this 
head. 

See Board's " The Commissioners refer to the fact of Colonel Wetherall's 
Report, .p.. absence from the Crimea in explanation of the circumstance of his 
x ^"« evidence not having; been signed by that officer. They forwarded 

it to Colonel Gordon on the 4th of June, 1855, apparently v/ifh 
the intention of procuring- its signature and revision by Colonel 
Wetherall, overlooking however, the circumstance of Colonel 



85 



Wcthcrall being at that time at Constantinople: for it appears that 
after Colonel WetheraU's examination was finished, viz. on the 
28th of May, he applied to the Commissioners to know whether 
he might leave the Crimea, and the Commissioners having con- 
sulted together, stated they had nothing further to ask from him ; 
that they had ascertained all they wished as to the clothing, and 
he was perfectly at liberty to go to Constantinople. lie accord- 
ingly left Balaklava either on the 31st of May or the 1st June, 
(p. 281, question 1,288.) 

" His evidence was returned to the Commissioners by Colonel 
Gordon without alteration. 

• ; The Commissioners state that they were led to believe, in 
consequence, that its correctness was admitted even though Colonel 
WetheraU's signature was not appended. 

" The value, however, of the evidence given by the officer who 
was charged with the apportionment of the articles in store, and 
the importance of that portion of Colonel WetheraU's evidence 
which was omitted when the other portion was forwarded to 
Colonel Gordon for correction, both bearing upon the delays and 
omissions supposed to have occurred in supplying the troops 
with comforts that were available, induce us to express our 
regret that Colonel WetheraU's attention had not been particularly 
called by the Commissioners to these points, and to the absence of 
his own signature ; especially as, with reference to the non-issue 
of various articles of clothing, the Commissioners appear to have 
formed conclusions which subsequent explanations and a compa- 
rison of Returns do not warrant." 

The reference here made by the Board to that 
portion of Colonel WetheraU's evidence which was 
omitted when the other portion was forwarded to 
Colonel Gordon for correction I am at a loss to com- 
prehend. If it be the Memorandum annexed to 
Colonel WetheraU's evidence, which Colonel Gordon 
alleges he never saw, a reference to page 74, where 
this matter has already been discussed, will at once 
show that no grounds whatever exist for such 
an assertion ; and it is to be regretted that the 
Board did not satisfy themselves on this head, by a 
careful examination of Colonel Gordon's notes and 
markings on the proofs and original manuscript, 
instead of adopting the bare assertion of that officer 
in a matter which implicated him so deeply. 

The Commissioners did not, as the Board assume 
in the preceding paragraph, overlook the circum- 
stance of Colonel Wetherall being at Constantinople, 



86 



but they conceived they had a right to expect that 
Colonel Gordon would first satisfy himself that his 
own part of the evidence was correct, and then send 
the other part to Colonel Wetherall for approval 
and signature ; or if he thought this too much 
trouble, though in a matter connected with his own 
Department, that he would at least have returned 
the evidence to the Commissioners, in order that they 
might communicate- with, and obtain the signature 
of that officer. 

Colonel Gordon, however, did neither ; he retained 
the papers for months in his possession, undertook, by 
his own special request, the duty of revising the first 
proof with the originals, thus preventing the Commis- 
sioners from making themselves aware of the absence 
of Colonel WetheraH's signature ;* and then after the 
whole had come before the public, he took advantage 
of his own omissions, to cast a doubt on the evidence 
of that officer, as printed under his (Colonel Gordon's) 
own directions. Whoever undertakes the revision of 
the proof with the manuscript is the person responsible 
for all the accessories being correct, and it would 
have formed a much more serious charge against the 
Commissioners than that which Colonel Gordon has 
thought proper to make, if, after being revised by 
him, they had altered a single word. 

The Board had it in their power, instead of casting 
blame on the Commissioners in this matter, to have 
cleared up the whole transaction by putting the 
following plain questions to Colonel Gordon : — 

1st. Why, if he considered the original notes, 
rough as they were, of the first and second day's 
examination at all necessary for reference, he did not 
ask for them before the revision of the proofs ? 

2ndly. Why, if he had these doubts which, after 

* Throughout the Commissioners' Report, it will be observed 
that the evidence being in the third person, none of the signatures 
are printed ; they were merely taken by the Commissioners for 
security, a precaution which, as circumstances have eventually 
showed, was not unnecessary. 



S7 



the matter came into Court, he appeared to entertain, 
respecting the omitted paragraphs, he took no notice 
of them whatever in his various corrections, both m 
manuscript and proof, when he had full liberty to 
insert whatever he thought proper ? 

ov&ly. How, when he failed in both these instances, 
he could blame the Commissioners for an omission 
which was solely attributable to himself? 

4thly. Whether he had ever called the attention of 
the Commissioners to the circumstance of Colonel 
WetheraH's evidence being unsigned, and that it had 
never been submitted to him for approbation after 
being separated from his own % and if not, why he 
omitted to do so during the long period it was in his 
possession ? 

It is unfortuate that from the absence of a 
few such questions on the part of the Board, the 
bond fides of Colonel Gordon in this transaction, 
should have been left open to suspicions of a still 
more serious character than that which he has en- 
deavoured to cast on the proceedings of the Commis- 
sioners. 

The next part of the Board's Report relates to the 
explanation, given by Colonel G-ordon, of the reasons 
why he did not issue the rugs, great coats, and., blan- 
kets, to the extent which his stores admitted. 

The inquiry on these points will be found in the See p. 166 
1st, 3rd, and 4th paragraphs of the Memorandum for g™£K£ 
the Quartermaster-General's Department, to which Report, 
the reply made by Colonel Gordon was as follows : — 

" The memorandum referred to in the evidence of Major Page 168 and 
TYetherall, relative to the non-issue of a large proportion of the 169 of E ?i- 
warm clothing and winter stores, and the explanations of that de . n( l e in C , om ' 
officer having been read over to him (Colonel Gordon), he states ^gp^^ 18 
that he is of opinion, that it would have been, an advantage to each 
man to have had a rug under him, but he is not aware that the 
question was ever raised as to the expediency of issuing a third 
blanket, nor does he think it was ever contemplated to. issue a 
second great coat to each man, in addition to the one in wear, 
which was renewed when worn out, as the sheep-skin coats were 
considered sufficient. It certainly was not suggested in any in- 
struction from home : and he does not believe there were a sufH- 



88 



cient number of blankets, great coats, or rugs in store, during the 
greater part of the winter, to admit of such an issue. Thinks that 
when the men had received two blankets, a sheep -skin coat, a fur 
cap, a waterproof coat, a pair of leggings, a waterproof hood, one- 
third of a buffalo robe, two Guernsey frocks, two pair of drawers, 
two pair of socks, a pair of winter boots, a comforter, and two 
pair of gloves, as well as an extra suit of uniform, consisting of a 
coat, a pair of trousers, and a pair of ammunition boots, which 
was renewed when required, they were not so badly off when 
packed fifteen in a tent." 

Page 26 of On this reply of Colonel Gordon, the Commissioners 

Commissioners o i j j_i n n • i , . i • i n ji 

Report. rounded the following observation, which torms the 
subject of the present complaint :— 

" It will be observed that Colonel Gordon, in his evidence, 
assigns as a reason for the non-issue of many of these supplies, that 
he conceived the men had enough, and he enumerates a long list of 
articles supplied to them, but he overlooks the fact that the greater 
number of these were not issued till about the end of January, or 
beginning of February, whereas the period during which the men 
principally suffered, was in the months of December and January, 
when it appears that there were supplies enough on hand to have 
averted much of that suffering." 

I leave it to any one acquainted with the 
simplest elements of the English language, or 
who is accustomed to the consideration of evidence, 
to say, whether the statement given by Colonel 
Gordon, as above, does not fully warrant all that 
was deduced from it by the Commissioners. They 
did not assert that this was the only reason, but that 
it was a reason. The other, that there was not a 
sufficient quantity in store, involved the absurdity 
that, because every soldier could not have one, 
therefore no portion of the immense stores of rugs, 
blankets, and great coats, should be issued, and 
this the Commissioners did not consider worthy of 
a remark. 

y | Out of kindness, however, to Colonel Gordon, and 
in order to prevent the possibility of any answer given 
hastily or without consideration, operating to his pre- 
judice when the Eeport was made public, the Com- 
missioners, in a second examination, by written inter- 
rogatories, so late as the month of August, 1855, 



89 



aftorded that officer an opportunity of modifying or See p. 199 

,.. a,,. r F/ : v* 7 °., of Evidence in 

explaining' any 01 his statements regarding the commissioners 

clothing, which they thought it possible they might Report. 

have misunderstood; but the petulant, not to say 

disrespectful, tone. in which his replies were couched, 

and the withholding of any further information as to 

what he really did mean, left the Commissioners no 

alternative but to retain the opinion they originally 

adopted on the subject. If that has tended to the 

prejudice of Colonel Gordon, it is entirely his own 

fault, more especially as the proofs were open to 

him for two or three months afterwards, during which 

he was at liberty to make alterations, wherever, from 

the tenor of the supplementary queries, he conceived 

the Commissioners to be at fault with regard to the 

real meaning of his explanations. 

With this latitude afforded in every way, it is 
difficult to conceive how a Board of General Officers 
could arrive at the unanimous conclusion that Colonel 
Gordon's complaint on this subject is borne out; but 
what follows will afford a sufficient illustration of the 
dependence to be placed on their conclusions and 
assumptions. 

They state 6( that the supplies of the articles enu- 
merated in the following list are shown to have been 
authorized as soon as possible after they were landed 
and received into store. 



Sheepskin coat . . 
Fur cap 

Pair of leggings 
Waterproof hood 
Buffalo robe 
Guernsey frock 
Drawers 
Socks 

Winter coats 

Comforter 

Gloves 

Coattee 

Trousers 



First arrivals. 
28th December 
20th January. 
9th February. 
9th February. 
25th December. 
21st November. 
Ditto. 
Ditto. 
30th January. 
24th December. 

6 th January. 
28th November. 
Ditto. 



This is rather an unfortunate illustration on 



90 



the part of the Board, particularly the two last 
items, in regard to which the General Officers have 
apparently forgotten, that Colonel Wetherall had 
Page 284 of previously told them, that the coatees had never been 
Proceedings. i ssue d to the troops at all, and the Returns of the 
Quartermaster- General's Department show, beyond 
a doubt, that they were all lying in store six months 
after their arrival. The trousers, too, which they refer 
to as having been promptly issued, are actually those 
which were lost for upwards of a month, and which 
Colonel Gordon was making efforts to recover with a 
view to distribution, even so late as the 28th Decem- 
ber, and of which no more than one-half were ever 
issued, though they had. been in the harbour all 
that time, while the nether extremities of the men 
were almost in a state of nudity for want of them. 

The explanations of the Board in regard to some 
of the other supplies, are equally unfortunate. For 
instance, they state, — 

Pa e 19 of " ^ ne ^ rs ^ °* t nese supplies consisting of the articles most 
Board's Report wanted, viz., Guernsey frocks, drawers, and socks, commenced 
before the end of November, they having arrived on the 21st of 
that month, and the assertion that the greater number of these were 
not issued till about the end of January or beginning of February, 
appears to be disproved by the Returns above referred to. 

Where is there any such assertion regarding this 
underclothing, as that alleged to be disproved? Cer- 
tainly not in any part of the Commissioners' Report, 
which expressly states, so far as regards the first 
supply 

" That with the exception of some articles given out to two or 
three regiments in the end .of November, the issue of the under 
clothing consisting of woollen frocks, flannel drawers, and stockings 
or socks,' : " commenced from the Quartermaster-General's store, in 
the first week of December." 

The Board assert that these supplies commenced 
before the end of November, so that both statements 
are almost identical on this point. With regard to 
the second distribution, the Commissioners stated, 
that on the arrival of fresh supplies in the beginning 



Page 25 of 
Commission- 
ers' Report. 



91 



of January, each man was completed with two suits 
of under clothing and socks, but as to that issue the 
Board give no information. 

I have looked in vain through every part of the 
evidence and Report, to find any such assertion as 
that which the Board alleges "to be disproved;" the 
only place where I can find any thing like it, though 
obviously referring to other supplies, is in the remarks 
of the Commissioners on the following statement of 
Colonel Gordon, before quoted. 

" Thinks that when the men had received two blankets, a sheep- p a ge 168 — 9 
skin coat, a fur cap, a waterproof coat, a pair of leggings, a water- of evidence in 
proof hood, one-third of a Buffalo robe, two Guernsey frocks, two Commission- 
pairs of drawers, two pairs of socks, a pair of winter boots, a com- ers ' Re P ort * 
forter. and two pairs of gloves, as well as an extra suit of uniform . 
consisting of a coat, a pair of trousers, and a pair of ammunition 
boots, which was renewed when required ; they were not so badly 
off when packed fifteen in a tent." 

This reference to the supplies received during a 
whole winter, as an excuse for the non-issue of what 
was in store at the commencement of the winter, 
could not of course deceive the Commissioners, who, 
in stating their views on the subject, pointed out 
that Colonel Gordon overlooks the fact — 

" That the greater number of these were not issued till about 
the end of January or beginning of February, whereas the period 
during which the men principally suffered was m the months of 
December and January, when it appears that there were supplies 
enough on hand to have arrested much of that suffering." 

JSTow^ what have the Board apparently done in 
order to disprove what never was alleged ? They 
have applied this statement, which clearly referred to 
the waterproof hoods and leggings, fur caps, winter 
boots, regimental clothing and ammunition boots, 
which could not have been distributed sooner than 
the end of January or beginning of February, be- 
cause they had not arrived till then, to the under- 
clothing which the Commissioners had pointed out 
in the preceding page of their Eeport as having 



92 



been received and distributed in the beginning of 
December and beginning of January. 

If a correct reference even had been given to the 
alleged assertion of the Commissioners, any one could 
then have seen that the statement could not apply to 
See P . xix. the Guernsey frocks, drawers, and socks ; but the 
: Board Re- re f erence gi ven by the Board, is to page 117 of 
Appendix of Commissioners' Report, which has no 
connection with the subject, being merely a summary 
of the Returns from the Quartermaster of the Second 
Division. 

Whence arises all this ? False reasoning might 
be excused, but erroneous statements and incorrect 
references, of which so many remarkable instances 
have been noted in these pages, ought, of all things, 
to have been avoided. With every disposition to 
consider such mistakes accidental, I must be per- 
mitted to express my surprise that, contrary to all the 
ordinary calculation of chances, they should be so 
uniformly to the prejudice of my colleague and myself. 



The observations of the Board upon Complaints 
IV and V, only appear to call for the remark, that, 
if all difficulty in regard to the distribution of great 
coats had been removed by Lord Raglan's dispensing 
with the operation of the Queen's Warrant, there 
was the less excuse for the Quartermaster-General's 
Department leaving about ten thousand of them in 
store in the middle of December, when they might 
have been so useful. This appears an omission which 
nothing can justify, more especially as there were 
nearly seven thousand more lying at Scutari, which 
might have been brought over a month or two earlier, 
had it been thought necessary. 



The next subject of complaint by Colonel Gordon, 
and of comment by the Board, relates to the non- 



93 



recovery of the knapsacks, as to which the Commis- 
sioners reported as follows : — . 

" It will be seen from the evidence of Colonel Gordon, then Page 24 of 
Assistant Quartermaster-General, that he attributes the non-recovery Commissioners 
of the knapsacks at an early period to the General Officers o^ 6 ? ^ 
Divisions, with the exception of the Duke of Cambridge, preferring 
not to receive them. On referring, however, to two of the officers 
who commanded Divisions on that occasion, one of them states 
positively, that no such offer was made to him ; another, that he has 
no recollection of it. though it may have been so ; the third being- 
absent, we have had no opportunity of communicating with him on 
the subject." 

On this, Colonel Gordon founds the following Pagexvii.of 

i • , Board's Re- 

complamt : — port 

"A point upon which I think I have some reason to complain, 
is the fact that after having obtained from Major Wetherall and 
myself, and from numerous other officers, the materials from which 
these portions of their Report to which I have been adverting were 
drawn up, the Commissioners should not have put to Sir Richard 
Airey, the Quartermaster-General, injustice to himself as well as 
to his subordinate officers, a single question upon the subject either 
of the knapsacks or the issue of clothing, which had unquestionably 
formed in their minds, from an early period, so important a feature 
of the inquiry." 

And on this, the Board come to a conclusion in 
unison with Colonel Gordon's complaint, 

" That he might reasonably infer, from the circumstances above 
detailed, that the evidence of himself and Colonel Wetherall had 
been deemed satisfactory by the Commissioners." 

So far as regards General Airey being questioned 
respecting the issue of clothing, Colonel Gordon must 
have been well aware that, from the circumstance of 
his illness, already explained, that officer could know 
little, if anything, personally, on the subject; that 
while all the delays or omissions were taking place 
in issuing the rugs, great coats, paillasses, blankets, 
coatees, and trousers, during the months of Novem- 
ber and December, he was, as shown by the 
evidence of Lord Hardinge, before quoted, a cripple 
in bed, unable to read or write. How, then, could 



94 



Colonel G-ordon imagine that the Commissioners, if 
dissatisfied with the statement of Colonel Wetherall 
and himself, who knew all the details, should have 
put questions on the subject to the Quartermaster- 
General, who, avowedly, knew nothing, and had, ex- 
pressly on that plea, referred the Commissioners to 
Colonel Gordon for all the required information. 
No blame is attributable to the Board for coming 
. to erroneous conclusions on this head, because they 
seem to have been kept in ignorance of Sir Eichard 
Airey's illness, though materially affecting the whole 
question of clothing ; but those who peruse the pro- 
ceedings will, doubtless, form their own opinion as 
to the conduct of Colonel Gordon, in never once 
alluding to the inability of that officer for duty, of 
which it was so necessary the Board should have been 
informed. 

No questions were put to Sir Richard Airey by 
the Commissioners, regarding the knapsacks, because 
nothing occurred, while in the Crimea, to raise 
any doubt of the accuracy of the statements made by 
Colonel Gordon on this head ; but hearing rumours to 
the contrary, some time after my return to this 
country, and. feeling, in common with my colleague, 
the responsibility of putting forth a public statement, 
which so materially affected four of the Generals of 
Division, I, in the course of conversation, inquired of 
Sir De Lacy Evans, who had commanded one of the 
Divisions, whether we should be liable to contradiction 
by making public the statement given by Colonel 
Gordon, regarding the refusal of the knapsacks, when 
he so distinctly repudiated the allegation, chat the 
Commissioners were led to apprehend some mistake. 
Finding that a communication with General England 
did not remove but rather increased this supposition, 
they, after receiving written statements on the subject 
od from these two Generals of Division, which will be 
found in the Appendix to this volume, conceived 
themselves justified in recording, that the statement 



95 

of Colonel Gordon must be received subject to this 
exception. 

There appeared no other course, except by re-ex- 
amining Colonel Gordon, but those who will refer to 
the tenor of his replies when that opportunity was 
offered him, regarding the clothing, after his return 
to this country, will, perhaps, excuse the Com- 
missioners for not having troubled him again for any 
further elucidation of his evidence. 

Colonel Gordon could have no difficulty regarding 
the names of the General Officers referred to, for as 
His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge was 
excluded in his statement, Sir G. Cathcart was no 
more, and General Brown was abroad, no others 
could be meant than Generals Evans and England, 
though the Commissioners saw no reason for bringing 
their names unnecessarily before the public. 

The correspondence with these officers on the 
subject, was tendered to the Board ; but they declined 
receiving it, on the plea that there was no complaint 
on that subject before them. 



96 



I next come to the concluding Section of the 
Boards' Report, entitled 

COMMISSARY-GENERAL FILDER'S CASE, 

of which the first statement brought under notice is 
that which refers to 



Quantities in Store. 

The Report of the Commissioners under this 
head, and to which Mr. Filder has raised objections, 
was as follows : — 
Page4 of Com- First as to Biscuit. 

missioner s 

Report. (i The ration of fr lscult having, on the 15th of October, 1854, 

been increased by General Order to l-|lb., in consideration of the 
severe labour to which the troops were subjected, it was reduced, 
on the 7th November, to 1 lb., on the express ground of the supply 
of biscuit being insufficient to furnish the increased ration lately- 
authorized. " 

On this Mr. Filder remarks : — 

" The established ration for all troops in the field was not 
reduced, but the extra allowance was discontinued. It was a 
matter of notoriety, that 1-| lb. of biscuit was more than the men 
could eat, and that they sold, or gave away, a part of what they 
received, to the French troops who frequented our lines. This 
was before the storm, or any deficiencies had occurred. My motive 
for recommending the discontinuance, under such circumstances, of 
the extra allowance, was, that its issue impeded the progress of 
the depot which I was then forming in the front. 

" Had the extra quantity of biscuit issued to the troops in 
camp been allowed to accumulate in depot there, the animals 
which, during the winter, were occupied in transporting that 
article, might have been employed in carrying up other supplies, 
which were then so much needed ; the extra quantity issued very 



Page 21 of 
Board's Re- 
port. 



97 



greatly exceeded all the deficiencies c-f biscuit which occurred 
throughout the winter." 

The Board on this observe : — 

4; In this view of the case, we consider that Mr. Filder was 
justified in recommending the discontinuance of the extra 
allowance." 

The question originally raised by the Commis- 
sioners under this head in their Report was — not, 
whether the issue of one-third of a pound of biscuit, 
in addition to the ordinary allowance of one pound 
per day, was judicious or otherwise, but whether the 
allegation of the Commissary-General and his sub- 
ordinates, of there having been at all times a sufficiency 
of supplies in store was in accordance with the fact. 
That it could not have been so, appears clear from 
the terms of Lord Raglan's General Order, dated 
7th November, 1854, viz. : — 

" The supply of biscuit being insufficient to furnish the increased Appendix to 
ration lately authorized, the Commander of the Forces is under the Commissioners 
necessity of ordering that the daily ration shall be lib., as Report, p. 10. 
formerly." 

Mr. Filder does not even assert that he had the 
means of continuing to supply the troops with this 
extra allowance, which had been ordered in considera- 
tion of the severe and continuous fatigue the men 
were undergoing ; and the General Order so com- 
pletely bears out the Commissioners' statement, that 
I might consider this question as disposed of. The 
remarks of Mr. Filder, however, coming from an officer 
of experience, and supported by the conclusion of the 
Board, that he was justified in recommending the 
discontinuance of the extra allowance, are calculated 
to lead to such serious errors in the supply of an 
army, that, although the question is a totally different 
one from that originally stated by the Commis- 
sioners, 1 have no objection to meet the opposing 
parties on their own ground, and to show that the 
circumstances afford no reason whatever for the 
change advocated by him. 

H 



98 



Page 564 of Mr. Filder, in his letter to Mr. Peel, commenting* 
Appenix on ^ e statement of the Commissioners, asserts, 
" that the established ration for all troops in the 
" field was not reduced." If by this, he means one 
pound of biscuit and one pound of meat, these 
certainly underwent no reduction ; but such a ration, 
does not, according to every trustworthy scientific 
authority, contain an amount of nutriment sufficient to 
support any man in health ; and even with rice, sugar, 
and coffee, it would be inadequate to maintain, for any 
considerable time, the strength and health of soldiers 
undergoing severe labour, with much watching and 
exposure, as was the case with the army in the 
Crimea. Vegetables, too, which usually form an im- 
portant addition to the messing, could not then be 
obtained, and the soldier was placed in circumstances 
under which, whatever might be his wants, he could 
purchase nothing for himself. 

Such was the condition of the troops on* the 
7th of November, when, with scurvy in the camp,, 
Mr. Filder recommended that the issue of one 
third of a pound of biscuit per man should be 
discontinued, not because there was any scarcity in 
the supply, but, as he alleges, because it was 
notorious that the men could not consume l^ib. of 
biscuit. 

It is admitted to have been notorious — not that 
the biscuit was more than the men could eat — but 
that it was frequently exchanged for fresh bread, 
because that necessary of life could not be obtained 
from the British Commissariat, even for the sick ; 
but this traffic, far from being stopped by the reduc- 
tion in the ration of biscuit, appears rather to have 
increased as the season advanced, and the diet 
of salt meat and biscuit, became, day after day, more 
and more intolerable. The practice was adopted, 
not by the men only, but by the officers ; and con- 
sidering that hard biscuit is described by several of 
the Regimental Surgeons as being not only distaste- 
ful ; but injurious to men who were suffering from 



99 



bowel affections, the exchange was rather to be com- 
mended than found fault with. 

Even had the reduction in the ration of the biscuit 
been the only change, there appear no circumstances 
to justify it, but on the 15th .November the issue of 
rice was also ordered to cease, so that within one 
week the troops were, in most cases, deprived of 
nearly half a pound of the vegetable and farinaceous 
food so much required to counteract a salt meat diet, 
and this, too, when scurvy had made its appearance, 
and the destruction of the fresh vegetables on board the 
"Harbinger" showed that no check was likely to be 
put to its ravages by the aid of that specific. 

Had the Board of General Officers referred to 
the extent of the soldier's labours at this time, and 
how little he had to support life under them, they 
would probably have hesitated to countenance the 
assertion either on the part of Mr. Eilder or others, 
that biscuit was parted with for any purpose but 
that of exchange for some other description of nutri- 
ment. Fortunately, such statements can be tested 
by better opinions than those either of Commissioners 
or General Officers. Science has now analyzed all 
the different articles of nutriment in use for the sup- 
port of man, and has assigned its precise value to 
each, so that by comparing what the soldier was then 
receiving in the Crimea, with the scale which is con- 
sidered necessary in other armies, or in the navy, even 
when the men are exposed to no extra labours, we 
shall be able to arrive at accurate conclusions as to 
whether any misapplication of the rations was not 
likely to have been prevented by the most powerful 
of all motives, hunger. 

In the Appendix to the Commissioners' Report Pao . eg m a 
will be found tables by Professor Christison, showing 192. 
the weight and nutritive value of each article issued 
to the British sailor and to the Hessian soldier as a 
daily ration, to be as follows : — 



H 2 



100 





Ounces of 


Whereof there is 




Nutritive 














Principle 


Carboni- 
ferous 


Nitrogenous 


British Sailor, daily nutri- 








mpnt pypiikjivp r>i nppv 


28'5 


20-90 


7-54 


Hessian Soldier, daily nutri- 










32-96 


26-59 


6-37 


British Soldier in the Crimea 


receiving daily — 










23-52 


16-6 


6-92 


Coffee, not used; rice un- 








certain ; beer, none. 









iTow, it is in evidence, in various parts of the 
Commissioners' Report, that the soldier in the Crimea 
did not consume his salt meat, and that, in many in- 
stances, he lived entirely on his biscuit and rum, 
while the salt meat was thrown away daily in large 
quantities ; but supposing it had been otherwise, and 
that the whole had been consumed by him, as well as 
his sugar, he would still, according to the above scales 
have had less nutriment than the Hessian soldier by 
nearly ten ounces, and less than the British sailor 
by about five ounces per day, though Dr. Christison's 
calculation assumes, what he admits is not likely to be 
the case, that salt meat contains the same amount of 
nutriment as fresh. 

Even had the soldier in thee Crimea continued to 
receive the allowance of rice, and been able to use 
his coffee, these, including the extra biscuit, would 
have afforded less nutriment than the rations of either 
of the other two classes, notwithstanding the demand 
for food which constant labour, want of rest, and 
exposure, must necessarily have created. Had the 
dietary in prisons even, been taken as a guide, the 
Board would hav^e found that the soldier's ration in 
the Crimea, according to Mr. Filder's regimen, was 
below that scale. Compare it, for instance, with the 



101 



weekly scale in the general prison at Perth, as given 
by Dr. Christison. 



Bread 

Oatmeal 

Barley 

Pease 4^ oz. per week . . , 

Vegetables 

Meat 

Fish 12 oz. once a week 
Skimmed milk 

Total 



Ounces of 

Nutritive 

Principle 


Whereof there is 


Carboni- 
ferous 


Nitrogenous 


7'14 
11-47 

2*33 
0*50 
0-17 
0-25 
036 
2-64 


6-18 

9'2 

1-9 

0-35 

0-14 

0-11 

T19 


1- 26 

2- 27 
0.43 
0-15 
0.03 
0-14 

0- 36 

1- 45 


25-16 


19-07 


6-09 



As the dietary of the north is not usually con- 
sidered too extravagant, it may safe]y be inferred 
that this quantity of nutriment is necessary to main- 
tain health even in confinement. It is difficult, 
therefore, to imagine on what principle the discon- 
tinuance of one-third of a pound of biscuit could be 
advocated unless Mr. Filder had been prepared to 
substitute some other article in its place. 

Perhaps if the Board of General Officers had 
referred to such facts as these, they would have been 
less disposed to second Mr. Filder's theory, that Hlb. 
of biscuit was more than the men could eat ; but 
from the want of local experience, it is possible they 
•may have been influenced by a recollection of the 
usual accessories to a soldier's ration in other 
localities, and under happier circumstances ; but 
which the experience of a Crimean General would 
speedily have dispelled. 

In reply to the observations of the Commissioners, 
calling attention to the shortness of the supply of 
salt meat on hand in the month of January, Mr. 
Filder remarks— Page 22 of 

" That, although some apprehension on the subject of a short jj 6 p 0P £ 



102 



supply existed in his mind, no positive deficiency ever occurred in 
the Commissariat stores ; that the lowest number of days for which 
he had salt meat on hand was eight or nine, and that the circum- 
stance of his having had even so short a supply as that, arose partly 
from the loan he had made of that article to the Navy, and partly 
from the detention of the vessels by contrary winds." 

Also that 



" The Commissioners have omitted to state what is shown 
by the evidence annexed to their Report, that the salt meat 
received from the Navy only replaced the quantity which had been 
supplied from the Commissariat stores for the seamen and marines 
serving on shore. This supply from the Navy was not, therefore, a 
loan, but a restitution of a loan." 

On tliis part of Mr. Filder's observations, the 
Board makes no comment ; it was, apparently, too 
serious a matter for seven G eneral Officers to express 
their concurrence in an experiment under which an 
army was left with only eight days' salt provisions, 
at a season when the communications by sea were 
liable to interruption. The real point of importance 
respecting Mr. Filder's application to the £Tavy for a 
supply of salt meat, was — not whether the Navy had 
borrowed from the Army, or the Army from the 
Navy, but whether the safety of the British Forces 
in the Crimea had been hazarded by allowing the 
quantity in store to fall so low. In dealing with a 
question of such fearful magnitude, the circumstances 
of the balance of the loans being in favour of, or 
against, either branch of the service, appears quite 
unworthy of consideration ; more especially as the 
Commissioners merely stated the fact of the insufii-, 
ciency of the supply, and drew no conclusions there- 
from adverse to Mr. Filder. Their observations were 
as follows : — 

?age4of Com- " From the Returns handed to us by the Commissary-General, 
missioner's and from his statements, it appears that though the Commissaries 
Report. } ia( j 2A that time in store sufficient for several days' consumption, 

there was still (in consequence of some mistake, it is stated, on the 
part of the Commissariat officers at Constantinople), cause for 
considerable anxiety lest the whole arm}* should be left without 
salt meat, at a time when no other articles of food were available 



Page 22 of 
Board's Re- 
port. 



103 



except biscuit, rum, and the ordinary groceries. The arrival of a 
vessel with a supply of salt meat, before that which had been 
obtained from the navy was issued, relieved the Commissary- 
General from the anxiety which he had previously felt upon that 
subject." 

Mr. Filder must be sensitive indeed on the subject 
of his management in the Crimea, if he conceives it 
possible for the Commissioners to have alluded to an 
event of such importance in terms less indicative of 
blame ; and to have left the subject untouched would 
have deprived the Army of a most useful warning 
against similar shortcomings in future. It had the 
effect of inducing Lord Raglan to call for periodical 
returns of all the supplies in the Commissariat store, 
and may prove a valuable lesson to future Generals 
as to the risks they are likely to run if they neglect 
so important a precaution. 



Short Rations. 



The erroneous conclusions into which the Board of 
General Officers have repeatedly been drawn by the 
want of local knowledge, are nowhere better illus- 
trated than in the following results at which they 
arrived, with regard to the issues of vegetables and 
rice. The Board states on this head, — Pa s e 22 of 

9 Report of 

" The Returns quoted on margin show that there were issued Soard * 
to the Troops, in the month of 

"November .. .. 340,818 lbs. of vegetables. 

December . . . . 22,797 

January .. .. 77,250 „ 

February . . . . 558,925 , ; 

Also in the month of — 

" November . . . . 79.059 lbs. of rice. 

December . . . . 63,014 

January . . . . 155,241 „ 

February .. .. 118,400 



" It appears, therefore, that the statements of the Commissioners 
are by no means borne out." 



104 



The statement of the Commissioners thus referred 
to was as follows : — 



Page 5 of "In the Crimea, during the greater part of November and 

Commission- December, and also in a great measure during January, and part of 
ers' Report . February, the soldier was confined exclusively to biscuit, in 
addition to his salt meat." 



It is to be regretted that, before asserting that 
this statement was not borne out, the Board did not 
refer to the recorded answers by the Commanding 

Page 251 to Officers of corps to the following question by the 

257rfCTidence - Commissioners :— 

" Has the corps been sufficiently supplied with vegetables 
since it landed ? If not, state the dates at which the supplies of 
vegetables were insufficient." 

In the. replies to this query, not above five or six 
Begiments admit that there were any issues of vege- 
tables in November at all. Still fewer acknowledge 
any in December. About the 20th or 24th of January 
is fixed by some as the period from which vegetables 
began to be received regularly; but others, for instance 
the Grenadier and Coldstream Guards, 62nd, 4th, 
7th and 90th Foot refer to the supply as irregular up 
to the middle of February, and five regiments re- 
present it as insufficient even up to March or April ? 
thus fully corroborating all that the Commissioners 
advanced in their general statement on this subject. 

But, how comes it then, that in the month of No- 
vember the Returns of the Assistant Commissary- 
General should bear that 340,818 lbs. of vegetables 
were received and issued to the troops ? 

Had the Board the same experience in the mode 
of making up the Commissariat accounts as the Com- 
missioners, they would have known, .that the mere 
circumstance of an Assistant Commissary-General 
having entered that quantity as received and issued, 
was no positive evidence of the troops having got it, 
and that the greater portion of this entry, without 
the accompanying explanation which would have been 



105 



found on the face of the accounts had the Board 
examined them, was altogether a fiction. 

To those acquainted with what was passing at 
that time in the Crimea, it was but too well known 
that the efforts of the Commissary-General to pro- 
cure vegetables for the troops proved at first, very 
unfortunate — that, as will be seen by a letter of Mr. 
Smith, the Deputy Commissary- General, dated 4th p ag e7of Com- 
No'vember, the 150 tons, or 336,000 lbs. of vegetables missioned 
shipped by the " Harbinger," left the Bosphorus in- a Appendiy * 
very bad state. That vessel reached Balaklava on 
the 9th, and lay there till the 24th of that month, 
because the Captain could get no one to take away 
the cargo. In the meantime the vegetables rotted, 
and were either thrown overboard, or scrambled for 
on the deck by the Zouaves and such of the soldiers 
belonging to the Division at Balaklava as happened 
to be present. 

Had the Board referred to Mr. Drake's accounts, 
they would have found that of the 340,818 lbs. re- 
ferred to, 263,842 lbs. were admitted to have been 
destroyed, and 76,976 lbs. only, were entered as 
issued ; few or none of these vegetables, however, 
reached the troops in front ; they were given out to 
such of the Division about Balaklava as chose to carry 
them away, or were scrambled for in the manner so 
graphically described before the Sebastopol Committee Vol. 2, P . iss. 
by Mr. Layard, M.P., whose evidence, as well as 
that of Mr. Yaux, the Medical Officer, and Mr. Villa- Bm pages 110 
cott, the Chief Officer of the " Harbinger," the Board and 174. 
apparently never perused. 

In regard to the supply of vegetables for Decem- 
ber, very little requires tc be said, as, according 
to the Commissariat Eeturns, it could not have 
amounted in the course of that month to more than 
three-quarters of a pound, or about two potatoes and 
one onion per man in the course of thirty -one days, 
provided the sick in hospital did not exhaust the 
supply. 

In January, the issue would have afforded about 



106 



lialf-a-pound a week to each individual, subject to the 
same exception with regard to the sick ; in the latter 
part of that month too, preserved potatoes began to 
be issued, but at first chiefly to the Hospitals. 

The issue in the whole of February of the quan- 
tity of vegetables stated by Mr. Filder, is quite con- 
sistent with the alleged deficiency in some corps 
during the early part of that month, therefore, no 
further comments appear to be required on that head. 

• The cause of the delay in obtaining vegetables 
in December and January, which proved so fatal to 
the troops, remains yet to be explained; the mis- 
fortune which attended the first supply was no reason 
for discontinuing further efforts, but ought rather to 
have given rise to renewed exertions to make good 
the deficiency. 

So early as the 24th of October, Mr. Filder had 
been informed by the Quartermaster-General, that 
scurvy having broken out in the army, it was neces- 
Page 7, Ap. sary to act with promptitude in procuring supplies of 
pendixtoCom- vegetables. On the 30th and 31st October, he was 
Report* S directed to purchase them from on board ships in the 
harbour, and on 1st November he " was written to 
to know what quantity of vegetables he had pur- 
" chased." In reply to these repeated applications, 
Mr. Filder addressed a remonstrance to the Quarter- 
master-General, with a request that it might be com- 
municated to the Commander of the Forces, against 
these duties being required to be performed by him, 
stating that — 

Appendix p. 75 " It is not the duty of the Commissariat to supply vegetables, 
&c, to the troops ; this, according to the usage of the service, is 
done by regimental arrangement." ' 

He afterwards made various objections to purchas- 
ing for the army potatoes which were for sale in the 
harbour on board the ship "Victoria," It was not, 
therefore, because he had been left in ignorance 
that vegetables were urgently required to preserve 
the health of the army that a proper supply was 



107 



not provided, — a measure in which apparently there 
need have been little difficulty, as the market of one 
of the largest capitals in Europe, where vegetable 
diet forms a considerable portion of the food of 
650,000 inhabitants, was at his command. 

I now come to the issues of rice, during the same 
period, viz., from November to February inclusive, in 
regard to which Mr. Filder has endeavoured, and 
apparently with success, to impress upon the Board, 
that though this was declared by General Order to 
be no longer a part of the daily ration, the troops 
actually received within a mere fractional part of the 
quantity to which the ration would have amounted. 

It might have occurred to a Board of General Officers 
that, at a time when the army was suffering under the 
direst form . of scurvy, and when, during nearly three 
months, vegetables could only be obtained in the 
infinitesimal quantities just detailed, it was by no 
means likely that Lord Eaglan would wilfully have 
incurred the odium of making it appear by General 
Orders, that his army was deprived of such an essential 
as rice, when it was not really the case. 

The issue of such quantities of rice, though it did 
not at the time form part of the daily ration, is, how- 
ever, easily accounted for ; and the explanation affords 
another illustration how necessary it is, before a body 
of officers express their opinion in a judicial capacity 
on such matters, that they should have more detailed 
information than appears to have fallen to the lot of 
the Board in this matter. 

The return of Mr. Drake, no doubt, states that See p. 13 of 
rice was issued from his stores to the extent of — Appe^dS° ners 

In November 79,059 lbs. 

„ December .. .. .. 63,014,, 

„ January .. .. .. .. 155,241 ,, 

„ February 118,400 „ 

But the Board omitted the important inquiry, to 
whom had the issue been made. If they had ex- 
amined the Eeturns, instead of quoting them merely, 



108 



they would have found that in the first of these 
months about 20,000 lbs. were issued to the Turkish 
troops at Balaklava alone, and about 4,000 lbs. to the 
Royal Marines, besides what may have been issued in 
other parts of the camp ; while in December there were 
issued 25,142 lbs. to Turkish troops, and 4,836 lbs. to 
the General Hospital at Balaklava, thus confirming 
what had often been stated in evidence to the Com- 
missioners, that rice could not be issued to the 
British soldiers because it was wanted for the Turkish 
troops. 

"What became of the remainder of the rice, after 
these deductions, is easily explained without supposing 
that it was actually consumed, as part of the rations, 
by the men in health. 

The camp at this time contained a very large pro- 
portion of sick, chiefly labouring under scorbutic 
dysentery and diarrhoea ; indeed they were so 
numerous that great numbers had to be treated in 
their tents. The evidence of the Medical Officers 
shows the impossibility of obtaining even a tithe of 
the hospital comforts necessary to feed these men ; 
and to have used the ordinary diet of salt meat and 
biscuit would, in many instances, have proved fatal. 
The sick necessarily, therefore, had a preference over 
the men in health, and there being little else to give 
them, the consumption of rice by many thousand 
patients absorbed nearly, if not all, the quantity 
sent up to the front. This, however, Mr. Filder 
reckons as if it had been part of the daily rations 
of the troops, though it is established, both by 
Lord Raglan's General Order, and an amount of 
concurrent testimony such as can rarely be brought 
to prove any statement, that little, or none, was 
received for upwards of six or seven weeks which 
could be applied to general use. 

Had Mr. Filder and the Board adverted to the 
simple fact that, in the very Return which they quote, 
the quantities in the months of January and February, 
after the issue of rice was again authorized, were 



109 



double those of the previous two months, they would 
have seen that this marked difference, of itself con- 
tradicted the assertion, that the troops had been 
receiving nearly their full ration, more especially as 
the issues to the Turkish troops had by that time 
been discontinued. 

In the general statement by the Commissioners, 
that " during the greater part of November and De- 
" cember, and also in a great measure during January 
" and part of February, the soldier was confined ex- 
" clusively to biscuit, in addition to his salt meat," 
I admit that the month of February should have been 
excepted, so far as the rice was concerned, for though 
not general in all the divisions in the early part of 
January, it became so in the course of that month, 
and was continued throughout February. 

In consequence of a statement given in evidence to 
the Commissioners, that the continuance of the issue of 
rice from the 30th September to the 15th November 
was owing to the prevalence of bowel complaint, they 
had been induced to give Mr. Filder credit for having 
been moved to that judicious step by the sufferings 
of the troops ; but as he, in his letter to Mr. Peel, see Appendix 
repudiates the idea of being influenced by any such ^^'^ee 
considerations, I must acknowledge them to have ep ° ,P 
been in error in attributing to him motives of so 
humane and praiseworthy a character. 

Had Mr. Filder referred to Peninsular experience 
to guide these arrangements, he would have found, 
that when the Duke of Wellington's army was suf- 
fering from bowel complaint, the issue of two ounces 
of rice per man was authorized, as a remedial mea- 
sure, by General Orders, dated 1st August, 1812 ; and 
when the Duke was obliged to put his army on two 
days' salt provisions per week, he, by General Order, 
dated 26th October, 1810, directed a similar allow- 
ance of rice, to counteract the injurious effect of that 
diet. The Crimean arrangements, however, show the 
converse of this, as the very period when the army 
was subsisting almost entirely on salt meat, was that 



110 



selected for depriving' it of rice, though then doubly 

valuable for the health of the men. 
•oarers Re The Board conclude their observations, under the 
ort. S e " head of rice and vegetables, with the following 

remark : — 

" We may here add, with respect to the remarks of the Com- 
missioners on the subject of vegetable food, that we entirely concur 
in the view of the Commissary-General, that his Department is not 
responsible for the particular articles of diet which constitute the 
ration of the men ; his duty is only to furnish it according to the 
order of the General Commanding." 

I am not aware that the Commissioners ever 
expressed any contrary opinion. It can hardly be 
doubted, however, that it was the duty of the Com- 
missary General to keep the General Commanding 
informed of the supplies, of every description, in his 
possession which could be rendered available for the 
use of the army, and to call his attention to the 
expediency, from time to time, of making such 
changes as they admitted. Had he done so, it 
might probably have brought out the fact that, while 
thousands were suffering from scurvy and scorbutic 
diarrhoea in their worst forms, 20,000 lbs. weight of 
lime-juice were lying in his custody unused for nearly 
a couple of months, — and that while Lord Raglan was 
authorizing the stoppage of rice and biscuit, in the 
belief that there was not a sufficient quantity of 
either in store, Mr. Filder had, according to his own 
statement, abundance of both. 

The Board state that it was only Mr. Filder 's duty 
to furnish the ration according to the order of the 
General Commanding; but did he do so? In October 
Lord Raglan urged him in the strongest terms to 
procure vegetables in sufficient quantities to preserve 
. the health of the men ; the issues in November, 
December, and January, just referred to, will show 
to what extent that Order was obeyed. Lord Raglan 
was incessant in impressing on that officer the neces- 
sity for extensive issues of fresh meat. The succeed- 
ing pages will show in what manner these instructions 



Ill 



were complied with, by considering the issues under 
the combined items of — 

Fresh Meat. — Abundance of Cattle. — Importance of 
Fresh Meat, 

On which the Board express their opinion as Page 23 of 
f H 0WS : _ Re P° rt - 

" It appears to the Board that the insufficient supply of fresh . 
meat arose from various causes, but primarily from the want of sea 
transport, which want Commissary- General Filder appears to have 
used every exertion to remedy." 

" The number of transports at the disposal of the Commissariat 
was diminished during the month of December by the circumstance 
of two of the most efficient cattle vessels being then under repair 
and useless. 

" The supply of fresh meat during the same month was rendered 
less than it otherwise would have been, owing to the Commissariat 
office at Eupatoria having sent back empty, two transports dis- 
patched to that place for a supply of cattle, he having given over 
the cattle he had in charge there, to the French and Turks, who 
had arrived without any supplies of Fresh. Meat, or the means of 
providing any." 

In adopting the difficulty of sea transport, as one 
of the chief causes why fresh meat was not more 
liberally supplied to the troops, the Board appear to 
have left entirely out of view the evidence of Colonel 
Gordon. 

" That a large number of horse sailing transports were placed ^ a S e ^8 of 
at the disposal of the Commissariat on the 28th October, and from e y iden ce in 
a list produced, showing the distribution of these transports on the ^ m o ™ :S£lone 
19th November, it appears that sixteen of them were then empty and 
available for Commissariat purposes. 

These vessels lay idle during the winter, while the 
troops were perishing for want of fresh meat; it 
must be presumed, therefore, that unless the fact of 
there being abundance of sailing vessels escaped the 
notice of the Board, they concurred in the following 
argument of Mr. Filder as a sufficient reason for not p age 572 of 

employing SUCh Vessels. Board's Ap- 

pendix. 

" I was at all times fully alive to the importance of providing 
fresh meat for the use of the troops, and employed to the utmost 



112 



all the suitable vessels I could obtain ; but I consider sailing vessels 
to be unsuitable for the service in winter, particularly in the Black 
Sea. Of all the cattle which were forwarded in sailing transports 
from Varna at the end of October, and beginning- of November, 
more than one third were lost. Even on board steamers, which 
were not fitted up as cattle-vessels, the casualties were very great. 
To have continued the use, therefore, of sailing-vessels, would have 
been to destroy the supplies of the Army, and must have led to a 
deficiency ; for in winter it would have been impracticable to obtain 
large supplies of cattle from the interior of Turkey to replace such 
losses. * * * Constantinople, where I had 

plenty of cattle, is, at that season, nearer the Crimea in point of 
time than Samsoon. 

" I know of no large army that has, at any former time, been 
dependent upon supplies brought by sea in sailing vessels." 

It must have been within the recollection of most 
of the members of the Board that there did exist a 
period in our history, and that not a very remote one, 
when there were no other means of sea transport but 
sailing vessels ; yet, that presented no serious diffi- 
culty to the conveyance of cattle, whenever the pur- 
poses of commerce required a supply. Several of the 
members, too, had shared in the honours and dangers 
of the Peninsular Campaign, and might have had per- 
sonal knowledge of the fact, even if they had never 
learnt it from the despatches of their great Com- 
mander, that when the army lay within the lines of 
Torres Yedras, it was in a great measure supported by 
cattle brought from the north of Spain in sailing 
vessels, — a much more tedious, difficult, and danger- 
ous voyage than any between the shores of Turkey 
and Balaklava 

The letters of the Duke of Wellington on this 
subject are so characteristic of that great General, 
and shows so clearly the importance which he attached 
to an adequate supply of fresh meat for his army that 
I quote them at length. Writing to Vice-Admiral 
Berkeley, he states, — 

Pero Negro, 26th Oct., 1810. 
See Vol. vi. of " The Commissary-General having deemed it advisable to 
Despatches, p. en( 1eavour to procure cattle at Oporto for the service of the army, 
I shall be much obliged to you if you will order 3,000 tons of 



113 



horse transport to proceed there in order to transport to the Tagus 
the cattle which Mr. McKenzie may purchase there." 

"Pero Negro, 29th Oct., 1810. 
" I shall be very much obliged if you will send the coppered 
horse transports to Oporto in the first instance for the cattle, and 
let them be followed by others to the amount of 3,000 tons. I Aches'' ° f 
hope that you are right about the quantity of cattle in the neigh- 5 g e ^ pa C 6S ' ^' 
bourhood of Lisbon, but if I am not misinformed you are mistaken, 
and I have already begun to give the British army salt provisions 
two days in the week." 

" I have directed the Commissary-General to make inquiries 
respecting the facility of purchasing cattle at Vigo, and we can send 
there hereafter. In the meantime I do not believe that there will 
be any difficulty in getting vessels into and out of the Douro. 

« I am, &c." 

Mr. Filder will here find that the very vessels 
designated by the Duke to be employed for this 
serv ce, were the horse transports, to the use of which 
the former raised so many objections. It is not impro- 
bable that, in giving them up for this purpose, Lord 
Baglan might have had in his recollection the advan- 
tagewhich the Duke formerly derived, under similar 
circumstances, from that class of vessels. It is only 
to be regretted that he was not equally imperative 
in insisting upon their being used. 

Instead of being deterred by the advance of win- 
ter, and the tempestuous weather usual on that coast, 
the Duke will be found, by the following letter, to 
have been increasing his supply of cattle, notwith- 
standing the heavy casualties which, no doubt, occur- 
red at that season, and this without the slightest 
apprehension of exhausting the supply, an event much 
more likely to occur in that country than in the 
Turkish provinces. 

Cartaxo, 16th January, 1810. 
" I have had some more conversation with Mr. Kennedy y \ y .j 
respecting the expediency of sending more transports to Oporto to 147] ' 
bring down cattle. Mr. Kennedy considers it advisable that as 
many as thirty sail should be employed on this service, and we shall 
always have them within reach, I shall be much obliged to you if 
yon will give directions that fifteen sail may go to Oporto every 
week for the purpose. 

I am, etc. 



114: 



Even during the worst part of the winter, instead 
of contracting the range from which he drew his sup- 
plies by means of sailing vessels, the Duke extended 
it to Vigo, and even to Corunna, regardless of all 
risks of casualties, as will be seen from the following 
letter to Yice- Admiral Berkeley. 

" 10th February, 1811. 

Yol. vii. p. a Sib — I enclose two letters which I have received from Mr. 

250. Kennedy, in which he requests that six transports may be sent to 

Oporto, ten to Vigo, and eight to Corunna every week, taking 
cattle for the use of the army ; and I shall be very much obliged 
to you if you will make arrangements and give directions 
accordingly. 

" I have, &c, 

" Wellington." 

If any one applies a pair of compasses to a common 
map of Europe, he will find that the circuit from 
which the Duke drew his supply of cattle, and con- 
veyed them in sailing vessels, comprises an extent 
equal to the whole shore of the Black Sea eastward of 
Trebizond. The navigation was also more difficult 
and dangerous, the time of the year the same, and 
the sources of supply far less ample than those at the 
disposal of Mr. Filder. 

After this, what is to be thought of the assertion 
in Mr. Filder's letter to Mr. Peel, " that he knew of no 
army that had at any former time been dependent 
upon supplies brought by sea in sailing vessels ;'' or 
what reliance is to be placed on that Peninsular 
experience to which he so often refers, when he imme- 
diately thereafter quotes what took place within the 
lines of Torres Yedras as an illustration, though on 
that occasion the Duke adopted the very course for the 
supply of his army which Mr. Filder disclaims. 

Did it never occur to the General Officers com- 
posing the Board, how little chance there would ever 
have been of earning the honours by which some of 
them are distinguished, had the Duke adopted the 
same course which they apparently approve in Mr. 
Filder, and allowed his horse transports to lie idle 
while his best troops were swept away by scurvy from 



115 



the constant use of salt provisions ? Remote, indeed, 
would have been the probability, under such manage- 
ment, that their deeds should be recorded in the most 
brilliant pages of England's history, while the first 
winter's campaign in the Crimea will be chiefly 
memorable for the sufferings of our Army, and for the 
heroism with which those sufferings were endured. 

So far as regards the assertions of the Board, with 
respect to the supply of fresh meat, there appears no 
necessity for any further comment; but as Mr. Filder 
has, in a letter to Mr. Peel, made some further state- Page 565 of 
ments, which the G-eneral Officers include in their Board's Ap- 
Report, though they do not positively adopt them, P endlx - 
they cannot be passed unnoticed, 

Mr. Filder, for instance, there maintains the ave- 
rage quantity of fresh meat issued from November 
to March, to have been lOlbs per month to each man. 
I must, however, object to any conclusion which mixes 
up the issues to the sick and healthy and brings 
the increased quantity in March to raise the average 
of the previous months when the men suffered most 
from the continued use of salt meat. What can be 
more deceptive than such a statement when it is found, gge 53g 
by the Return of sheep and cattle consumed, that BoarcivAp- 
the quantity in March was more than double that pendix. 
average, or what influence could the liberal issues in 
that month have in averting the evils already incurred 
by short issues in December ? 

Mr. Filder is obliged to add, in explanation, 

" That the healthy did not receive the ration which these figures Board's Re- 
would indicate, was unfortunately owing to the large numbers of port, p. 24. 
sick, who, in some divisions, received full rations of meat daily, in 
others five days a week, thus curtailing the rations of the rest of 
the troops." 

The rations of the troops were thus, no doubt, 
greatly curtailed ; but it must not be inferred that even 
the sick really got the quantities alleged by Mr. Filder; 
that, like most of his other statements, must be taken 
under considerable exception. For instance, the 

I 2 



116 



eridenceto^ ^ ur & eon °^ the ^th Dragoon Guards says, in his evi- 
Commissioners dence to the Commissioners, that — 

Report. 

" During part of November the sick received fresh meat occa- 
sionally, but in December they had nothing but salt meat till the 
25th. In January the sick had fresh meat twenty days — in Feb- 
ruary twelve days ; on some of the days on which fresh meat was 
issued the quantity was not sufficient for the requirements of the 
Hospital.' 1 '' 

ib. p. 107. The Surgeon of the 49th Regiment also states 

" In the month of December there were fourteen clays during, 
which no fresh meat could be got for the sick, either from the 
Commissariat or the Purveyor." 

page 566 of It must also be inferred from Mr. Elder % letter 
pendk! Ap " to Mr - Peel > tlmt tlie British soldier received, during 
the three months referred to, more fresh meat than 
the French soldier, but this inference is also in- 
correct. Mr. Filcler compares the whole quantity 
issued to the British army, including the sick who, 
as he admits, got much the larger share of what 
was supplied), with the quantity issued to the French 
troops, exclusive of what was required for the sick. 
Ten ounces every three days, or 6 J lbs. per month, 
was the quantity issued to the healthy French soldier 
as his ration of fresh meat ; the corresponding quan- 
tity received by the healthy British soldier of the 
five Divisions of Infantry, during the months of 
December, January, and February was, on the 
average, only about 4 lbs. per month, as stated in 
the Commissioners' Report. But Mr. Filder has not 
extended his quotation from the Report, to that 
statement ; had he done so it would have precluded 
the erroneous inference to which his "Remarks" 
naturally lead. 

The practicability of using the horse transports, 
for the purpose of bringing over cattle, having already 
been discussed, the only other part of Mr. Filder's 
Page 572 of Letter to Mr. Peel which appears to require notice, 
^endix! Ap " is his apprehension of exhausting the resources of 



117 



Turkey in the supply of cattle, by the anticipated 
loss of about one-third of all that he embarked for 
the use of the army in sailing vessels. 

Little indeed could Mr. Filder have known of the 
resources of Turkey, if he really allowed such a con- 
sideration to weigh with him for a moment ; and it 
seems almost a waste of time to enter upon such 
an argument, when we know by experience that 
nearly three times the force employed during the 
first winter in the Crimea has since been supported 
there chiefly on fresh provisions. But that he may 
not complain of any assertion, however extraordinary, 
being left unnoticed, it may be useful to remind him, 
of his having stated in evidence before the Commis- 
sioners that " there were available in depot in the Pa s e 63 of 
" beginning of the winter of 1854 about 8,000 head vl ence ' 
of cattle." Of these there were only brought over 
in the following months : — 

November, 1854 .. .. .. 1,007 

December, „ . . . . . . . . 754 

January, „ .. 1,894 



Leaving apparently a reserve of 4,345; but on the 5th 
and 14th December he had rejected one tender for Seepage 122 of 
1,500, another for 300, and he had entered into a amp e ' 
contract with Mr. Whittall on 13th of January, for 
2,000 more, by which date he might thus have in- 
creased his reserve to 8,145, even after the con- 
sumption of the greater part of the winter was over. 
In February also he rejected tenders for the following 
quantities : — 



7,500 

And one of his reasons for refusing the last two was, 
that Mr. Whittall had offered to extend the contract 



3,655 



Cattle. 



Feb. 8, Henry Powell and Son 
12, J. Zohrab 
,, 19, Vincent Rosa . . 



4,000 to 6,000 
1,000 
500 



118 



of 13th January to any amount which might be 
required, so that they were not wanted 

On the 2nd April, when first examined by the 
Commissioners, he stated the supply on hand to be — 

3,000, besides 

1,500 per month from Mr. Whittall, 
1,000 at Sizopoli, 
1,000 at Sinope, 
1,000 at Samsoon, 

7,500 total, 

or very nearly the same quantity he had at the 
beginning of winter. 

In short, instead of Mr. Filder being in any 
danger of exhausting the resources of Turkey, he 
had, apparently, more offers for cattle than he knew 
what to do with ; and the loss of an extra thousand, 
by bringing over in sailing vessels twice the number 
imported in November, December, and January, 
would never have been felt. The bullocks, it is pre- 
sumed, were bought for the purpose of being used, 
and whether they were consumed by the troops, or 
thrown overboard on the voyage, could assuredly 
have made no difference, so far as the resources of 
Turkey were concerned. 

And why were the above offers rejected, when a 
more liberal supply of fresh meat would have saved 
Page 573 of the lives of thousands ? Mr. Filder states on this 
pend£ S Ap " subject, in his letter to Mr. Peel, that :— 

" In. the circumstances in which the army was placed the 
question of expence teas never taken into consideration. What 
was deemed best for the troops was purchased icithout regard to 
cost. This is stated in the written answers sent in to the Com- 
missioners by the Quartermaster- General, who consulted me on 
this point." 

It is most unfortunate that, in the consideration 
of this letter, to which the Board refer whenever it pre- 
sents a feature unfavourable to the Commissioners, 
they should never have thought of examining the 
official reasons for refusing such tenders as quoted 



Page 63 of 
Evidence in 
Commission- 
ers' Report. 



119 



in the Appendix to their Report, where they would £*^J? s ?J n 
have found the fact undeniably placed on record, under e rs' Appendix. 
Mr. Filder's signature, that the chief, and, in some 
instances, the only reason was the consideration of 
price, though considerably below that of salt meat. 

So important a fact must not rest on my own 
assertion, and as those who peruse this statement 
may not be in possession of the Appendix, I submit 
for their inspection the following extracts : — 




Tender for 1,000 to 1,500 head 
of cattle, at an average weight 
of 80 okes of clean meat, deli- 
verable on the beach at Lam- 
psacus, Chardak, and Galli- 
poli ; at the rate of £4 ster- 
ling for each head, to be paid 
in cash on delivery. 



Too far off, and 
the price 25 per 
cent higher than 
our purchases. 



Tender for 300 live oxen, in 
good marketable condition, at 
£4. sterling per ox, to weigh 
100 okes of issuable meat after 
being slaughtered. If the oxen 
shall exceed or be deficient of 
the stipulated weight of 100 
okes. the price to be paid shall 
be increased or diminished in 
proportion. Deliverable at 
Samsoon. 



An officer of the 
Commissariat 
stationed at Si- 
nope was pur- 
chasing cattle 
drawn from the 
neighbourhood 
of Samsoon on 
much lower 
terms. 



Tender for 4,000 to 6,000 (at 
contractors' option) oxen of 
Bosnia, to weigh 740 lbs. 
each on an average, at £ 1 5 per 
head, to be delivered free on 
board a vessel at Trieste or 
Fiume ; also to ship the re- 
quired quantity of forage, in- 
cluding water and casks, until 



Price exceedingly 
high, the dis- 
tance too great, 
and conditions 
inadmissible. 



120 



o ea 



Conditions cf Tender. 



arrival at port of discharge, for 
£4 per head. Together £19, 
including cost of forage, &c. 
Contractor will not guarantee 
safe "delivery, or hold himself 
liable, in the event of disease 
breaking out among the cattle 
for the due fulfilment of this 
contract. 

Tender for 1,000 oxen, averag- 
ing 100 okes of issuable meat, 
at £4 10s. per head, deliver- 
able at Gimlik at the rate of 
200 head per week ; and 5,000 
sheep averaging 15 okes each, 
at the rate of 16s. per head, 
deliverable at Gimlik 1,000 
head per week, Payment in 
Treasury Bills at par. 

Also mutton in such quantities 
as required, at 6 piastres per 
oke, paper currency. 

Tender for 500 head of cattle 
weighing 160 okes the pair, at 
950 piastres deliverable at the 
Sweet Waters in 51 days after 
signing the contract. 

Tender for 6,000 head of cattle, 
4,000 to be delivered atSizopo - 
lis, and 2,000 at Sinope or 
Samsoon. Weight not to be 
less than . 140 okes, gross 
weight ; the price to be £5 
sterling per head. First deli- 
very to be made in May. 



Reasons assigned 
by Mr. Filder 
for rejection. 



Rejected. An 
olfer having 
been received 
from Whittall & 
Co. to extend 
the number of 
cattle to be de- 
livered under 
their tender of 
13th Jan., to any 
amount which, 
might be requir- 
ed, on more fa- 
vourable terms. 

Ditto. 



Commissar i at 
officers purcha- 
sing at same 
places on lower 
terms. 



Then follow ten tenders in April, for upwards of 
60,000 sheep, the refusal of which was stated to be on 
similar grounds ; but as, at that time, cattle could be 
had in abundance, and they were moie easily trans- 



121 



ported than sheep, it is unnecessary to go into the 
particulars. 

After this specimen, no comments of mine are 
required to show the degree of reliance to be placed 
on Mr. Filder's statement, that the price was no 
object — even when that statement is supported, as 
he affirms, by Sir Richard Airey. I must leave the 
Board to explain why, with this Return of the rejected 
tenders in their possession, they should have given 
their countenance to assertions so erroneous, and 
so contradictory of the Report of the Commissioners, 
which was, at least, entitled to fair consideration at 
their hands. 

It must not be forgotten, in connection with 
this subject, that one of the chief difficulties in the 
Crimea, as admitted by the Board, was the deficiency 
of land transport ; but if a sufficient supply of live 
cattle had been provided, they would have transported 
themselves from Balaklava to the front ; and the 
mules and horses required to carry up the salt meat 
would then have been available for the conveyance of 
other supplies, and the men would have been saved 
those frequent journeys to Balaklava, which bore so 
hard upon them during a part of the winter. 

The whole question regarding the supply of fresh 
meat lies in a very narrow compass, and may be 
summed up briefly as follows : — 

Mr. Filder admits that he had, during the winter, 
" plenty of cattle at Constantinople, " and the 
tenders just referred to show that he might have had 
many more had he wished. 

Whilst this was the case, the soldiers were 
perishing by thousands from disease produced by the 
use of salt meat. 

During December, January, and February, there 
was almost a total absence of fresh meat, and even the 
sick were, for many days, nay, even for weeks, fed 
exclusively on salt meat, which, in their state, was 
poison. 

"Why, then, this reckless waste of life ? Who is 



122 



Commission- 
ers' Report, 
p. 12. 

Page 23 of 
Board's Re- 
port, 



See p. 12 of 
Appendix to 
Commission- 
ers' Report. 



answerable for this stain on the administration of our 
Army — for what, indeed, might almost be termed an 
outrage on humanity, considering that the alleged 
difficulty of carrying cattle in sailing vessels has now 
been dispersed by the best of all tests, that of 
experience ? 

I have now only to notice the following observation 
of Mr. Filder, adopted by the Board in their Report. 

On the suggestion of the Commissioners, that 
" slaughtered meat might, at that season of the year, 
"have been carried without much loss," he states 
that : — 

" Slaughtered meat was sent by the cattle vessels during the 
winter, in addition to their cargoes of live cattle, notwithstanding 
that the plan in a climate where the variations of temperature are 
so extreme was attended with much. loss. It was possible for the 
Commissioners to have inquired into the manner in which this 
important service had been conducted by the Commissariat, and 
they would have discovered that their suggestion had been antici- 
pated by our practice." 

" The Commissioners cannot, it is presumed, mean that slaugh- 
tered meat should have been forwarded in sailing transports, as 
vessels of that class were often, in winter, nearly a month in per- 
forming the voyage from the main land." 

The Commissioners were well aware that killed 
meat had been imported, and if Mr. Filder or the 
Board had read the Appendix to the Report, which 
they profess to criticize, they would have there found 
a Return by one of the Commissariat officers, showing 
that 11,886 lbs. of beef and 72,384 lbs. of mutton, or 
about three' days' rations for the whole Army, had thus 
been imported into the Crimea in the course of about 
as many months. The Commissioners were led to the 
suggestion by observing that no such importation 
had taken place either in December or up to the 
10th of January, though during that time the ne- 
cessity for it was greater than at any subsequent 
period. 

It does not appear likely that any serious loss could 
have arisen from attempting that experiment on a 
more extended scale : especially had it occurred to 



123 



the parties employed to use a sprinkling of salt, suffi- 
cient to preserve the meat for so short a voyage 
without depriving it of its nutritious qualities ; but 
no medium seems to have been recognized between 
what was absolutely necessary to ensure meat keeping 
for several years, and what might be useful to prevent 
it from spoiling in as many days. If the arrangement 
failed at times owing to the want of so simple a pre- 
caution, it cannot surely militate against the opinion 
of the Commissioners, that it might have been more 
generally adopted with advantage. 

I now come to the remarks of the Board on the 
subject of 

Lime Juice, 

as to which the Commissioners stated in their Report Page 8. 

"That from the 10th of December the lime juice brought by 
the * Esk' was lying in the Commissariat stores at Balaklava, and 
none of it was issued till the first week in February, an interval 
during which the sufferings of the army from scurvy were pro- 
bably at their height." 

On which the Board made the following remarks : — 

Page 24 of 

" It appears from the evidence before us that there is some Report, 
contradiction in the date of the arrival of the ' Esk.' 

The Commissary General stated that that vessel did not 
arrive until the 19th December, in which he is confirmed by Mr. 
Archer. However this may be, it appears clear that the casks of 
lime juice in the ' Esk' were landed and delivered into the Commis- 
sariat stores on the 20th December; that information of their 
arrival was given to the Purveyor of Hospitals, who appears to 
have actually removed some of it away from the beach while it was 
being taken out of the vessel. 

" The Medical Department were therefore duly apprised of this 
supply, and Lord Raglan also _ appears to have been duly informed 
that there was lime juice in store, but the issue of it as a regular 
ration to the troops generally was not authorized until the General 
Order of 31st January, 1855. 

" Steps were promptly taken to procure supplies from Malta 
and Sicily, and as soon as they were procured the issues 
were regularly maintained, therefore in this matter no blame seems 
to attach to the Commissary-General." 

This is a painful subject — painful no less from 
a recollection of the frightful accession which the 



124 



delay caused to the sufferings of the troops, than 
from the apparently light consideration given to so 
important a matter by the Board. 

The statement of the Commissioners, that the 
% Esk" arrived in Balaklava harbour on the 1 Oth of 
See Return, p. December, rests upon the authority noted on mar- 
Sebastopoi ' ° g m > which appears sufficient for their exoneration. It 
Report. is quite possible, however, that even if it arrived on 
that day in the harbour, the lime juice might not 
have been received into the Commissariat stores till 
the 19th ; but whether the 10th or the 19th is of no 
great moment compared with what follows regarding 
the period of issue. 

It has devolved on me to comment, in nearly every 
page of the Board's Report, on the false conclusions 
deduced from the evidence before them. Of this my 
colleague and myself have hitherto been the chief 
victims ; but I have now to adduce an instance in 
which, perhaps unintentionally, they throw upon Lord 
Raglan, without even the shadow of a reason, the 
burden of an omission which forms undoubtedly one 
of the greatest blots in the history of the war. 

Page 24 of The words of the Board are — 

Report. 

" The Medical Department was therefore duly apprised of this 
supply, and Lord Raglan also appears to have been informed that 
there was lime juice in store, but the issue of it, as a regular ration 
to the troops generally, was not authorized until the General Order 
of 31st January, 1855." 

If Lord Raglan really knew that 20,000 lbs. of 
lime juice were lying in the store unused, at a time 
when its issue was essential to the health of his men, 
his memory would assuredly little deserve that high 
consideration which it has hitherto justly received 
from his profession ; but how stands the fact ? 

The Board refer, in support of this weighty 
charge, to page 374 of their Proceedings, where Mr. 
Filder's examination on this subject will be found at 
length ; but the very first question distinctly negatives 
the conclusion of the Board. 



125 



" Was the General Commanding-in-chief informed of the arrival 
of this lime juice ? 

" No. Stores belonging to another Department we informed 
the proper officer of. 

" Then you informed the Medical Department ? 

" Yes. I have a certificate here that I will read." 

But, instead of a certificate establishing the fact 
that any communication had been made on the sub- 
ject to Dr. Hall, Mr. Filder quotes a letter from one 
of his own subordinate officers, alleging that verbal 
intimation was given to Purveyor Jenner, who took 
some of the lime juice a way from the beach ; but as 
the latter w r as constantly receiving supplies from the 
Navy for the use of the hospitals, he would naturally 
suppose, unless it was otherwise explained to him, 
that this was a similar supply, instead of being a 
part of the large quantity expected from England 
for general issue to the troops. 

The only way in which Mr. Filder connects Lord 
Raglan with the subject is in the following statement 
on the same query. 

" After the 22nd January we used to furnish Lord Haglan with 
a statement of all the stores in our possession of every kind, and 
it was not till the 29th January that he gave me an Order to begin 
the issue." 

Had Mr. Filder stated the 24th, instead of the 22nd, 
it would have been more correct, as it was on that 
day the Return was made up, which first communi- 
cated to Lord Raglan the fact, that the lime juice, 
from the want of which his army was daily melting 
away, had been lying for five or six weeks in the 
Commissariat stores. Only two days after this 
came to his knowledge, his Adjutant-General will 
be found in communication with Dr. Hall, as to 
the proper mode of using it, and on the 29th the 
General Order appeared, under which it began to be 
issued as part of the daily ration. In fact, instead 
of Lord Raglan having been cognizant of the delay, 
it is more than probable that, but for his calling for 
the Returns in question, the lime juice would have 



126 



remained in store till he no longer had an army to 

use it, 

See p.^ 567 of Mr. Filder, in a foot-note in his letter to Mr. 

ceed r ings. Pr °' ^ ee ^ mentions the possibility of Lord Raglan's 
knowing there was lime juice in store, from Dr. 
Hall's monthly Memorandum to the Adjutant-General 
on the health of the troops. No doubt Lord Raglan 
always knew that there was lime juice in store, 
because it was constantly being borrowed from the 
]Navy for the use of the sick ; but that he could have 
learned nothing through Dr Hall of the supply which 
had arrived from England for general issue, is clear 
from the circumstance that Dr. Hall did not know it 
himself. Writing to his Lordship on the 25th 
December, a week after the lime juice had been 
received into store, he states — 

Page 163 of " I have heard from Dr. Smith, Director- General of the Army 

Commission. Medical Department, that a very large supply of lime juice had 
ers* Appendix. j )een ^{pp^ a t j^g recommendation, when it was reported to him 
by me that symptoms of scurvy had made their appearance in some 
few cases. A supply of lime juice was obtained from the Navy at 
the time, and has been in use ever since. 

Had Dr. Hal] been aware that the supply had 
arrived he would have informed his Lordship — not 
that it had been shipped merely, but that it was 
actually in store, awaiting his authority for general 
distribution. 

See p. 167 of The lime juice referred to in Dr. Hall's Medical 
erTAppendix Memorandum of 2nd January, and in his December 
ers ppe . |^ or ^ was obviously that which had been obtained 
from the Eavy for the use of the hospitals, for he 
expressly states in the former that : — 

" In a short time the supply of lime juice expected from Eng- 
land will admit of a ration of one ounce per diem being served out 
to- the whole army as a prophylactic measure." 

an expression that he could not, by any possibility, 
have used had he knovm of its arrival. The first 
notice of the lime juice from England which occurs 



127 



in any communication with the Adjutant-General, 
is in the January Report, which was not made up 
till the first week in February, by which time it was 
in general issue, and Dr. Hall there states it to be so. 

The Commissioners did not, in their Report, enter 
into the question whether Dr. Hall was in error for 
not inquiring what had become of the lime juice, 
which, from the letters of Dr. Smith, he had reason 
to believe should have arrived in December, or 
whether the Commissary- General, when he knew the 
sufferings of the troops from scurvy, was not equally 
in error in not reporting the arrival of a larger Commission _ 
supply of the acknowledged specific for that disease, ers' Report, 
they merely stated that : — p ' 8, 

" Had the General Commanding been informed of the arrival 
of that supply it cannot be doubted that it would have been issued 
to that part of the army which most required it nearly two months 
earlier." 

And the Board, it is to be hoped, with no worse 
object than that of contradicting the Commissioners, 
came to the conclusion that Lord Raglan appeared to 
have been duly informed that there was lime juice in 
store, but that he did not sanction the issue of it till 
the 31st of January, thus throwing on him the odium 
of withholding from his army a remedy which every 
one knew was essential to its preservation, and this, 
not only without evidence, but in direct opposition to 
the only evidence examined on the subject. 

Before closing these observations, I cannot avoid 
referring to an hypothes : s of Mr. Filder's, in his letter & r >J of 
to Mr. Peel, that though Dr. Hall knew of the quantity BoarX^^ 
of lime juice in store, and the further supply expected 
from England, he did not think proper to recommend, 
with only ten days' supply in the custody of the Com- 
missariat, a general issue to the army, until more was 
in hand. 

It is well that this comes from Mr. Filder merely 
as a supposition, instead of Dr. Hall himself assign- 
ing such a motive for his conduct. A proposition 



128 



so monstrous as that a whole army should be left 
to suffer from scurvy because 20,000 lbs. weight 
of lime juice would not have kept up a constant 
supply to the effective men for more than ten (or 
rather it should be fifteen) days, while the easy 
alternative presented itself of using that supply 
in preserving either the whole or a portion of the 
Divisions in front which had been suffering most, 
leaving the others to enjoy the advantage of the 
remedy when fresh quantities arrived, is an idea which, 
it is to be hoped, could never enter the mind of any 
other individual. It is somewhat remarkable that 
Mr. Filder should have been accessory to the suffer- 
ings of the army from scorbutic affections in no less 
than three different ways : — 

1st. By the absence of a proper supply of fresh 
meat. 

2nd. By the absence of vegetables. 

3rd. By not duly reporting to Dr. Hall himself, 
or to Lord Raglan, the arrival of the lime- 
juice from England. 

If, however, such principles of action, as he here 
suggests in the case of Dr. Hall, regulated his own 
conduct in the distribution of supplies, the catas- 
trophe which marked his Commissariat administration 
in the Crimea will no longer excite surprise. 



Fresh Bread, 

Page 24 & 25 The remarks of the Board under this head are as 

of Board's Re- fojjQ^yg • 

port. 

" Mr. Filder complains that the Commissioners have charged 
him with an indisposition to make the attempt of baking fresh 
bread. 

Letter to Mr. " He replies to this, and in our opinion satisfactorily, by bring- 
Peel, p. 568 of hig forward his purchase of three months' supply of flour for the 
Board'sAppen- p Ur p 0Se of baking bread, but contends that as bread requires 50 
dix. 



129 



per cent more of transport for its conveyance than biscuit, it would 
have been impossible in the then state of the roads and the trans- 
port to have found means of carrying it up to the camp. 

A floating mill and bakery which he had applied for did not 
arrive from England till the 12th of May. 

" In proportion as the state of sea transport improved, bread was 
brought from Constantinople sufficient for an issue twice a week. 

" When on the arrival of the floating bakery its capabilities were 
found insufficient, and the construction of ovens was commenced, 
the means existed of baking, so as to allow of an issue to the 
tioops on three days in the week." 

" The different organization of the French army is sufficient to 
explain the circumstance of their being more regularly supplied 
with fresh bread than was the case with the English." 

u The Quartermaster-General's letter of March 21st, 1855, to Appendix to 
the Commissioners, points out the difficulties which at present exist Commissioners 
in the British service with regard to employing soldiers as bakers." Report, p. 21. 

According to the reasoning of the Board, the 
mere circumstance of having, in the beginning of 
winter, purchased three months' supply of flour, is 
considered sufficient to acquit Mr. Elder of any 
indisposition to convert that flour into bread, as well 
as to relieve him from all blame for having left the 
army, during more than half a year, without that 
important article of food. The usual process of 
reasoning on such matters would produce conclusions 
the very reverse. What, for instance, would be said, 
if the Ordnance Department considered it sufficient 
to allege that it had shown a disposition to provide 
for the protection of the troops in winter, by ordering 
cloth for great coats, or wool for blankets, though 
no efforts were made to convert these materials 
into a form in which they could be useful to the 
army ? 

When Sir John McNeill and I arrived at Bala- 
klava, on the 12th March, and found that no means 
had been taken to enable the Commissariat to issue 
fresh bread to the troops, or even to the sick, I imme- 
diately set about t e erection of ovens, under the 
circumstances state I in the Memorandum, p. 20 of 
Appendix to Commissioners' Report. To obtain 
bread, however, it was not necessary that it should 
have been baked at Baiaklava; subsequent experience 

K 



130 



showed that, during all the winter, it might have been 
brought from Constantinople and issued in good con- 
dition ; but it was only when the hot weather was 
setting in, that this expedient was resorted to, which 
limited the quantity obtained from that source to a 
few weeks' supply in April and May. 

In regard to the floating mill and bakery — the 
distant prospect of which seems to have obscured 
Mr. Filder's perception of the sufferings of the troops 
in the meanwhile— it will be seen that, when they 
did arrive, in the month of May, they were found 
quite insufficient to furnish an adequate supply of 
bread. Several ovens, in addition to those erected 
under my superintendence, had, in consequence, to 
be constructed,, and this, for a considerable time 
longer, retarded the issue in sufficient quantities to 
the troops. Had these ovens been made at an early 
period, as the Commissioners urged, not only would 
they have insured a partial supply of bread in the 
meantime, but they would have prevented that 
disappointment which ensued when the vessel did 
arrive, and was found inadequate to provide the 
quantity expected from it. 
Page 534 of Mr. Filder, in his evidence, comments on the cir- 
pend?x SAp " cumstance of the bread produced from the two ten- 
bushel ovens erected by me, having only amounted on 
an average to 3,617 lbs. per day. On this point I need 
only refer to the calculations by k ; ir John Bisset, 
Commissary General, as given at page 47 of his 
Memoranda and Observations, published under au- 
thority of the Treasury, viz., — 

" The size of oven most preferred is what is called a ten-bushel 
one, in which 1 84 loaves of four pounds each are baked each batch. 
Two men and one boy can work four batches a day ; the same 
number of hands additional could work seven batches in twenty- 
four hours; and that number of persons, viz., four men and two boys 
could keep two ovens (if built close together) at work night and 
day, and could produce twelve batches from the two in twenty-four 
hours. The ovens should be heated with wood. 

"Ten-bushel ovens are built 10 feet deep, 8 wide, 22 inches 
extreme height and centre of crown, 14 inches ditto sides." 



131 



These were precisely the dimensions of each of the 
two ovens erected by me, and they were built close to 
each other, the quantity they should have produced, 
therefore, was 184x4x12, or 8,832 lbs. of bread 
daily ; it remains for Mr. Filder to show why, after 
they were given over to him, they only produced 
between one-third and one-half of that quantity, and 
for the General Officers to reconcile that circumstance 
with Mr. Filder's alleged disposition to make bread. 

These calculations show, in a striking light, too, 
the difficulties as to bread might have been over- 
come ; two more ovens of the same size, properly 
worked, would have admitted of bread being issued 
for the whole army every second day during the 
winter, merely by the employment of twelve men 
acquainted with baking — a number which there is 
little doubt might have been found among the Scotch 
regiments at Balaklava alone. 

The hardship of the want of bread during the 
winter fell with the greatest severity upon the sick, 
particularly those suffering from scurvy, whose gums 
were in such a state that they could not use biscuit, 
and whose longing for fresh bread is described as 
being incessant. If there was really a difficulty in 
transport, as is alleged, even for so limited a quantity, 
surely as many animals might have been devoted to 
that purpose as were found necessary for an equal 
weight of biscuit, which few of the sick could use. 

But it places the question apart from all consi- 
derations of transport, that even the sick in the hos- 
pitals at Balaklava received no bread, though, during 
the greater part of the winter, it was baked in abun- 
dance, within a few hundred yards of them, for all 
who were rich enough to pay for it at the rate of 
a shilling per pound. So far as regards these men, 
at least, it was clearly a question of money, not 
of transport. 

Colonel Hardinge states, that when he was 
appointed Commandant at Balaklava on 17th Ja- 
nuary, he found one bakery kept by a Frenchman, 

k2 



132 



and that subsequently, under his direction, two more 
were established yielding 2,900 loaves per day. 
These were not new ovens constructed for the pur- 
pose, but old ones belonging to the Russians, which 
merely required being cleared out, and this might 
have been done for the exclusive benefit of the sick 
almost as soon as the town was taken possession of ; 
yet, up to the 9th day of April, not a morsel of bread 
was issued to the sick, though Mr. Filder, in his 
evidence before the Board, admits that it was 
repeatedly applied for. 

Were any evidence wanting of the indisposition 
to make bread, it might be found in the Correspon- 
Pao-e2iof \ P - ^ ence anc ^ Memorandum by me on that subject, 
pendixtoCom- where it will be^seen that, though, in order to remove 
Eetrt 6 ^' a ^ difficulties with regard to ovens, I offered on the 
15th March to superintend the building of two, so 
many difficulties were thrown in the way of my ob- 
taining the requisite materials and assistance, that, 
after a fortnight's delay, I was actually obliged to 
obtain an order, under Lord Raglan's own hand, for 
the fire-bricks required. 

On the 31st of that month, Sir John McNeill 
intimated to Mr. Filder the necessity for bringing 
over bakers to work these ovens, as objections had 
been urged by the military authorities to men being 
employed from the army ; but, even after this, it was 
not till the 1.8th of April that bakers were sent for ; 
nearly another month elapsed before they arrived 
from Constantinople, and the ovens were only brought 
into use on the 19th May, and then not till the Scotch 
Regiments at Kadekoi, seeing them remain so long 
idle, were making preparations to use them for baking 
bread on their own account. 

On the 21st of March, the Quartermaster-General 
in writing to Sir John McNeill relative to the difficulties 
which he apprehended in employing bakers from the 
ranks, states u that measures were in progress for 
" carrying out a system of baking for the troops on a 



133 



" large scale." It will now be seen how far these 
measures had advanced two months afterwards. 

AVith respect to the want of an establishment of 
bakers, such as in the French army, to which both 
the Board and Mr. Filder refer, that want could have 
been supplied just as easily in the month of Novem- 
ber, by the importation of bakers from Malta or 
Scutari, as in the month of May ; the building of 
ovens was not a work involving either much time, 
ingenuity, or labour ; and if there existed any doubt 
of obtaining workmen from the Sappers and Miners 
for such a purpose, there was nothing to have 
prevented a few masons being imported ; but building 
more ovens would have been of little advantage while 
those already existing in the town were not in use, 
even for the benefit of the sick. 

Indeed, it was not till the Commissioners had 
satisfied themselves as to the capabilities of the ovens 
then existing, to supply bread enough for the hos- 
pitals, and not till they had pointed out, both to 
Lord Raglan and the Commissary-General, that 
a gentleman, charged with the administration of 
the " Times Fund," contemplated supplying the de- 
ficiency in some of the principal hospitals, that the 
discredit of having this effected from a private 
source, while the Commissariat failed to perform it, 
apparently brought about the desired improvement. 

If all this did not warrant the assertion of an 
indisposition to make fresh bread, it is difficult to 
say what would. In giving such ample credit to 
Mr. Filder's intentions, in opposition to his deeds, 
the Board have apparently forgotten that a certain 
road is said to be paved with good intentions, for 
which, it is to be feared, the same credit will not be 
given, as is so charitably assigned by them to Mr. 
Filder. 

Green Coffee, 

This part of the ration has been so often the 
subject of complaint by the soldier, and of comment 



134 



by civilians, that the Board may, perhaps, he excused 
Page 25 of for not offering any very novel remarks in expressing 
porf* d ' S Re " their views on the subject, which are as follows : — 

" Mr. Filder was in no degree responsible for the coffee not 
being roasted ; it was sent out in a green state by the Treasury, 
and it was no part of Mr. Filder' s duty, nor was he ordered to 
cause it to be roasted previously to its being delivered to the 
troops." 

"No complaint was made on the subject till the month of 
November," 

' Mr. Filder stated, that a Military Board decided on issuing 
coffee as a ration to the troops, and that the Board knew that it 
was sold to the men in a green state." 

" He added, 

" Subsequently a small quantity of roasted coffee was sent out 
from England, as an experiment, upon which I was desired to 
report ; but although ordered in July, it did not reach the army 
till towards the end of September, when we were on the march 
from Kalamita Bay to Sebastopol : and as soon as I learnt that it 
was approved of; I recommended that coffee should be sent out 
roasted, but none arrived till about the 24th of January, from 
which date green coffee ceased to be issued to the troops." 

On this I beg to remark that Mr. Filder was 
a highly-paid official, holding one of the most re- 
sponsible appointments with the army. He was 
highly paid — not to do merely what he was ordered, 
but in the expectation* that, when difficulties arose, 
he would show himself equal to the emergency, by 
departing from the usual course, and exercising that 
discretion and intelligence which the public has a 
right to expect from a person holding so distin- 
guished a position. 

But were the decision of the Board a correct one, 
and were the Commissary-General allowed to plead 
that he could not exercise his own judgment and 
foresight, even in so trifling a matter as the roasting 
and grinding of coffee, because it ivas not ordered, 
he would be degraded below the position of the 
officer commanding a company, of which the following 
illustration may suffice : — 

Certain regulations are made in every regiment, 
when in garrison, for the breakfast and evening meal 



135 



of the soldier, and it is specified in Regimental orders 
of what these meals are to consist — generally coffee 
and bread. 

Under ordinary circumstances, the officer com- 
manding a company has no right to make any 
deviation ; but suppose him suddenly detached to a 
station where neither of these supplies can be had, 
but abundance of tea and corn-meal cakes, what 
should we say of him if he suffered his men to be 
deprived of these meals, because he had not received 
orders to change the materials of which they are 
usually composed? Yet, this is precisely the 
doctrine laid down by the Board, only with this 
difference, that when Mr. Filder found the men in 
a difficulty about making use of their coffee, he could 
relieve himself from all responsibility by requesting 
Lord Raglan's authority for having it ground at Con- 
stantinople or Balaklava, or for procuring and issuing 
tea instead ; but he did neither, and, according to his 
own showing, allowed the men to suffer under this 
privation, from the beginning of November till the 
end of January. 

So far from the Board's assertion being correct, 
that Mr. Filder was in no way responsible for the 
coffee not being roasted, they will find, by referring 
to the evidence taken before the Sebastopol Com- 
mittee, that it was sent out raw, at his special request, 
and this, though the difficulty attending such an 
arrangement was distinctly pointed out to him. 
It is much to be regretted that the Board never 
referred to the following statement of Mr. Grant, the 
Comptroller of Victualling in this country, when 
questioned on the subject : — 

" Q,. Can you state why the coffee was sent out green ? 

" A. The first requisition that was made to us to send out coffee 
was for coffee in an unroasted state. It certainly did appear to me 
strange at the first moment that we should send out raw coffee. 

" Q,. Had you any correspondence with Mr. Filder on the sub- 
ject? 

" A. Yes, and before I gave orders for the purchase of unroasted 
coffee I thought it desirable to address a letter to Commissary* 



136 



General Filder to know whether he was quite correct in asking, or 
requiring that unroasted coffee should be sent out. 
" Q. Will you just read that letter? 

" A. I have not got a copy of my own note, but I have Com- 
missary-General Filder's note in answer to mine, which is dated the 
28th February, 1854. He says, I am unable to answer your note 
of yesterday till I have consulted some military officers on the 
subject to which it relates. The soldiers will no doubt find some 
means of overcoming any difficulty that may arise from the want of 
mills and coffee roasters." The coffee should consequently be un- 
burnt, as before proposed^ 

Q. 17758. Mr. Grant, on being subsequently questioned as 

q. 17761 & 4. £ w } ie £] ier } ie made any proposition to Mr. Filder to 
supply mills for grinding the coffee, replied in the 
affirmative ; but that only six small ones were directed 
to be sent out. 

Here then we have established, beyond a doubt, 
that the origin of the whole difficulty was Mr. Filder 
himself; and that he adhered to the plan, though 
advised to the contrary by those who were, at least, 
as competent as himself to decide on such matters. 

In calling attention to the circumstance that no 
complaint of the coffee was made till November, Mr. 
Filder and the Board afford a striking proof that the 
troops were not unreasonable in their demands ; and 
that it was only when the want of fuel to roast the coffee 
threw an almost insurmountable obstacle in the way 
of its being prepared as an article of food, that they 
began to murmur at an issue which was quite useless 
to them ; but long before the end of January, there 
was abundance of time to have provided a suitable 
substitute. 

In adducing as a further justification, that the 
Military Board held at Varna had decided on issuing 
coffee as a ration to the troops, and that the officers- 
composing it, knew the coffee was to be sold 
to the men in a green state, Mr. Filder and the 
Chelsea Board have altogether kept out of sight 
the important distinction that this took place 
during summer, in a country where, wood being 
abundant, and the soldiers having plenty of leisure, 
the roasting of coffee presented little difficulty. Very 



137 



different, indeed, was the condition of the troops 
during winter in the Crimea ; there they could only 
procure fuel by digging roots from ground covered 
with snow and ice, which their previous duties 
in the trenches scarcely left them strength to 
accomplish. 

The Board conclude their observations relative Boards' R e - 
to the green coffee by stating :— porfc ' p ' 25 ' 

" With respect to the suggestion of the Commissioners that tea 
should have been issued to the troops instead of coffee, on account 
of the difficulties attending the roasting of the latter owing to the 
scarcity of fuel, it is obvious that fuel would have been equally 
required for making the tea, and as much tea appears to have been 
issued during the months of January and February as was con- 
sistent with maintaining a supply necessary for the use of the 
sick." 

In framing such a conclusion, could these General 
Officers have supposed that any person perusing their 
Report was likely to be ignorant of the fact, that 
coffee requires fuel, and a considerable quantity, too, 
to roast it, while tea needs no similar preparation ; 
that the roasting of coffee also requires time and a 
degree of care, which could scarcely be expected 
from men returning wet and weary from the trenches ; 
and that, while for tea it is necessary only to have 
some vessel in which water can be boiled, coffee 
requires the means of being roasted and ground, in 
which most of the troops were deficient. 

The Board must have been well aware of these 
distinctions. If so, why put forward a comparison 
which they knew to be unfair ? If not, what must be 
said of their arriving unanimously at a conclusion, 
the logic of which must necessarily subject them to 
the criticism even of the least observant ? 

I shall next advert to the conclusions of the 
Board relative to the supply of 

Fuel. 

Under this head I have but little to observe, as 
the conclusions of the Board form no contradiction, 



138 



either direct or implied, to the statement of the 
Commissioners. 

After a brief allusion to the quantities provided 
by the Commissariat and Lord Raglan, the Board 
come to the conclusion that — 

Page 26 of Re] " Mr. Filder having thus actually formed a depot of fuel at 
port of Board. Scutari, under the impression that the army might winter there in 
barracks ; having also sought instructions relative to the formation 
of a smaller depot at Varna, supposing the army might winter in 
the Principalities, and having moreover taken prompt measures to 
supply the troops in the Crimea when the local resources were on 
the point of exhaustion, cannot in our opinion be justly charged 
with, any want of foresight or exertion in this respect." 

It is necessary, in order to prevent misunder- 
standing, that I should now quote the precise words 
of the Commissioners on this head. After alluding 
to the fact of Lord Raglan having on the 11th 
of November instructed the Commissary-General to 
provide a sufficient supply of fuel for the ensuing 
winter, and having promulgated an order on the 4th 
Commissioners' ^ ecem ^ er f° r this issue to the troops, they stated — 

Report. 

" In consequence of the representations of the Commissary- 
General, however, the Order of 4th December appears to have been 
modified, and it was not till the 29th December that the troops in 
and near Balaklava received rations of fuel. 

"This apparent want of alacrity, on the part of the Commissariat 
to provide fuel for the army in the field, could not have arisen from 
any difficulty in procuring firewood." 

And the Commissioners then went on to point 
out the facility of obtaining supplies of firewood from 
the shores of the Black Sea. 

It is the apparent want of alacrity, therefore, in 
making this issue, that I have to establish, and not 
the want of foresight and exertion ; an accusation, 
apparently, brought forward by the Board with no 
other object than to refute it. 

To establish the statement of the Commissioners 
it is only necessary to observe that, the very day 
after Lord Raglan's order of 4th December, direct ing 
the issue of fuel, Mr. Filder expressed his fear that 



139 



the supply at Lalakhiva was not so Great as it was ? ee p- f 

i j i i l i ill Appendix to 

Supposed Or Stated tO DC, aild adds, Commissioners 

Report. 

' l I would recommend, therefore, that it should be used 
sparingly till a supply arrives from Scutari." 

On the 7th December, Colonel Gordon, writing 
to the Commissary-General by Lord Eaglan's direc- 
tions, states, — 

" I must also express my surprise that you should not be ready 
to commence the issue of fuel and light according to the regulated 
allowance, for the question of supplies of this nature for the army 
has been the subject of occasional correspondence and conversation 
between us since the 24th October." 

On the 9th December, five days after the date of 
the General Order for the issue of fuel and light, the Appendix, to 
Commissary- General submitted to the Commander of commissioners 
the Forces a Memorandum in which he says — v- 79 - 

" Throughout the Peninsular war, during a period of six years, 
neither fuel nor light was ever issued to the army, although in the 
campaign of 1813. a portion of it was in tents on the mountains up 
to a late period of the year. 

" With that army, the troops could no doubt provide themselves 
with fuel, but it would appear to have been as necessary that light 
should be issued to it as to this." 

Even after the question had been decided, there- 
fore, and the General Order issued, Mr. Filder could 
not abstain from appealing to precedent, or from 
remonstrating with Lord Raglan on his departing 
from the practice of the Peninsula. 

In a Memorandum by Colonel Gordon, dated 10th 
December, which was transmitted to the Commissary- 
General by Lord Eaglan on the 11th, great surprise ibid. p. so. 
is expressed that the Commissary-General should not 
be able to commence the issue of fuel. The Com- 
missioners had, therefore, sufficient authority for 
stating that there was an apparent want of alacrity 
in that respect. 

The issue of charcoal commenced on the 8th 
December, but only to the troops in front, those 
which were at, or near Balaldava, being excluded. 



140 



Mr. Filder appears to deny, in express terms, 
that these troops were, as alleged in the Report, 
excluded in consequence of his representations. 
But in a letter of the 9th December, which Colonel 
Appendix to Gordon was directed to address to the Commissary- 
commissioners & enera -> -^ r - Filder is reminded that, he had repre- 
P . 79. sented the insufficiency of the supply, 

" Upon which representation the Commander of the Forces 
found himself compelled, much against his inclination, to restrict 
the issue of fuel to the troops in the upper camp before Sebastopol 
until you were prepared with a proper supply." 

It must be admitted by the Board that this 
correspondence evinces anything but alacrity in com- 
mencing' the issue of fuel, the want of which, for a 
period of twenty-five days, in the month of December, 
could not but be felt as a severe privation by that 
portion of the army exposed to it ; and this the Com- 
missioners were obliged to notice, as being connected 
with the supplies, into the non-issue of which they 
were specially directed to inquire. 

Under these circumstances, it appears a fair 
ground of complaint against the Board that, after 
finding ail that the Commissioners had advanced 
fully established, they should, instead of admitting 
it to be so, and giving them credit for the 
moderation and justice of their statements, have 
commented on charges which were never made, and 
exculpated Mr. Filder from them, as if they had 
originated with the Commissioners. 

The statement that, " that officer" cannot be justly 
charged "with want of foresight or exertion" in this 
respect, necessarily implies that some one made such 
charges ; and as the W arrant of the Board did not 
authorize their inquiring into any other alleged 
animadversions than those of the Commissioners, the 
majority of readers would certainly infer that they 
must have made the accusations which the Board have 
taken so much trouble, unnecessarily, to refute. 



141 



I now come to the observations of the Board 
under the head of 

Land Trans-port and Hay. 

The lengthened statements and calculations by 
Mr. Filder and the Board, implying neglect on the 
part of the Treasury with respect to the supply of 
hay, I must leave to be answered by that Department 
where the requisite documents are, I presume, avail- 
able for this purpose. 

With regard to the forage of the baggage 
animals, however, it scarcely appears necessary to 
comment on the singular idea started by Mr. Filder 
and adopted by the Board as the climax of their 
conclusions, that it was necessary to bring hay from 
England for animals which had previously, as is 
the custom all over the East, been fed on barley 
and chopped straw. So far as they were concerned, 
Mr. Filder might just as well have included English 
oats in his demands. 

The whole of this part of the question rests upon 
whether sufficient chopped straw could have been pro- 
cured, and whether there were the means of bringing it 
to Balaklava. Of the first there can be no question, as 
Mr. Filder admits that abundance could be procured 
every where along the shores of the Bosphorus and 
the Sea of Marmora ; but that officer rests his defence 
on the circumstance that because in an impressed state 
a vessel could only carry a quantity equal to about one- 
tenth of her tonnage, it was inexpedient or impossible 
to make the attempt to provide this species of forage, 
and he must needs wait, therefore, till supplies of 
pressed hay could be obtained from England. 

Had it so happened that no sailing transports 
were lyiug idle at the time, this argument might • 
hold good ; but in addition to other disposable sailing 
vessels, the names of which are given in the Sebas- 
topol Eeport, the sixteen horse transports placed at see pages 451 

to 459.° 



142 



Mr. Filder's disposal, in October, were still unem- 
ployed, and if he thought them unfit to carry 
cattle, from the apprehension of loss, some might at 
least have been used for bringing chopped straw 
which was not likely to suffer any damage. 

At this time, too, it must be borne in mind 
that Mr. Filder had upwards of 2,000 baggage 
animals in depot at Constantinople or Varna, which 
See page 6 of bad been left behind when the army went to the 
Appendix to Crimea, and for the support of which the public were 

Commissioners . ' , . n \ , • i / i t 

Report paying at the rate ot about eigntpence a-day each, 
besides the cost of superintendence, with little or no 
chance of their ever being of any use, except by 
transfer to the Crimea. Matters in fact were in that 
state, that any loss which might have been incurred 
on the voyage or afterwards would have been a gain 
to the public, as their keep had already, by the end 
of November, cost more than their value. 

Under these circumstances it might have been 
supposed that Mr. Filder would gladly have embraced 
the opportunity of turning the idle transports and 
the idle horses to good account, but nothing of that 
kind was attempted, 

Mr. Filder has the credit of being an economist, 
and we have already seen in the case of the tenders 
for cattle how carefully he avoided any fractional 
excess of expenditure, even at the risk of leaving the 
troops to be subsisted entirely on salt meat ; but not 
only did he neglect this opportunity of increasing his 
transport without cost, but he is found contending for 
pressed hay being sent out from England at an 
enormous expence, while chopped straw in abundance 
could be brought from the opposite coast by sailing- 
vessels. 

Before condemning these arrangements of Mr. 
Filder, however, of which the Board unhesitatingly 
approve, the matter must be reduced to calculation. 
It will scarcely be denied that an addition even of 
500 baggage animals beyond what were brought over 
would, by doubling the available trasport in the begin- 



143 



ning of the winter of 1854, have prevented the most 
serious of the evils from which the troops subsequently 
suffered. For that number, a couple of sailing trans- 
ports only would have been required, and they could 
have brought with them as much barley and straw 
as would at least have sufficed for the voyage, and 
left a considerable surplus of the former for future 
use. 

To keep up the necessary supply after landing, 
two other sailing transports would have sufficed. 
I shall suppose these devoted to the carriage of the 
chopped and impressed straw, about which Mr. 
Filder makes such difficulties. Even according to his 
widest calculations, that a vessel of 600 tons will See 3 
only carry 50 tons of that description of forage, two Board's 
such vessels would have brought double that quantity, ceedm s s « 
or 224,000 lbs., besides barley, about the carriage of 
which there never w r as any difficulty ; and if this straw 
had been issued at the rate even of twelve pounds 
daily to each animal, it would have lasted for thirty- 
five days, by which time the same vessels could have 
gone back and brought over a fresh supply. 

Thus the whole difficulty in regard to the 
baggage animals, so far at least as the possibility of 
feeding them was concerned, would at once have been 
provided for, had Mr. Filder thought proper to employ 
regularly two of the horse transports for that purpose, 
out of the sixteen placed at his disposal, and which 
were doing nothing all the winter. 

These results, too, are founded on the supposition 
that each of the animals must, necessarily, have had 
J 2 lbs. of chopped straw in addition to barley, whereas 
a much less quantity might have sufficed had the 
barley been increased ; indeed, according to the ex- 
perience of many, several weeks of very good work 
might be got out of them, though fed upon barley 
alone, and it will be seen that the contract allowance ^P; ss 
for their maintenance at Yarna after the army left Append 
was only 6 lbs. of straw 7 and 6 lbs. of barley daily. 

I shall now look a little at the economy of 



144 

the measure. Pressed hay, sent out from Eng- 
land, is understood to have cost about £18 a ton, 
See p. 35 of ' or within a fraction of 2d. per lb. Straw, from the 
Commissioners shores of the Bosphorus, as will be seen by the 
Report. accepted tenders, cost about 2s. 6d. per cwt., or little 
more than one farthing per lb. ; the sea trans- 
port cost nothing, for the freight had to be paid 
whether the sailing vessels were employed or not ; 
it would consequently appear that . passing over a 
source of supply which was within 200 or 300 miles 
of him, and which would, at one-seventh of the price, 
have answered every purpose, so far at least, as the 
baggage animals were concerned, Mr. Filder lays all 
the misfortunes of the army on the shoulders of the 
Treasury, because they did not enable him to feed 
baggage animals in the Crimea with pressed hay 
brought from a distance of nearly one-fifth of the 
Globe, and subject to all the delay and uncertainty 
which that distance necessarily involved. 

The public will now be able to judge of the correct- 
ness of Mr. Filder's statement in his letter to Mr. Peel, 
as to " the impracticability of conveying across the 
" Black Sea chopped straw or loose hay, in sufficient 
" quantities for the wants of the baggage animals." 
As to the difficulty of landing either of these sup- 
plies, owing to the inconveniently small size of the 
harbour, to which Mr. Filder in another part also 
alludes, it is a sufficient evidence of the futility of any 
such objection that the harbour was just as limited 
in extent at the end of the following year, when 
nearly thrice the number of troops and ten times 
as many baggage animals were abundantly supplied 
through that channel. 
Page 26 of Board of General Officers support Mr. 

Report. Filder in the following terms : — 

_ " The insufficiency of land transport appears to have been the 
principal cause of most of the sufferings experienced by the army, 
and this insufficiency appears to have been occasioned by the want 
of means of supporting more animals." 



145 



" As relates to Mr. Filder, therefore, in his position of Commis- 
sary-General, the question is, in our opinion, correctly stated by him 
to be, 

" Whether he is to blame for the deficiency of forage, to which, 
step by step, all other deficiencies were mainly attributable, as 
limiting the number of transport animals that could be maintained 
in the Crimea ; and whether he availed himself of all the sea trans- 
port which he could obtain for the conveyance of forage and live 
cattle." 

" Mr. Filder stated at the outset of his case, and we think cor- 
rectly, that ' if it was expected that he should provide transport for 
the conveyance of an indefinite quantity of huts, timber, buffalo 
robes, warm clothing, &c, it must be obvious that it would have 
been wholly impracticable, even had there been no difficulty with 
respect to forage. The additional transport power could only have 
been procured by long previous preparation, the time for which was 
never allowed him.' 

" He showed that even for the most ordinary Commissariat pur- 
poses no more sea transport was available than that which he 
actually used, and he, in our opinion, satisfactorily accounted for the 
circumstance adverted to by the Commissioners, that the Land 
Transport was for a few days reduced to an effective number of 333 
pack horses and mules, and 12 camels." 

On these conclusions I have only further to 
observe, that the Board appear to have been labour- 
ing under some misapprehension in regard to addi- 
tional transport power being only procurable by long 
previous preparation ; they probably omitted to 
notice, that, according to Mr. Filder 's own admission, 
2,000 baggage animals were in depot at Constanti- 
nople and Varna, and only required to be brought 
over ; none had to be purchased for the purpose, nor 
were any measures required which involved loss of 
time when the conveyance was ready. 

In expressing their concurrence in Mr. Filder's 
assertion, that no more sea transport was available 
than that which he actually used, the Board must 
also have forgotten that all the horse transports 
remained unemployed, neither used for conveying 
cattle, bringing over baggage animals, nor carrying 
the forage by which these baggage animals might 
have been supported. It must apparently have been 
steam transport that the General Officers referred to, 

L 



14:6 



which, though very useful, was by no means essential 
to the transit of supplies, particularly in so open a sea 

Page 29 of as that between Balaklava and the Bosphorus. 

Board's Re- £ oar( } g0 on to state in conclusion :— 

" On this trying state of things, the Commissioners remark with 
direct allusion to Mr. Filder's management, that a man of compre- 
hensive views might probably have risen superior to these disad- 
vantages, and created an organization suited to the circumstances." 

" It is difficult, however, to believe that any man, even of the 
highest inventive resources and administrative capacity, could have 
effectually provided beforehand for daily and ever increasing 
demands, many of which extending as they did infinitely beyond the 
limits of all previous Commissariat administration, were not, and 
from their very nature could not, be foreseen." 

If Mr. Filder had but provided for the wants 
which could be foreseen, he might have been excused 
for omissions in regard to those which the Board 
describe as being " beyond the limits of all previous 
66 Commissariat administration ;" it is, however, rather 
singular that the most important of the omissions to 
which the disasters of the first winter in the Crimea 
are attributable, were entirely of that class which could 
have been foreseen and guarded against. 

For instance, Mr. Filder must have known that the 
troops could not long be supported in health without 
fresh meat ; he had thousands of cattle on the oppo- 
site coast, yet he failed to bring them over, though 
precisely the same means were placed at his disposal 
as had been employed successfully in the Peninsular 
War. 

He knew, so early as October, that the army must 
winter in the Crimea ; that to enable them to do so, 
large quantities of warm clothing and the means of 
shelter and covering must be carried up to the front, 
yet with 2,000 baggage animals on the opposite coast 
and sailing vessels in abundance at his disposal, he 
did not bring over sufficient for the emergency. 

Mr. Filder knew that green coffee could be of no 
use to men who, for want of fuel, had not the means 
of preparing it ; yet for nearly three months he 



147 



neither had it roasted nor obtained tea instead, 
though both alternatives were practicable. 

Mr. Filder knew that there were ovens at Bala- 
klava in which fresh bread was baked during the 
greater part of the winter, and which was purchased 
daily by himself and other officers for their own use, 
yet for several months he took no steps to secure a 
supply for the sick, and, beyond the purchase of flour, 
made no preparations to extend the issue to the 
healthy. 

Mr. Filder knew that vegetables and lime juice 
were the best of all known specifics to arrest the pro- 
gress of the scurvy prevalent in camp, yet he failed 
to provide any adequate supply of the former in 
December and January, and prevented any use being 
made of the latter by omitting to intimate its arrival 
to those who had the charge of distributing it. 

All these arrangements required — not the " highest 
"inventive resources and administrative capacity," 
but the ordinary exercise of common reason ; and the 
most important of them, such as those relating to 
fresh meat and land transport, were absolutely forced 
on Mr. Filder's consideration by the General Com- 
manding in such a manner, that, probably, no 
other officer in the British army but himself would 
have ventured upon opposition, and no other General 
but Lord Raglan would have borne it. None of these 
measures, except, perhaps, the supply of vegetables, 
could be characterised as infinitely " beyond the 
ordinary limits of Commissariat administration/' nor 
were there at that time " any daily and ever increasing 
demands " to complicate the arrangements, by the 
unexpected arrival of fresh troops. 

If anything were wanting to show the fallacy 
of the conclusions of the Board in Mr. Filder's case, 
it would be found in the fact that with the same 
resources within reach, so far at least as regarded 
external supplies, it was ultimately found practicable 
to bring to the Crimea all that was required for the 

L 2 



148 



subsistence of our own, as well as the Sardinian 
army, though nearly trebling in numbers the force 
which suffered, and was almost annihilated, during 
the eventful period referred to in the Eeport of the 
Commissioners. 



SXJMMAET OF INFORMATION COLLECTED RY SlR JOHN 

McNeill and Colonel Tulloch relative to the 
Sickness, Mortality, and prevailing Diseases, 
among the Troops serving in the Crimea, and 
not included in their Eeport. 



The sickness and mortality among the troops 
serving in the Crimea having frequently been referred 
to as excessive in the evidence taken by the Com- 
missioners, it appears desirable to determine its actual 
extent, and how far it can be fairly presumed to have 
arisen from the absence or deficiency of supplies. 

The annexed abstract of a General Return, pre- See page 169. 
pared by Dr. Hall, shows the admission into hospital, 
and the diseases and deaths, for a period of six 
months, from the 1st October, 1854, to 31st March, 
1855, exclusive of those which took place on ship- 
board or at Scutari ; and, being arranged on the 
same principle as the Statistical Reports periodi- 
cally submitted to Parliament, it will enable those 
who may be so disposed, to compare the prevalence 
and fatal character of the diseases in that Army 
with what usually takes place among British troops 
in other countries. We shall refer only to the follow- 
ing summary : — 











Ratio per 1,000 of mean, 
Strength for 6 months. 


Mean strength 
of the -whole 
Army, 
28,623 


Total 
in the 
Crimean 
Army in 
6 months. 


Deduct 
caused by 
wounds 

and 
injuries. 


Remain 
from 

sickness 
alone 


In the 
Crimea, 
Oct. to 
April. 


Great 
Britain 
on 

average of 
10 years. 


Canada, 
one half 
of year 
1838. 


Admissions "| 
into Hos- . 
pital ) 

Deaths 


52,548 
5,359 


3,806 
373 


48,742 
4,986 


1,697 
174 


493 
9 


474 

n 



150 



The cases of disease have thus been nearly four 
times, and the deaths about twenty times, as numerous 
as the average in either of these two countries. 

Many men who were sick, but who, for want of 
sufficient accommodation, could not be received into 
hospital, were treated in the barrack-tents, and do 
not appear among the admissions. The amount of 
sickness, therefore, must have exceeded what is shown 
by these Returns, though to what extent it is impos- 
sible to ascertain with any approach to accuracy. 

With this exception, the above summary affords 
a tolerably fair criterion of the sufferings of the 
army from disease ; but it is otherwise as regards 
the mortality, because the returns on which it is 
founded refer only to deaths in the Crimea, whereas 
the majority of the sick were transferred to Scutari 
as fast as conveyance could be found for them ; 
and such was the intractable character of the dis- 
eases, or so impaired were the constitutions of the 
patients, that the deaths which occurred there, and 
on the passage, very nearly equalled those which took 
place in the Crimea. 

Indeed, it is one of the most serious considera- 
tions connected with the history of this period, that 
the loss by disease was at first much underrated. 
For several months, no accurate or complete returns 
appear to have been received from Scutari, to show 
what had become of the invalids sent there ; the 
mortality was estimated only at the amount that 
took place on the spot, and without reference to the 
fact that of all who embarked as invalids more than 
one-third died on the passage, or after their arrival 
at Scutari, thus raising the real mortality to more 
than double what at first appeared by the "Regi- 
mental Returns. It was only by degrees that the 
small proportion who returned, of those who had left 
the Crimea sick, awakened a suspicion of the fatal cha- 
racter of the diseases, and the extent to which the 
constitution of the troops had suffered by the hard- 
ships and privations they had undergone. Had it 



151 



even been surmised by the principal medical and 
military authorities, that the loss in that army 
averaged, during a great part of the winter, about a 
battalion every week by disease alone, we cannot 
doubt that energetic measures would have been more 
promptly adopted to check it. 

Similar losses, though not so severe, have occa- 
sionally been sustained by British troops, particularly 
within the tropics, when exposed to the influence of 
climates decidedly hostile to the European consti- 
tution ; but it will be observed, that none of the 
medical officers examined, attribute the loss to any 
such influence, and that more than one expressed the 
opinion that, but for the nature of the service, and 
the peculiar circumstances under which it was carried 
on, the men would have suffered as little, in point of 
health, as if they had been in our North American 
colonies."' 

Any great mortality resulting from the influence 
of climate alone would have shown itself in nearly 
a corresponding degree in all classes and descrip- 
tions of the troops ; but the loss among the officers 
in the Crimea was comparatively slight, and the 
different corps and arms of the service w r ere affected 
in very different degrees, according to the nature of 
their duties, and their relative sufferings from fatigue, 
exposure, and privation. 

As it was important that these facts should be 
carefully examined, Eeturns were obtained, showing 
the sickness and mortality among officers and men 
respectively, as well as the principal classes of diseases 
in every corps serving in the Crimea. But in order 
to make the comparison correct, it was necessary to 
include the loss which took place among the invalids 
at Scutari, or on the passage. Eeturns containing 
similar information were, therefore, also obtained 
from that quarter, and from the subordinate hospitals 
on the \Bosphorus, of which the particulars will be 

* This has been proved by the health of the Army during the 
winter 1855-6. 



152 



See page in found in the Abstract annexed. The following are 
some of the most important results, so far as regards 
the Infantry : — 





Mean 
Strength 
oi Inlautry. 


Total Ad- 
missions. 


Total Deaths. 


General 
Total of 
Deaths. 


in Crimea. 


at Scutari. 


October 


19,430 


4,847 


194 


144 


338 


November 


22,360 


6,498 


620 


228 


848 


December 




9,077 


1,030 


423 


1 A KQ 
1,40D 


January 




9,908 


1^269 


1,193 


2,462 


February 


25,780 


6,351 


885 


1,261 


2,146 


March 


24,414 


5,241 


652 


587 


1,239 


April 


23,333 


3,515 


313 


216 


529 




23,775 


45,437 


4,963 


4,052 


9,015 


Deduct for S 












wounds and C 




3,455 


311 


297 


608 


injuries ) 
















41,982 


4,652 


3,755 


8,407 


Add 10 per cent > 












for deaths un- ) 










841 


reported 












General Total .... 


23,775 


41,982 






9,248 



In this table all deaths from wounds and injuries 
have been excluded, the loss is from sickness alone, 
and it extends to one month beyond the period 
included in the previous return of Dr. Hall. 

The statement of deaths in the hospital at Bala- 
klava is incomplete, and there is reason to believe, 
that such as took place in the harbour, where vessels 
were often detained for several days, have been 
excluded from the Eeturns, as well as many which 
occurred at sea between the Crimea and Scutari; 
an addition of 10 per cent, has therefore been made 
to the ascertained deaths to cover these. We shall 
hereafter have occasion to show, by reference to the 
Adjutant-General's Eeturns, that this estimate is not 
too high. 



153 



After making this allowance, it would appear that 
the aggregate loss of the Infantry, by sickness 
alone, has been 9,248 men, or about 39 per cent 
within seven months. We are not aware of any 
other British army having sustained so heavy a loss 
in so short a time. During the Peninsular War, 
though the troops occasionally suffered much from 
sickness, the loss from that cause did not average 
above 12 per cent, for a whole year. Even on the 
ill-fated expedition to Walcheren, the deaths only 
amounted to 4,212, out of an average force of 40,589, 
in six months (between 28th July, 1809, and 1st 
February, 1810), being about 10 J per cent for the 
half year. 

The estimated mortality of 39 per cent, in the army 
of the East during so short a period, leaves entirely 
out of view the loss sustained among several thousand 
invalids sent from Scutari to England, of whom, 
judging from the state in which many of them arrived 
from the Crimea a large proportion must have died 
either during the voyage home or after reaching 
this country. It also takes no account of many 
lingering cases remaining in the Scutari hospitals at 
the end of April, whose diseases, though contracted 
in the course of the seven months referred to, did not 
terminate in death for some time afterwards. 

On the other hand, it must be kept in view, that 
while the deaths at Scutari form part of the general 
loss, the large proportion of invalids there, are not 
included in the strength, and that this omission would 
tend to lower the rate of mortality, to at least as 
great an extent as the circumstances above referred 
to probably increased it. 

The average strength at Scutari, and the other 
hospitals on the Bosphorus during this period, could 
not have been less than about 3,500, as may be 
inferred from the following summary : — 



154 





Oct. 


Nov. 


Dec. 


Jan. 


Feb. 


Mar. 


Total. 


Average. 


Remaining in"| 
Hospital in each [ 
of the following [ 
months : J 


1894 


2750 


3476 


3975 


5115 


4102 


21312 


3552 



About two-thirds of which number, at least, were not 
included in the strength given in the preceding table, 
as ought to have been the case. 

In inquiries of this magnitude, extending over such 
large bodies of troops quartered at different stations, 
it is impossible to do more than give a tolerably cor- 
rect approximation to the rates of mortality, and they 
must always be received under this exception. 

Several of the corps included in the above table, 
however, having v arrived in the Crimea later than 
others, escaped much of the privation, fatigue, and 
sickness, which took place at the commencement of 
the winter. The 14th, 39th, 18th, and 7 1st, for 
instance, having arrived on the dates undermen- 
tioned, were in the Crimea for only four months out 
of the seven over which these observations extend, 
during which their losses were as under : — 



14th Regiment .... 
18th Regiment 
39th Regiment .... 
71st Regiment .... 



Average 
strength 
during four 
months. 



Reduced 
strength 
correspond- 
ing to seven 
months. 



740 
832 
701 
578 



Deduct for wounds and"! 
injuries J 

Remained 



423 
475 
401 
330 



1,629 



1,629 



Admissisons 
into 
hospital. 



878 
636 
623 
348 



2,485 
118 



2,367 



'Deaths in 
the Crimea 
and Scutari 



10 
47 
39 
17 



113 
6 



107 



Arrived 19th January. 
„ 1st January. 
„ 31st December. 
One-half arrived 20th 
Dec. the other early 
in Feb. Jan. is taken 
as the medium. 



If 10 per cent be added, as before, to the deaths, 
for the proportion likely to have been unreported, 
the total loss will be 118, and the ratio of deaths, 
calculated upon seven months, only 7 per cent, being 
not one-fifth of what took place among the rest of the 



155 



Infantry during the same period. It is necessary, 
however, to remark, as one of the causes of this low 
rate of mortality, that although the 14th and 39th 
arrived on the above dates, the former remained on 
shipboard in the harbour of Balaklava for three 
weeks, and the latter for nearly the same period, 
exempt, it may be presumed, from most of the 
deteriorating influences which affected the health of 
those on shore, and when they did land, they con- 
tinued at Balaklava for nearly a month, exposed only 
to the less severe duty and less important privations 
incident to the force there. Even the 18th Regiment 
remained either on shipboard or at Balaklava for a 
fortnight after its arrival, before joining the Head- 
quarters' camp, and the 7 1st Regiment did not leave 
Balaklava till about the expiry of the period over 
which these observations extend. 

These corps, too, not only had the advantage of 
arriving with the usual stock of necessaries in their 
knapsacks, but they received ample supplies of warm 
clothing on landing; indeed one of the corps had a 
double supply. With the exception of the 1 8th, they 
had the advantage also of being hutted immediately 
on their arrival, and of continuing so during the 
whole time included in these Returns ; the compara- 
tively small extent of their loss, therefore, may be 
considered as a measure of the limit to which the 
mortality of the whole force was likely to have been 
restricted had it been serving under circumstances 
equally favourable. 

As the four regiments noted below arrived about 
a month earlier than the preceding, and were thereby 
exposed to much of the cold, wet, and privation of 
December, besides an epidemic of cholera, which 
destroyed 114 in a few weeks after their arrival, the 
loss beyond that of the four corps above-mentioned 
may serve to show the baneful influence of that month 
on the troops ; and it has, therefore, been stated 
separately, as follows : — 



15G 





Average 
strength 
during live 
months. 


Reduced 
strength cor- 
responding to 
seven months 


Admissions 
into hospital. 


Deaths in the 
Crimea and 
Scutari. 


Date of 
arrival. 


17th Regiment .... 
34th Regiment .... 
89th Regiment .... 
90th Regiment .... 


785 
706 
606 
587 


561 
504 
433 
419 


846 
652 
993 
642 


82 
84 
170 
156 


17th Dec. 
9th Dec. 

4th Dec. 


Deduct for wounds and in- 1 
injuries J 


1,917 
.... 


3,133 
151 


492 
19 




Remain 

Add 10 per cent, for deaths ) 
unreported ) 






473 
47 




General Total 




1,917 


2,982 


520 





According to this table, the loss in these four corps 
if extended over seven months, must have been 
at the rate of 27 per cent., or nearly four times 
that of the corps previously referred to. 

We shall next separate from the general mor- 
tality that which took place in the Highland Brigade, 
because, as they were stationed at Balaklava during 
the whole period, it may serve, to show whether there 
was any material difference in the healthiness of the 
troops at that station compared with those upon the 
heights in front. 





Average 
strength of 
7 months 


Admissions 
into 
hospital. 


Deaths in 
Crimea and 
Scutari. 


42nd Regiment 

79th „ 

93rd „ 


704 
714 
727 


775 
932 
797 


123 
221 
140 


Deduct for wounds and injuries .... 




2,504 
60 


484 
11 


Add 10 per cent' for deaths unre- T 
ported J 






473 
47 


General Total 


2,145 


2,444 


520 



being in the ratio of 24 per cent, of the strength. 



These corps had considerable advantage over 
those in front, in being' much nearer their supplies, 
in having less trench duty, and in most of them being 
hutted at an early period. They were exposed, how- 
ever, to a considerable amount of fatigue, particularly 
in forming extensive lines at Balaklava, and carrying 
shot, shell, and biscuit to the front ; but their labour 
was not so excessive as that of the rest of the Infan- 
try, and their lower rate of mortality is, probably, 
attributable to this circumstance, rather than to 
any superior salubrity of the locality. The sickness 
and mortality in the 79th, which exceeded that in the 
other corps of the brigade, was, in a great measure, 
owing to the insalubrity of a part of the ground occu- 
pied by that regiment. That occupied by the 93rd 
was also in some respects unfavourable to health. 



By deducting the loss in these eleven regiments, 
we have the following results for the rest of the 
Infantry employed in the siege, viz. : — 



Corps. 


Average 
strength. 


Admissions 
into 
hospital. 


Total 
deaths. 


14th, 18th, 39th, 71st 

17th, 34th, 89th, 90th 

42nd, 79th, 93rd 


1,629 
1,917 
2,145 


2,367 
2,982 
2,444 


107 

520 
520 


Total in these 11 corps 

Total in whole force of Infantry .... 


5,691 
23,775 


7,793 
41,982 


1,147 
9,248 


Remains loss in front 


18,084 


34,189 


8,101 



This raises the deaths by sickness among the rest 
of the Infantry employed in front to about 45 per 
cent. 

Whenever the mortality runs so high, however, 
the changes in the strength are so frequent, that, to 
insure accuracy, it should be taken on a daily, or at 
least weekly, average ; but that information could 
seldom be obtained oftener than once a month, any 



158 



correction on this account would, however, be just 
as likely to raise the mortality as to reduce it : and 
the results here submitted may, therefore, probably 
be considered a fair medium. 

Great as was this loss of 45 per cent in seven 
months among the corps in front, it was much below 
what some of the corps suffered, especially the follow- 
ing, in which the mortality greatly exceeded the 
average : — 



Corps. 


Average 
strength 
of seven 
months. 


Deaths 
within that 
period in the 
Crimea and 

Scutari. 


Whereof 
from wounds 
and injuries 

deducted. 


Bemains 
mortality 
from disease 
alone. 


Add 10 per 
cent, for 

deaths not 
reported. 


Total 
mortality 
in each 
corps. 


46th Kegiment 


378 


405 


7 


398 


40 


438 


95th „ 


417 


p 354 


32 


322 


32 


354 


63rd „ 


448 


353 


15 


338 


34 


372 


33rd „ 


424 


324 


32 


292 


29 


321 


23rd „ 


579 


^359 


21 


338 


34 


372 


44th „ 


598 


316 


11 


305 


30 


335 


28 th „ 


522 


276 


10 


266 


27 


293 


50th „ 


520 


327 


19 


308 


31 


339 




3,886 


2,714 


147 


2,567 


257 


2,824 



According to this calculation, the loss in these 
eight corps averaged 73 per cent during these seven 
months. 

In the 46th Regiment it was so heavy that the 
results present the striking anomaly of the deaths 
being greater than the average strength of the 
corps ; but this is owing to that strength being 
much reduced by the numbers sent to Scutari, as 
above-mentioned. The corps arrived in November 
about 900 strong ; of these 79 died of cholera alone, 
in the course of that month. In December the 
strength was reduced to 512, in consequence of 72 
more deaths, and 252 having been sent to Scutari. 
In January it was further reduced to 404, by deaths 
and invaliding ; in February it fell as low as 285, 
from the same causes, and though increased in March 
and April, by drafts and men rejoining, it never rose 



159 



above 323, and the average of the whole seven 
months is only 37 8, as stated in the preceding sum- 
mary. 

As a striking contrast/we shall now submit the loss 
in the Cavalry during the same period. It is, perhaps, 
unnecessary to detail this by months or regiments ; 
but the total for the seven months has been as 
follows : — 





Average 
[strength. 


Admissions 
into hospital. 


Deaths in the 
Crimea and 
at Scutari. 


Total, as in Abstract annexed 
"Whereof deduct for wounds "1 
and injuries .... ... J 




1,915 


3,G59 
291 


280 
14 


Remain 




3,368 


266 


Add ten per cent, for deaths T 
not reported .... j 








26 


General total 




1,915 


3,368 


292 



According to this summary, the loss has been in 
the proportion of about 15 per cent of the force 
employed during these seven months, or less than two- 
fifths of what took place among the Infantry generally. 
So marked a difference may be traced to the circum- 
stance, that this arm of the service was entirely 
exempt from the labours of the siege ; that they had 
but little night duty ; and that, being in the vicinity 
of Balaklava,"they had greater facilities for getting 
supplies. Though employed for several weeks in car- 
rying up provisions, and bringing down sick, as detailed 
in the Commissioners' Report, their duties there- 
after were chiefly confined to their own camp, and 
the conveyance of their forage and other supplies. 

It will be observed, that while there is so remark- 
able a difference between these various corps and 
descriptions of troops, as regards the mortality, that 
difference does not extend to the admissions into 



160 



hospital, which, excepting in the Highland Brigade, 
are very much alike, as will appear from the following 
comparison : — 



Infantry generally 


"is 

Average 
strength. 


A Emission 

into 
hospital, 
excluding 
wounds and 
injuries. 


Ratio per 
cent, of 
admission. 


cent, of 
deaths. 


23,775 


41,982 


177 


39 


14th, 18th, 39th, and 71st "1 
Regiments .... J 


1,629 


| 2,367 


146 


7 


17th, 34th, 89th, & 90th do. 


1,917 


2,982 


155 


27 


42nd, 79th, and 93rd do 


2,145 


2,444 


114 


24 


Other corps in front .... 


18,084 


34,189 


190 


45 


Cavalry generally 


1,215 


3,368 


176 


15 



Thus, while the mortality has ranged from 7 to 
45 per cent, the admissions into hospital have only 
ranged from 114 to 190 per cent. 

It seems to have been principally in the diminished 
intensity of the diseases or the greater strength of 
constitution to resist their effects, that the distinction 
was manifested in favour of particular parts of the 
force ; the diseases made their appearance in all in a 
greater or less degree, but were less fatal wherever the 
strength of the patients had not been materially 
impaired previous to the attack, or a moderate 
degree of rest, comfort, and improved diet, could be 
obtained. 

We shall next submit a summary of the sickness 
and loss in the Artillery and Sappers and Miners^ 
among whom the same peculiarity in regard to the 
proportion of admissions to deaths will be observed. 



161 





Average 
strength. 


Admissions 
into hospital. 


Deaths in the 
Crimea and 
at Scutari. 


* 

Total, as in Abstract annexed 
Deduct for -wounds and injuries 


3,249 


4,817 
339 


568 
27 


Remain 

Add 10 per cent, for deaths ") 
not reported.... .... J 




4,478 


541 

54 




3,249 


4,478 


595 



So that, while the admissions are equal to about 
138 per cent, the deaths amount to only 18 per 
cent in these seven months, the latter being rather 
more than among the Cavalry, but less than one-half 
of what took place among the mass of the Infantry. 

This may apparently be traced to the advantages 
which these men enjoyed in many respects over the 
Infantry. The Assistant Adjutant- General of Artil- 
lery, who was examined on that head, stated that 
two troops and one battery being constantly at 
Ealaklava, were exempt in a great measure from 
trench duties ; that the men of the field batteries 
in front did not remain all night in the trenches, 
though they were occasionally on fatigue duty there, 
for a great part of it ; that the siege train com- 
panies remained in the trenches, but in a smaller 
proportion than the men of the line, and that the 
batteries having their waggons, were provided regu- 
larly with rations and other supplies, and were thus 
spared the fatigues they would otherwise have under- 
gone for that purpose. 

The Captains of the Batteries of the Light and 
4th Divisions also stated, that their men had little 
night work in the trenches during bad weather, and 
were from three to four nights in bed to one on duty. 
They also add the important fact, that each man of 

* The returns of the strength and deaths in this force are not 
quite complete, but the omissions would not make any important 
difference in the results. 

M 



162 



the Artillery had an oil-cloth to lie upon, and was 
thus protected from the damp ground. 

Major Chapman of the Royal Engineers stated, 
that his men, the Sappers and Miners, had two nights 
in bed for one on duty, and that in case the weather 
proved so bad as to prevent the performance of the 
duties for which they had been told off, they were 
sent back to their tents. The working parties were 
relieved at daylight, and afterwards rested till mid- 

day. ? . ^:^,jM 

It likewise appears that these men hadan officer at 
Balaklava. who purchased all kinds of groceries, flour, 
and other food for them, from the shipping, whenever 
they could be obtained, and had them conveyed to 
the front on fifteen mules belonging to the corps, 
which were maintained effective throughout the win- 
ter ; their higher rate of pay also afforded the men 
considerable advantages in making such purchases. 

A striking instance of the extent to which the loss 
might be reduced under favourable circumstances, is 
afforded by a detachment of the 68th Regiment, 
stationed at Lord Raglan's head-quarters during the 
winter, and exempted in a great measure from the 
various heavy duties, exposure, and privations which 
affected the other part of the regiment. These men 
lost only three out of 1 54, or about 2 per cent, while 
the rest of the corps employed in front lost 152 out 
of 503, or 30 per cent. 

Another favourable illustration is afforded by the 
ISTaval Brigade, the strength of which is stated, in two 
Returns furnished by Captain Lushington, R. N\, Com- 
manding, to have averaged 1,188 during the seven 
months, while the deaths from sickness were only 39, 
besides one man not expected to survive, which would 
make the mortality about 3J per cent. This appeared so 
very low, as compared with the other forces employed 
in front, that we considered it necessary to trace the 
loss as far as possible beyond the camp, because 
sailors when sick, are frequently passed to their ships. 
This we have been able to do by means of four 



163 



returns from the Medical Officer, from which, it appears 
that there died at the camp — 





Of Fevers. 


Of Lung 
Disease. 


Of Apoplexy. 


i Of Diarrhoea, j 


Of Cholera. 


in 

s 

Q 


Total. 


Between 12th and 30th 
















November .... 


2 








5 




7 


1st December to 31st 
















TV if „,.„1, 

Marc ii 






1 




5 


1 

1 


9* 


1st to 30 th April 


o 












2 


And, of C6 men sent 
















on board the "Dia- 
















mond,'' between 1st 
















December and 30th 
















April, there died 
















also 




2 




10 


1 




13 


Total 


5 


2 


I 


11 


11 


1 


31* 



122 sick were also sent on shipboard between the 
10th and 12th November, among whom we have not 
been able to trace the casualties ; but assuming 
these to have been in much the same proportion 
as on board the " Diamond," there is every reason 
to suppose that the total loss could not have mate- 
rially exceeded what has been stated by Captain 
Lushington. It must, however, be borne in mind, 
that part of this force was changed occasionally, which 
was not the case with the troops. Five ships- of-the 
line left the Crimea during the winter taking their 
men with them, who were replaced by drafts from the 
other ships, and this may have removed many who 
were beginning to suffer in constitution. Supposing 
even, however, that the mortality would otherwise 
have been even doubled, the difference in favour of 
that force is very remarkable. 

On referring to the evidence of Captain Lushing- 
ton, it will be found that these men had from three to 



* One died of wounds not included. 



164 



four nights in bed to one on duty ; that their cooking 
was well arranged, and that hot meals were always 
ready for them when they came from the trenches ; 
that they were well provided with boots, stockings, and 
clothing; that, in addition to their rations, they made 
good soup of ox-heads which they bought of the 
Commissariat butchers for that purpose. Every man 
had also in his tent a couple of dry blankets, in which 
he lay while his wet clothes were being dried in a 
hut, where a stove was arranged for that purpose. 
Great care was also taken to enforce personal clean- 
liness, and promote cheerfulness and merriment among 
the men ; and in the month of December, which was 
so trying to the troops, in respect of diet, the Naval 
Brigade had 11,041 lbs. of fresh meat, and 18,800 lbs. 
of vegetables for 1,356 men ; oranges were also sent 
on several occasions by the Admiral to the extent of 
about 35 per man. It must also be noted, that, 
although the Brigade remained all winter under can- 
vas, the ground on which they were encamped was 
particularly favourable. 

The only remaining force we have to notice is the 
Royal Marines, of which the strength averaged about 
1,000 men during the period referred to. 

Owing, however, to their sick having been usually 
sent on shipboard for treatment when the cases 
appeared serious or lingering, it is impossible to trace 
the total loss in that force ; but it appears, by a letter 
and Return from Dr.Walsh, that 57 deaths took place 
on shore — that 166 invalids were sent to Therapia, 
and 462 on shipboard, among whom there may have 
been a considerable loss, though not sufficient under 
any circumstances to have brought the mortality on a 
par with what occurred among the Infantry employed 
either at Balaklava or in front. 

Having thus referred separately to the different 
classes of troops employed, we shall next consider the 
loss among the officers. On this head, our information 



1G5 



unfortunately is not complete, as the Returns from 
the Artillery and one of the Infantry Divisions as 
well as one of the Brigades, are wanting. In the 
remainder of the force, it appears from the Eeturns 
furnished to us, that only 31 deaths took place in the 
Crimea, among' 709 officers, during the seven months 
referred to; but of these 13 were caused by wounds, 
leaving as the loss from disease only 18, or about 2|>- 
per cent, whereof there were : — 



From fevers . . . - 2 

Diseases of lungs . . . . 2 

Diseases of stomach and bowels . . 2 

Spasmodic cholera . . . . 1 

Frostbite . . . . . . 1 

All other diseases . . . . 2 

Total .. .. ..18 



Dr. Hall, however, who had an opportunity of 
obtaining more complete Returns, states the ]oss by 
disease among 1,133 officers to have been 42, or in 
the ratio of 3f per cent, but this includes the period 
between 17th September and 1st October, during 
which it is understood there was a much greater loss 
among the officers by disease than in the last week of 
March, which it does not include. 

Assuming, however, his estimate to be a fair 
average, the loss of officers in the Crimea would have 
been only between one-fifth and one-sixth of the pro- 
portion which occurred among the men, of whom, 
according to Dr. Hall's Return, 5,359 died there, 
between the 1st October and the 31st March, out of 
an average force of 28,623. 

But, to make the comparison complete, it is neces- 
sary to trace the number of officers who died at Scu- 
tari, or on the voyage after being invalided from the 
Crimea ; and here the necessary information is want- 
ing in the Returns received from that Hospital. For- 
tunately, however, we can, to a certain extent, supply 
that deficiency, from an Abstract of the Weekly states 
of sick and wounded, between 1st October and 31 



166 



January, in the " Report on the State of the Hospitals 
of the Army in the East/' in which the deaths of the 
officers at Scutari are stated to be as follows : — 



October . . . . . . . . 3 

November . . . . ... . . 4 

December . . . . . . . . 3 

J anuary . . . . . „ . . 3 

Total .. .. .. 13 



Assuming that the deaths in February and March 
continued at the same average as in January, though 
they are not likely to have been so great, the total up 
to the end of March would have been nineteen, which, 
with six reported to have died on the passage, would 
increase the ratio of mortality to about 6 per cent, 
or above one -sixth of the aggregate loss among 
the men in the Crimea and at Scutari;* this, too, 
includes the deaths among wounded officers, which 
there are no means of separating after they left the 
Crimea. 

Considering the excessive mortality indicated by 
the Medical Returns, particularly among the Infantry, 
it may, perhaps, be desirable to corroborate the results 
by the. Returns of the military authorities, who have 
better opportunities of ascertaining the actual loss, 
including casualties in action ; and, for this purpose, 
we refer to a letter and Return from the Assistant 
Adjutant- General to the army, in which it is thus 
p * 17 °* stated for the Infantry alone : — 



Died in the Crimea .. .. .. 5,914 

Died in Scutari . . . . 4,117 

Died on board ship, or elsewhere . . . . 715 



Total, including killed in action .. .. 10,746 



* It would be easy in the present advanced stage of such in- 
quiries to give this information in a more decided form, but ihe 
object I have in view is merely to submit the facts on which the 
Report of the Commissioners was originally founded 



167 



The loss in the Infantry, according to the medical 
abstracts, including those who died of wounds, but 
exclusive of killed in action, was — 

In the Crimea . . . . . . 4,963 

At Scutari .. .. .. 4,052 

Add 10 per cent for deaths unreported . . 841 

9,856 

Excess of deaths in Military Returns . . . . 890 

But, as the Medical Returns do not include the 
killed in action, it is necessary to deduct the following, 
in order to complete the comparison, viz. : — 

Killed at Inkerman . . . . .570 

Killed in trenches, sorties, and attacks, between 
October 1 and April 30, as ascertained from 
the Gazettes .. .. ..185 

755 

Understated in Medical Returns . . »% 135 

This shows that the 10 per cent allowed for deaths 
unreported in the Medical Returns is not more than 
must actually have occurred, and that there can be no 
material error ; the same test might be applied to the 
Cavalry and Artillery Returns ; but as the loss they 
sustained is not so remarkable, it is, perhaps, unne- 
cessary to carry the comparison further. 

It is beyond our province to enter into any pro- 
longed details as to the diseases by which this heavy 
loss has been occasioned, but the following summary 
will show generally their character : — 





o3 


Diseases of | 
Lungs. 


ises of 
ach and 
:1s. 


o 

1g 




& 




!, excluding! 
rids and 8 
•ies. ! 






o S > 

.a s o 


Spas: 
Choi. 


EG 


P 
Ph 


All o 
Diset 


I|| 


Infantry, strength 23,775 — 

Admissions into hospital 

Deaths in Crimea and Scutari ... 


8,959 
1,930 


2,997 
313 


18,838 
4,071 


1,879 
1,123 


1,834 
192 


1,844 
399 


5,631 
379 


41,982 
8,407 


Cavalry, strength 1,915 — 

Admissions into hospital 

Deaths in Crimea and Scutari ... 


579 
48 


237 
25 


1,567 
130 


45 
38 


141 


33 
8 


766 
17 


3,368 
266 


Artillery and Sappers, 

strengtn 3,249— 

Admissions into hospital 

Deaths in Crimea and Scutari ... 


855 
93 


204 

'27 


2,477 
286 


83 
67 


92 
3 


70 
21 


697 

44 


4,478 
541 


Officers, strength 709— 

Treated for disease 

Deaths in Crimea aud Scutari ... 


231 

2 


67 




598 


15 
9 


3 


8 
1 


220 
2 


1,142 
18 



168 



It may be necessary to explain with reference to 
the above classification, that the cases recorded under 
the head ot Scurvy afford but a very slight indication 
of the sufferings of the troops from that disease, 
as they include those only in which it show r ed 
itself in the form of scorbutic sores and erup- 
tions. Nearly all the Medical Officers stated that 
the greater proportion of the diseases of the bowels 
were complicated with scurvy, and the results 
of post mortem examination fully confirmed that 
opinion. The cases recorded as frost-bite, too, 
were those only in which that happened to be 
the prominent or sole affection ; numbers admitted 
for fevers and diseases of the bowels had also to be 
treated for frost-bites, though to prevent the com- 
plexity which must necessarily have arisen from enter- 
ing the same men twice in the Eeturns, the graver 
disease only has been noticed. 

It should also be kept in view that the deaths 
which took place at Scutari were not always from the 
same disease as originally came under treatment in 
the Crimea. Many who were sent away from the 
army suffering only under frost-bite or scurvy, reco- 
vered from these, in a great measure at Scutari, but 
died subsequently from fever contracted there; while, in 
other cases, men who had been sent from the Crimea 
labouring under fever, partially recovered, but after- 
wards sank under diarrhoea or dysentery. Whether 
these diseases, that proved so fatal at Scutari, 
originated in any peculiarity of the climate there, or 
were merely the result of previous sufferings and 
broken constitution, it is impossible for us to deter- 
mine ; we can only submit such information as has 
been obtained from the Eeturns, and deplore a loss 
w r hich is probably unparalleled in the annals of cur 
military history. 



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Return forwarded with the Adjutant-General's letter 
of 22nd June, 1855, showing the Deaths in the 
Infantry, from 1st October, 1854, to 1st Mav 
1855. 

Camp before Sebastopol, June 15, 1855 



Regiment. 


In the 
Crimea. 


At Scutari. 


On board ship, 
or elsewhere. 


Total. 




- Grenadier Guards 


190 


201 


20 


411 


o 


Coldstream Guards 


120 


269 


45 


434 


m 


Scots Fusilier Guards 


178 


162 


35 


375 


> \ 42nd Foot .... 


91 


57 


11 


159 


Q 


79th „ . . 


189 


72 


16 


277 


H 


93rd „ . 


106 


59 


13 


178 


w 


-63rd „ . 


173 


162 


24 


359 




'2nd Battalion 1st Foot 










. 

1 


30th Foot .... 


87 


80 


2 


169 




55th „ . 


84 


107 


18 


209 


I. 


62nd „ . 


106 


40 


7 


153 




41st „ . 


168 


70 


57 


295 


1 


47th „ . 


115 


90 


19 


224 




49th „ . 


125 


78 


19 


222 




L 95th „ . 


224 


139 


21 


384 


r 1st Battalion ! st Foot 


244 


108 


None 
reported 


352 




4th Foot .... 


94 


84 


17* 


195 




14th „ . 


11 


2 


3 


16 


o 

H 


39th „ . . 


27 


11 


8 


46 


CO 


50th „ . 


281 


92 


38 


411 


> < 


89th „ . 


133 


52 


19 


204 




9th „ . . . . 


122 


63 


4 


189 




18th „ . 


39 


17 


2 


58 


pj 


28th „ . 


185 


91 


15 


291 




38th „ . 


185 


115 


33 


333 


L44th „ . 


217 


111 


11 


339 


. 


f 17th Foot . . 


70 


15 


11 


96 


o 


20th „ . 


135 


116 


10 


261 




21st „ . 


130 


108 


13 


251 


!> 


57th „ . 


107 


61 


6 


174 




46th „ . . . . 


253 


194 


3 


450 




48th „ . 












1 68th „ . . 


84 


89 


5 


178 




L 1 st Battalion Rifle Brigade . 


141 


121 


40 


302 




• 7th Foot . . 


131 


117 


25 


273 




19th „ . 


145 


103 


22 


270 


o 


23rd „ . 


269 


164 


12 


445 


03 


33rd „ . 


183 


144 


9 


336 


> 


34th „ . 


70 


23 


12 


105 




77th „ . 


168 


89 


42 


299 


H 

a 


88th „ . 


174 


169 


2 


345 


2 


90th „ . 


105 


68 


4 


177 


3 


97th 


188 


59 


39 


286 



poops serving 1 i 
Treatment at 8 




ABSTRACT sh 
distinguish, 
each Weel 



009 
I09'I 



00S 
IS8'l 



-.1219 



88 
9ZS 

m 

9Z9 
888 
I8f'S 



9199 



98 

US j 
988 | 
68? 
60S ; 
S8? f 8 



1000 I 008*1 

08 009 

9 pn'B 'piodi 



> 



8T 

f29 

908 

088 
9U'S 



8S9*> 



91 

955 
692, 
Oil 
fSS 
SI8'S 



/Present under Arr 
Batmen, and othe: 
Sick /Pfsent .. 

§ I Absent .. 

£ On Command 

g Missing and Priso 
fl J 

tn 

^ '« „ Dm 
Camp Guards and 



Working Parties 



n GUAEI 

present under Arr 
Batmen, and othe: 
Sick / Resent . . 

I Absent . . 
On Command 
Missing aud Priso 



Dm 

Lamp Guards and 
Working Parties s 
Outlying Picquets 



Present under An 
Batmen, and othe.i 
Sick / Resent . , 

I Absent . 
On Command 
Missing and Priso" 
;ii 

^ I 
Du3n< 

Camp Guards and 
Working Parties 



ctober, 1854, to the 30th April, 1855, 
dons taken on the average of one day in 



0W ing ane ' 
ing th 



ing tn- 

c 'i V x 


March. 


April. 




1 


8 


15 


22 


1 


8 


15 


22 


as 

-wise i 


962 
954 
389 
796 
277 
32 


3,224 
1,046 

890 
2,619 

279 
21 


3,915 
375 
797 

2,574 
308 
19 


3,865 I 
392 
799 

2,460 
289 
20 


3,863 
381 
705 

2,271 
274 
25 


3,863 
386 
757 

2,155 
267 
15 


3,871 
395 
650 

2,101 
224 
12 


3,774 
402 
637 

2,171 
224 
8 


r, 


910 


8,079 


7,988 


7,825 


7,519 


7,443 


7,253 


7,216 


aers 

ice. The other Fatigues were detailed by Kegiments, but 


y P: 
Tat 


780 


780 


1,140 


1,280 


1,180 


1,200 


800' 


1,200 


nd 

)S 1, 

us 

:w 


303 
376 
275 
360 
329 
5 


275 
390 
205 
1,331 
386 
5 


486 
227 
166 
1,249 
375 
5 


639 
144 
171 
1,123 
349 
5 


581 
151 
211 

963 
366 
2 


766 
152 
225 
871 
247 
2 


752 
159 
229 
740 
242 
2 


771 
158 
209 
657 
242 
2 


2, 


648 


2,592 


2,508 


2,431 


2,274 


2,^63 


2,124 


2,039 


n 


160 


226 
To Bala 


260 
klava. 


247 


249 


332 


282 


179 


2 
1 


178 
786 
693 
735 
201 
16 


2,166 
792 
750 

1,636 
170 
15 


2,827 
319 
726 

1,602 
167 
16 


2,645 
306 
547 

1,571 
215 
16 


2,617 
308 
562 

1,439 
162 
16 


2,637 
317 
519 

1,364 
138 
15 


2,601 
313 
473 

1,297 
139 
14 


2,596 
299 
436 

1,250 
150 
15 


5,609 


5,529 


5,657 


5,300 


5,104 


4,990 


4,837 


4,746 



ig of 20 Men daily. All other Fatigues were detailed by the 



.. 11,500 | .. | .. j 1,500 | 1,100 | 700 | 500 
h, the Second Division furnished strong picquets day and 



173 



ABSTRACT op information obtained by Colonel 

TlJLLOCH RELATIVE TO THE EXTENT OF DUTY PER- 
FORMED by the Infantry Corps before Sebas- 
topol, from 1st October, 1S54, to 30th April, 
1855, and not included in commissioners 5 
Report. 



The information submitted on tins head will be 
sufficient to show, that though my colleague and I 
did not, as Commissioners, examine the Adjutant- 
General or his Department, I obtained from him all 
the facts and Returns likely to be useful with refer- 
ence to the subjects into which Sir John McNeill and 
myself were directed to inquire, and, indeed, more 
than either of us considered ourselves strictly war- 
ranted in calling for, by the tenor of our instructions. 
It is now brought forward in order to meet the state- 
ment of Sir Richard Airey, that no inquiries were 
made in that Department, where information, bearing, 
in an important degree, on the various questions at 
issue, might, in his opinion, have been obtained. 

The following is a copy of the letter addressed by 
me to the Adjutant-General, calling for this informa- 
tion, and of his reply : — 

Colonel Tulloch to Major- General D' JEstcourt. 

BalaJdava, June 1, 1855. 

As a check upon the Returns which we have found it necessary 
to call for from the Medical Officers, will you have the goodness to 
furnish Sir John McNeill, and myself, with a Return showing the 
deaths in each division (or regiment if you can give it) from 1st 
October to 1st May last, distinguishing, if possible, those which 
took place at Scutari, or on ship board, from those in the Crimea. 

I presume you will also be able to let me have a Statement 
showing the strength of each Division, say on the first day of every 
week during this period, showing the number sick and on duty in 
the trenches, or otherwise employed on that day. The latter is a 
matter which is rather out of the usual course of our inquiries ; but 
as the extent of duty of this kind is alleged as a reason for not 
making a road, as well as being the cause of much of the evil which 

O 




lit! 



■l-HH-HHH-IH-l-IH-l-l H-l-l-l- 

»;»« I AT,.. -,7M : ., ,■ > ,. . 




174 



has occurred, it would be as well that we should be prepared with 
some information to elucidate that statement, and in case you are 
of that opinion I hope you will be able to have such a Return ready 
by Monday next, when we hope to be again at head-quarters. 



Assistant Adjutant- General Pakenham to Colonel Tulloch. 

Head- Quarters before Sehastopol, 
Sir, 22nd June, J 855. 

Ik compliance with your request, I have the honour to inclose 
a Return, showing the deaths which occurred in each regiment of 
this army from 1st October, 1854. to 1st May, 1855, and Returns 
(6) showing the strength of each Division, during same period, with 
the numbers sick and on duty. 

It is to be observed, how r ever, that the figures given as men on 
duty include only those actually in the trenches, and that no precise 
account is given of the numbers of men employed in carrying stores, 
provisions, and ammunition from Balaklava, attending the sick, 
draining camps, procuring fuel, &c, which really occupied all 
hands every day. 

I have, &c, 

AV. L. PAKENHAM, Lieutenant- Colonel, 
Assistant Adjutant- General. 
For the Adjutant-General. 

It will be seen by the last paragraph of my letter, 
that this information on the subject of duty was 
entirely voluntary on the part of the Adjutant- 
General, to whom I had explained that it was not 
asked for by me in my capacity as Commissioner, but 
merely in case reference was required to it, in con- 
nection with any military question, on which I might 
be asked to give information after my return. 

Beyond these Returns of Duty it does not appear, 
even had he been examined, what information could 
have been obtained from the Adjutaut-General's 
Department bearing in the slightest degree on the 
questions affecting the distribution of the Stores, 
into which the Commissioners were directed to 
inquire. The period of their arrival — when taken into 
store — the quantities issued — and the dates when 
issued, were all established by Eeturns, signed either 
by the Quartermaster-General, or his Assistants or 



175 



Storekeeper ; and the reasons why the stores were not 
issued were given, so far apparently as they could be 
given, by the two officers under whose direction the 
distribution had been made. Not one of the reasons 
assigned by them involved, apparently, the slightest 
necessity for going to any other Department, either 
for confirmation or refutation. 

The Abstract herewith submitted refers only to See 
the Infantry, and the Highland Brigade has not been 
included because it was stationed at Balaklava, where, 
though the daily working parties were numerous, the 
duties were not so severe. 

It is stated, that in the 2nd, 3rd, and Light 
Divisions the above were exclusive of all regimental 
fatigues, and it will be observed that the Deputy 
Adjutant-General, in transmitting the Return adds; — 

" That the figures given as men on duty include only those 
actually in the trenches, and that no precise account is given of the 
number of men employed in carrying stores, provisions, and 
ammunition from Balaklava, attending the sick, draining camps, 
procuring fuel, &c, which really occupied all hands every day." 

There is reason to believe, also, from the evidence 
of some of the Medical Officers, that many of the men 
nominally returned as effective, were not capable of 
taking their tour of duty in consequence of suffering 
under the incipient stages of disease, or being conva- 
lescents who would be likely to relapse if sent to the 
trenches in bad weather, and this still further increased 
the pressure on the remainder. 

The ordinary duties of these men, involving 
watching and exposure had previously, when in gar- 
rison, seldom come round oftener than once in four 
or five nights, and then they were only exposed for 
two hours in six, and could repose on a guard-bed in 
the interval ; but duties in the trenches, particularly 
in bad weather, admitted of no such relaxation ; they 
were incessant. Contrasted with the ordinary duties of 
a British soldier, or with what is usual in other armies 
in the field, those here recorded may be designated 



176 



as excessive, particularly considering the reduced 
physical condition of the men. But this will be seen 
better by referring to a summary of the Returns for 
some of the months, say, January, which gives the 
following result : — 



Rank and File. 


Brigade of 
Guards. 


2nd 
Division. 


3rd 
Division. 


4th 
Division. 


! Light 
Division. 


Total. 


Effective and present ) 
under arms . . . . ) 

Detailed for duty of \ 
various kinds daily . . J 


948 
403 


2,469 
827 


2,668 
1,170 


2,332 
1,431 


2,770 
1,490 


11,367 
5,321 



The results for December and February were much 
the same as in January ; indeed, it \t as not till the 
termination of the winter, when the sick began to 
return to duty ; when considerable drafts and other 
reinforcements arrived, and when a new division of 
the ground between the British and French armies 
was made, that any material relaxation took place. 

One obvious cause of this extreme pressure may 
be traced to the circumstance, that at this time the 
number of sick in hospital and at Scutari, considerably 
exceeded the force fit for duty, as may be seen by the 
following summary for the month of January : — 





Brigade of 
Guards. 


2nd 
Division. 


3rd 
Division. 


4th 
Division. 


Light 
Division. 


Total. 


Sick- 


-Present 


403 


534 


1,023 


1,004 


1,194 


4,158 ] 


Sick- 


-Absent 


1,063 


1,708 


1,373 


1,802 


1,921 


7,867 




Total Siek . . 


1,466 


2,242 


2,396 


2,806 


3,115 


12 ; 025 



177 



So that the 11,367 effectives shown on the pre- 
ceding page, had to perform not only their own duty, 
but that of the 12,025 who were sick, and this, too, 
under the most adverse circumstances. So large a 
number of sick, also involved the necessity for many 
men being withdrawn from duty to attend upon them, 
and increased the pressure on the remainder. 

The routine of duty in particular regiments is 
thus described by various officers : — 

Lord AVest, commanding the 21st Regiment, states 
that :— 

" Those for the day covering party are roused out of their tents 
at 4 o'clock in the morning, have about^a mile and a-half to march 
down through snow and mud, and get back to their camp about 
7 o'clock in the evening, being thus exposed it open trenches for 15 
hours to such inclement weather as now prevails. Most of them 
will go on the following evening at 5 o'clock, and remain out all 
night till 6 o'clock the following morning ; this routine has been 
kept up incessantly for the last six weeks." 

Lieutenant Colonel Maxwell, commanding the 
46th Regiment, a corps which was nearly annihilated 
by sickness in the months of November and December, 
states that the number of hours his men were in the 
trenches in every 24, was 12 in the first of these 
months, and 10J in the second ; and it was stated by 
the Surgeon and verified by the Lieutenant-Colonel, 
that at one time the men were in the trenches for six 
successive nights, and had only one night in bed in 
the course of a week, but that afterwards the duty 
was better regulated. 

The duties in the Light Division are thus 
described by Deputy Inspector- General Alexander, 
in a letter dated 10th December, 1854 : — 

" In the 7th Fusiliers, men were in the trenches 24 hours, 
without relief, up to or about the 17th November : on the 14th two 
companies were kept on piquet for 36 hours, when, of course, no 
cooking took place. 

" In the 19 th Regiment, taking the total number of hours for 
November, viz. 720 — 304 have been passed by the men either on 
duty in the trenches or on piquet, which is 10 hours daily for each 
maD, the remaining 14 being passed in bringing water, seeking for 



1.78 



fuel, cooking, and other duties, &c. In the 23rd Fusileers, the 
average return gives to each man, one night in camp and one on 
duty; many men, however, had to go on duty with their companies 
two or three nights running, doing 24 hours duty to 12 in camp. 

" In the 33rd Regiment, the men, on an average, were some- 
thing less than one night in their tents, with water and fuel 
fatigues when off duty ; they are in consequence weak and wasted 
from the incessant and severe duty. 

" In the 77th Regiment, the men were either in the trenches 
or outlyiDg piquet every second night; on the intervening days, 
guards besides water and fuel fatigues, &c. 

" In the 88th Regiment, no man has ever more than one night 
in his tent, has 12 hours in the trenches, and 24 hours on piquet, 
and then has to look after wood for cooking, water, &c. &c." 

A Return and letter from Captain Forman, com- 
manding the right wing of the 2nd Battalion of the 
Rifle Brigade, also shows that in November that wing 
was on duty 17 times, namely: 9 in the trenches and 
8 in piquet, and that the average daily duty per- 
formed by each man was about 10|- hours, in addition 
to two hours spent in going to and from the trenches, 
besides the fatigue of procuring wood and water, and 
other regimental duties. 

In December the amount of duty in that corps is 
described as being rather less, viz., only about 9 
hours in the trenches or piquets exclusive of other 
duties. 

These few individual instances will be sufficient 
to show how the system worked, and there appears 
no reason to suppose that (except, perhaps, in the 
46th Regiment,) they differed from the ordinary 
routine of duty in other corps during this period. 

Though this information is not included in the 
Report, it was submitted, as the result of my indivi- 
dual inquiries, to Lord Panmure, in case he consi- 
dered it expedient either to communicate it to the 
Military Authorities, whose duty it more especially is 
to attend to such matters, or to make it public ; and 
in his hands I left it. 

Two deductions may at least be drawn from these 
Returns. 

1. That such severe duties, combined with scanty 



no 



nourishment and insufficient clothing, must, no doubt, 
have added greatly to the sickness and mortality. 

2. That they necessarily prevented any such ex- 
tensive undertaking as the formation of a road to 
Balaklava 

o. But, that they could have presented no posi- 
tive obstacle to the employment, say of one hundred 
men from each Regiment for a single day early 
in December, and the like number for another day 
in the end of that month or early in January, to 
carry up the Rugs, Great Coats, Blankets, Coatees, 
and Trousers, in the Quartermaster- Generals Store, 
provided no other means of transport could have 
been devised. 



This painful inquiry into the loss of an army is 
now completed, and during the last six months there 
has been leisure calmly and deliberately to weigh the 
evidence adduced on both sides. Public opinion will 
pronounce the verdict, whether it perished " by the 
visitation of God" or from mortal agency. 

Into the final opinion of the Board, that there 
does not appear to be any ground for further pro- 
ceedings, I do not intend to enter. My object in 
coming before it was, not to show that the rewards of 
a grateful Sovereign and a generous nation had been 
unfortunately bestowed, but to establish the accuracy 
of what my colleague and I had stated in our Report. 
By this feeling I have been guided throughout the 
whole course of these proceedings, and I have some- 
times even perilled my own vindication rather than 
appear in the character of a prosecutor. 

The main object of the Commissioners throughout 
the painful and invidious duty imposed upon them by 
the Government was, by a fair exposition of the 



180 



sufferings of the troops and the causes which led to 
them, to provide some security against the recurrence 
of similar disasters in future, ever bearing in mind 
the adage of Cicero — 



" Delicto dolere, correctione gaudere, nos oportet." 



APPENDIX. 



No. 1. 

Sir John McNeill to Lord Panmure. 

My Lord, February 9, 185G. 

The Commission which you sent to the Crimea to inquire into 
the supplies of the Army has finished its work by reporting its 
proceedings, and the time has come when I may venture, I hope ? 
without impropriety, to represent to your Lordship the zealous and 
efficient co-operation for which I am indebted to Colonel Tulloch. 
I find that he is anxious for active professional employment, and 
with that view is very desirous of the promotion which, I believe, he 
was permitted to hope for at the conclusion of the service on which 
he was engaged with me. 

For myself, I have no favor to ask ; but it would be very agree- 
able to me to see the services of Colonel Tulloch rewarded in the 
manner which would be most acceptable to him. 

I have the honour to be, 
(Signed) JOHN McNEILL. 



No. 2. 

Sir John McNeill to Colonel Tulloch. 

Granton House, Edinburgh, 
My dear Colonel, January, 5, 1857. 

You have sent me the proof-sheets of a pamphlet which you 
propose to publish, and have requested me to inform you of any 
statements of facts that I may find in them which appear to me 
not to be perfectly accurate ; but, after reading them over, I am 
unable to say that I have observed any such statements, relating to 
matters of fact, within my knowledge. 

t 1 ought, perhaps, to tell you that I have not attempted to verify 
your quotations, references or calculations, which, from your 
habitual accuracy, are no doubt quite correct. I may observe, 
however, that these proof-sheets seem still to require revision and 

p 



182 



are, of course, subject to any modifications or amendments that you 
may think it proper to make in revising them. 

You certainly have presented a curious picture of the means by 
which a Board of General Officers, selected by the Government, 
have attempted to discredit every statement, almost, that any one 
chose to complain of in the Report of Commissioners selected, by 
the same Government, to conduct an inquiry in the Crimea, and 
who are admitted to have faithfully carried out their instructions. 
That attempt has, I believe, utterly failed ; but it has not been 
without its use. The disasters in the Crimea exposed the defects 
of some parts of our military system in the field, and the proceed- 
ings at Chelsea have laid bare some of its deformities at home. 
Let us hope that the result will be the improvement of both. 

But, long before the Board of General Officers met at Chelsea, 
I had determined not to interfere, spontaneously, with their pro- 
ceedings, and had urged you to adopt the same course. Having 
acted in a judicial, or quasi judicial, capacity, it appeared to me 
that we ought not to descend into such an arena of personal con- 
tention to defend the results, whatever they might be, of a most 
careful and conscientious investigation, and founded upon the 
evidence which accompanied our report, The Government had 
indignantly repudiated the imputation that they were putting us 
upon our trial. I could not, therefore, appear as a defender ; and 
I certainly had no intention to appear as a prosecutor. I was of 
opinion that to take part in the proceedings at Chelsea, either as 
defender or as prosecutor, must tend to drag down to the level of 
personal differences questions which I had never regarded, or 
desired to see regarded, in any other light than that of their bear- 
ings upon the welfare of the army and the interests of the country. 
We had carried out the instructions of the Government to their 
entire satisfaction, and I considered it their especial duty to protect 
the public interests involved in the maintenance of the truths 
that had been established. I, therefore, left to them the whole 
responsibility of the course, in regard to us and to our Report, 
which they had thought proper to adopt and of which I could not 
pretend to understand the scope or objects. In short, I declined 
to interfere with the execution of the trust which had devolved 
upon Her Majesty's Ministers. 



183 



These views were coniiiiunicated to you, and through you to 
the Secretary of State for War, early in March ; but under the pres- 
sure of what you regarded as a military obligation, affecting you 
even in the civil capacity of Commissioner, it appeared to you 
after the Board met in April, that you could not, without incurring 
great hazard, avoid taking an active part in its proceedings. Having 
there maintained, single-handed and with acknowledged ability 
and integrity, a gallant contest against fearful odds, till your health 
gave way from excessive exertion, it is natural that you should 
now desire to review, deliberately, the results of those proceedings 
in which you were engaged and to complete what you had begun. 

The same considerations winch influenced me on the occasion 
to which I have referred, have led me to decline taking part in 
the pamphlet which you now propose to publisb/as the sequel and 
complement of a course in which I could not concur. I still look 
to the Government for the assertion and maintenance of every truth 
in our Report which can be made available for the advancement 
the public interests, and to anything else, so far as I am personally 
concerned, I have always been indifferent. But the Chelsea Report 
was not laid before Parliament till the last days of the Session* and 
I, therefore, consider it premature to depart from the course which 
I have hitherto pursued. 

Although we have taken different lines in respect to these later 
transactions, arising from the different circumstances in which we 
were placed , I have much pleasure in stating that, throughout the 
whole of the difficult and often painful service which I was requested 
to undertake, and which we conducted together, I received from 
you, on all occasions, zealous, able, and manly co-operation. I 
considered it my first duty, after our Report had been presented, 
to bring your services to the notice of the Secretary of State for 
War in an official letter of the 9th February, 1856, and of which I 
soon afterwards sent you a copy. 

I have only to add that, you are perfectly at liberty to make use 
of this letter in any. manner that you may think proper, and that 
I remain, 

My dear Colonel, 

Very sincerely Yours, 

john McNeill. 



p 2 



184 



No. 3. 

Colonel Tulloch to Sir De Lacy Evans. 

Pension Office, 2, Whitehall Yard, 
My dear General, August 15, 1855. 

Among the probable causes of sickness in the Crimea which 
came under the consideration of Sir John McNeill and myself, 
was the separation of the men for six or seven weeks from their 
knapsacks after landing. We thought it our duty, therefore, to put 
some questions to the Quartermaster-General's Department in the 
Crimea on this subject; and received the answer which I annex, and 
as that would appear to exonerate the Department, at the expence 
of the Lieutenant-Generals' commanding Divisions, perhaps you 
will be so good as to let me know whether you can afford me any 
information on the subject, seeing that you are a party interested in 
this solution of the question. 

Yours very sincerely, 
(Signed) A. M. TULLOCH. 



Statement by Colonel Gordon referred to. 
" That on the 1st October Sir E. Lyons was requested to send a 
ship to collect the knapsacks of the Army from the different trans- 
ports, he appointed the ' Orinoco,' steamer for this duty, but in con- 
sequence of the Generals of Division, with the exception of the 
Duke of Cambridge, preferring not to receive the knapsacks at that 
time, there was some delay in sending her for them, and in the 
meanwhile many of the vessels went away on other duties." 



No. 4. 

Sir De Lacy Evans to Colonel Tullocli. 
My dear Colonel, Bryanston Square, August 17, 1855. 

The statement of Colonel Gordon, that the " Generals of Division 
(with the exception of the Duke of Cambridge) preferred not to 
receive the knapsacks at that time," is, so far as I am concerned 



185 



entirely imaginary, and as I am convinced, without the slightest 
foundation whatever. 

Very faithfully yours, 
(Signed) DE LACY EVANS. 



No. 5. 

Colonel Tulloch to Sir Richard England. 

Pensioji Office, 2, Whitehall Yard, 
My dear General, October 2, 1855. 

Among the probable causes of sickness in the Crimea which 
came under the consideration of Sir John McNeill and myself, was 
the separation of the men, for seven or eight weeks, from their 
knapsacks, after landing. We thought it our duty, therefore, to 
put some questions to the Quarter-master- General's Department, 
in the Crimea, on this subject, and received the answer which I 
annex ; and as that would appear to exonerate the Department at 
the expence of the Lieutenant Generals commanding Divisions, 
perhaps you will be so good as to let me know whether you 
recollect anything on the subject, as some of the Lieutenant 
Generals do not, and it would not answer to print any statement 
on which there might hereafter be a question. 

Yours very sincerely, 
(Signed) A. M. TULLOCH. 

See Statement of Colonel Gordon annexed as on previous page. 



No. 6. 

Sir Richard England to Colonel Tulloch. 
My dear Colonel, Bath, October 8, 1855. 

Absexc e from home has prevented my replying to yours of the 
2nd till now, and with reference to the question you ask, I regret 
to say that I cannot give a very satisfactory reply. 

I cannot bring to my recollection that any proposal was made 
to me about the 1st of October of the last year, regarding the 
re-delivery of the soldiers' knapsacks ; but I could have better 
answered that question if you had put it to me when in the Crimea. 

Should you be desirous of positive information thereon, I have 
no doubt I .could get it by reference, and so could you, by applying 



186 



to the General Officer who succeeded me in the command of the 
3rd Division, who could refer thereon to documents, or to the Staff, 
or to Commanding Officers of Corps 

I cannot, of my own recollection, state decidedly whether this 
proposition or offer was made to me or not. I should think not, 
because there would have been great difficulty in getting the knap- 
sacks up at the moment in question, and my Division had not 
finally taken up its ground till the 2nd or 3rd before Sebastopol. 

Whoever has answered your interrogatory by saying that the 
proposal was made to us, must have assured himself of the facts 
which, nevertheless, I confess my want of memory upon. 

Believe me truly yours, 

(Signed) R. ENGLAND. 

No. 7. 

Memorandum for Lord Panmure. 

War Office, July 5, 1855. 

About ten days before we left Sebastopol certain queries were 
sent to be answered by Maj or- General Airey in writing, and which 
had been specially framed in order to ascertain from his own 
statements whether the non-issue of various stores, sent out for the 
use of the men, was attributable to the Quartermaster-General's 
Department or not. 

The Major-General objected to answering these queries at once, 
because they were necessarily of an accusatory character, but pro- 
mised that the replies should be forwarded in a few days. They 
have not yet been received, and from the long delay in forwarding 
them, I am afraid either that they have been mis-sent, or that there 
is no intention of forwarding them. 

Without this information it is impossible for Sir John McNeill 
and myself to close our Eeport, and I trust, therefore, that a tele- 
graphic communication may be authorized to Major-General Airey, 
requesting that he would forward, by the first mail, the answers to 
the queries sent by me to him, as also the evidence of Colonel 
Gordon, left with that officer for correction, but never returned; or 
in the event of these having been already forwarded, to state on 
what date and how they were sent. 

I have, &c. 
(Signed) A. M. TULLCCH. 



187 



Rclpy by Electric Telegraph communicated to Colonel Tulloch 
July, as follows. 

Major-General Airey's answers have been sent by the mail on 
] Oth July, and Colonel Gordon is on his way home with his evi- 
dence. Started 3d July. 



No. 8. 

Memorandum sent by Mr. Sisson, Chief Clerk in the Pension 
Department, to Colonel Tulloch during his absence in the Highlands 
on SOth August, 1855. 

Colonel Goedox called to say that he has only received a part 
of the Appendix of his evidence (that I sent from you this morning) r 
that he is about to return to Scotland in a few days, before he goes 
out again to the Crimea, and that he should like to have the 
remainder of his evidence ivhen it comes from the printer, instead of 
waiting for it to be sent to and returned by you. Also, that he shal 
see Sir John McNeill when he goes back to Scotland. 

I told him I would write you what he stated on the subject. 

(Signed) C. SISSON. 



No. 9. 

Extract from Mr. Peel's letter to Colonel Tulloch, dated 17 th April, 

1856. 

I aim directed by his Lordship to intimate to you that if legal 
or other assistance would be acceptable to you, in the performance 
of the duty, which, in the absence of Sir John McNeill, devolves 
entirely upon yourself, of sustaining the Report of the Crimean 
Commissioners before the Court of Inquiry, his lordship can have 
no objection to your availing yourself of it ; and is prepared, on the 
part of Her Majesty's Government, to defray the expence of such 
ssistance. The selection his Lordship would prefer to leave to 
you, but it must be understood that the duties of this assistant will 
be confined to assisting you. He is not to be permitted to address 
the court or to examine witnesses. 



188 



No. 10. 

Extract from Colonel TullocVs reply to Mr. F. Peel, dated 19th 

April. 

Sir, 

I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 17th April, and 
to express my thanks for the permission to employ legal assistance 
at the expence of Government to advise me in the proceedings 
before the Board at Chelsea. 

I would gladly have availed myself of this permission at aa 
earlier stage of the proceedings, but the inquiry into the points 
raised by Lord Lucan is now, I apprehend, too far advanced for 
legal assistance to be of much advantage, as my course is already 
taken, and whatever might be the advice it is now too late to alter 
it ; but when I find to what extent it may be necessary to defend 
myself against the attacks of the other officers implicated, I will 
gladly avail myself of legal advice, if there is any probability of its 
being useful. So far as I see at present, most of their statements 
may be met by referring these officers to the signed evidence in 
the Report, leaving it for the Board and them to determine whether 
that evidence is correct. 



No. 11. 

Mr. F. Peel to Dr. Balfour. 

Sir, War Department, May 19, 1856. 

In a communication from Sir John McNeill, dated 12th May, 
that gentleman states to Lord Panmure that he has reason to believe 
that Printer's " Proofs" of Colonel Gordon's evidence, corrected in 
his own hand, will be found among the documents of the Commission 
in Colonel Tulloch's Office, and that the proofs of Colonel Wetherall's- 
evidence, bearing marks in Colonel Gordon's own hand of its having 
been revised by him, and of his having noticed an omission con- 
nected with that evidence, which appears to have been supplied 
on his demand, is also to be found there ; Lord Panmure deems it 
important to ascertain whether Sir John McNeill is correctly 
informed, and, if so, that these documents should be submitted to the 
Chelsea Commission ; but. as His Lordship is reluctant in the present 



139 



state of Colonel Tullocli's health, to trouble that officer on the sub- 
ject, I am directed to request that you will be good enough to 
inquire into the case, and, if the papers can be found, Lord Panmure 
will cause them to be laid before the Commission. 

I have, &c. 
(Signed) F. PEEL. 



No. 12. 

Dr. Balfour to Mr. F. Peel. 

Sir, Royal Military Asylum, May 20, 1856. 

In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of 
048 

the 19th instant, ^y- I have the honour to forward the first proofs 
of Colonel Gordon's and Colonel Wetherall's evidence, with the 
manuscript corrections of Colonel Gordon, and beg to state, for 
Lord Panmure" s information, that previously to Colonel Tulloch 
being compelled by illness to withdraw from the Court he had 
mentioned to me the existence of these proofs, corrected by Colonel 
Gordon. Upon his becoming completely disabled, I felt it to be my 
duty to communicate the circumstance to the Judge -Advocate 
General, and to submit the proofs in question for his inspection ; 
and upon these proofs, he put certain questions to Colonel Gordon 
It would, perhaps, be better, however, that they should be laid 
officially before the Board. 

I beg further to state, that, with the concurrence of Sir James 
Clark and Mr. Martin, I took down from Colonel Tulloch's dicta- 
tion, at different periods, the facts connected with the alleged 
omission of a portion of Colonel "WetheraU's evidence ; that from 
these I prepared an explanatory statement, which, after having 
been read and approved by Colonel Tulloch, I submitted on the 
I6th instant to the Soard, through the Judge-Advocate-General, 
and was informed yesterday that it would be received by them, and 
although not read in Court would appear in the proceedings of the 
Board. 

I have, &c. 
(Signed) T. GRAHAM BALFOUR. 



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